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The wrongful life action is a legal remedy used by a person who is born into a disabled state 
as a result of the negligence of a medical practitioner, and who would not have been born at 
all but for the negligence of that medical practitioner, to claim damages. The action, 
however, is generally argued to be premised upon an un-actionable injury because the 
wrongful life plaintiff is argued to have suffered no harm. The implicit moral argument 
therein, moreover, is that allowing a wrongful life claim would be analogous to holding a 
rescuer liable for injuries that he caused to an endangered person. In this thesis, I propose 
that this argument rests upon the application of a deeply problematic conception of harm 
which, upon closer inspection, does not accord with our intuitions regarding harmfulness. I 
will attempt to show that what is harmful about harm is not that it objectively renders a 
person worse off, but rather that it causes a subjective clash with, or usurping of, that 
person’s will. I also argue that harm can be retroactive in nature, in that there can be a time 
gap between the harmful act or event and the harmful felt effects of that act or event. In this 
way, the harm paradox within the wrongful life action is resolved and, as a consequence, the 
‘unactionable injury’ argument against the wrongful life action fails. In this thesis, I also 
consider certain policy arguments against the wrongful life action, and I argue that they also 
fail. In the first place, I consider the argument that the action unfairly discriminates against 
disabled persons by perpetuating their social inequality. I try to show, however, that the 
compensation element of the wrongful life action can be viewed as a form of positive 
accommodation which affirms the worth and dignity of disabled persons by recognising their 
difference and particularity. In the second place, I consider the argument that permitting the 
action would lead to a slippery slope whereby children, who feel harmed by coming into 
existence, would use the action to claim against their parents, and that this would conflict 
with the parents’ moral right to procreative autonomy. I try to show, however, that procreative 
autonomy should be limited in any event because it is impermissible to impose harm onto 
unconsenting individuals purely for the sake of bestowing benefits. This implies that, from a 
moral standpoint, we ought to take the claims of children who feel harmed by coming into 




Die aksie weens onregmatige lewe (“wrongful life”) is ’n regsmiddel vir gebruik deur ’n 
gestremd-gebore persoon wat glad nie gebore sou gewees het as dit nie vir die nalatigheid 
van ’n mediese praktisyn was nie, om skadevergoeding teen sodanige mediese praktisyn te 
eis. Daar word egter algemeen aangevoer dat die aksie op die premis van ’n onafdwingbare 
besering berus, deurdat daar betoog word dat die eiser in die onregmatigelewe-aksie geen 
skade gely het nie. Die implisiete morele betoog hierin is verder dat die toestaan van ’n eis 
weens onregmatige lewe soortgelyk sou wees daaraan om ’n redder aanspreeklik te hou vir 
die beserings wat hy of sy aan ’n bedreigde persoon sou aangerig het. In hierdie proefskrif 
doen ek aan die hand dat hierdie betoog berus op die toepassing van ’n diepliggende 
problematiese opvatting van skade wat, by nadere ondersoek, nie met ons onmiddellike 
intuïsies oor skadelikheid ooreenstem nie. Ek toon aan dat wat skadelik aan skade is, nie 
objektief-gewys is dat dit ’n persoon slegter daaraan toe maak nie, maar eerder 
subjektief-gewys ’n botsing met, of wederregtelike toe-eiening van, daardie persoon se wil 
veroorsaak. Ek voer verder aan dat skade terugwerkend van aard kan wees, deurdat daar ’n 
tydsgaping tussen die skadelike daad of gebeurtenis en die skadelike gevolge gevoel weens 
daardie daad of gebeurtenis kan wees. Só word die skade-paradoks in die aksie weens 
onregmatige lewe opgelos, en gevolglik misluk die “onafdwingbarebesering”-betoog teen die 
onregmatigelewe-aksie. In hierdie proefskrif oorweeg ek verder bepaalde beleidsbetoë teen 
die onregmatigelewe-aksie, en ek voer aan dat ook hulle misluk. Eerstens oorweeg ek die 
betoog dat die aksie ongeregmatig teen gestremde persone diskrimineer deur hul sosiale 
ongelykheid te laat voortduur. Ek wil egter aantoon dat die vergoedingselement van die 
aksie weens onregmatige lewe gesien kan word as ’n vorm van positiewe bystand, wat die 
waarde en waardigheid van gestremde persone bevestig deur hul verskille en 
besondersheid te erken. Tweedens oorweeg ek die betoog dat die toelating van die aksie ’n 
gevaarlike weg kan oopstel deurdat kinders, wat benadeel voel deur hul ontstaan, die aksie 
sou kon gebruik om teen hul ouers te eis, wat in stryd met die ouers se morele reg op 
voortplantingsoutonomie is. Ek probeer egter aantoon dat voortplantingsoutonomie in elk 
geval beperk behoort te word omdat dit ontoelaatbaar is om skade aan nie-toestemmende 
individue toe te meet bloot ter wille van voordeleverlening. Dit impliseer dat ons, vanuit ’n 
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The wrongful life action is a legal remedy which is used by a person who is born into 
a disabled state or condition due to the negligence of a medical practitioner, and who 
would not have been born at all but for the negligence of that medical practitioner, to 
claim damages. More specifically, the plaintiff in a wrongful life action claims that he 
or she would have been aborted had the medical practitioner informed his or her 
parent(s) of the potential disability, and that, therefore, the medical practitioner is 
liable for the fact that the plaintiff has been born and now spends his or her life in a 
disabled state or condition, which could have been avoided.  
 
The wrongful life action, however, is largely argued to be premised upon an un-
actionable injury. The argument runs as follows. An actionable injury only arises if a 
person has been harmed. A person has only been harmed if he or she has been 
rendered worse off by the conduct of another. A wrongful life plaintiff, however, has 
not been rendered worse off by being born disabled as the result of the conduct of 
the negligent medical practitioner. This is because, had the medical practitioner 
acted otherwise, the wrongful life plaintiff would have been aborted and would 
therefore not have existed, and because a disabled existence is not worse than non-
existence,1 the wrongful life plaintiff has not been harmed by the conduct of the 
medical practitioner but, rather, he or she has been benefited.  
 
Consider the following hypothetical case study. A couple discover that they are 
pregnant. They decide to undergo amniocentesis to screen for any disabilities in their 
baby on the presupposition that they will abort should any disability be present. The 
couple get the procedure done. Three days later, their medical practitioner informs 
them that he has received their amniocentesis results and that, based on his 
observations, there is no risk of any disability present in their baby. The pregnant 
couple are overjoyed and they continue with their pregnancy. A few months later 
their baby is born and he is named Jim. Jim is a relatively easy baby for the first two 
months. During the third month, however, Jim begins to cry incessantly at night and 
appears to be going slightly blue in the face during these crying fits. The couple end 
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up rushing him to hospital one night. At the hospital, Jim is put through a variety of 
tests. After hours of waiting, the couple is informed by the attending physician that 
Jim suffers from a severe form of cystic fibrosis and that he has an under-developed 
left lung. This is why Jim cries at night when he is lying down and why he goes 
slightly blue, as he is unable to breathe properly and comfortably. The parents ask 
the attending physician what has caused this and what cure there is for such a 
disease. They are informed, however, that it is genetic and that there is no cure. 
They are further informed that Jim’s life to follow will be accompanied by serious 
breathing difficulties and pain. The parents are devastated with this prognosis 
because they had specifically tested for cystic fibrosis in the amniocentesis. It turns 
out, however, that the medical practitioner who conducted their amniocentesis had 
negligently misinterpreted the results. They consider whether to sue him, but decide 
that if they proceed with this route they would have to acknowledge that Jim’s life is 
not worth living, and he may then believe that they do not love him. They ultimately 
decide that the best course of action is to love Jim as he is, with his medical flaws, 
and to make his life as comfortable as they can, so that he experiences the least 
suffering possible.  
 
Fast forward some sixteen years later. Jim’s cystic fibrosis has progressed to the 
point that he has become physically weak and virtually immobile. His disability has 
also led to other complications which cause him pain. Jim feels that his disability has 
really hindered him in his life and has prevented him from partaking in many 
activities. In a few years time, he will have to spend the rest of his life wheelchair-
bound with a specialised medical ventilator. Jim is really down about this. Jim also 
knows that the specialised medical ventilator is extremely expensive. As a result, Jim 
decides to institute a wrongful life claim against the medical practitioner who 
conducted the amniocentesis for his parents. Jim believes that the medical 
practitioner is to blame for the fact that his life is accompanied by physical, emotional 
and now, as the last straw, economic suffering.  
 
Jim consults with an attorney. The attorney, however, advises him that courts are 
reluctant to grant wrongful life claims because they are thought to be unactionable 
injuries. More specifically, he is advised that the legal argument which will be levied 




amniocentesis, did not cause Jim any harm. This is because had the medical 
practitioner acted otherwise (i.e. not negligently), Jim would have been aborted and 
would therefore not have existed, and because a disabled existence is better than no 
existence, Jim has not suffered any harm and therefore lacks a basis for a legal 
claim. 
 
The moral argument inherent within this legal argument, moreover, is that allowing a 
claim for recovery in this context would be analogous to holding a rescuer liable for 
injuries that he caused to an endangered person whilst rescuing him or her. 
Suppose, for instance, that a rescuer sees an endangered person drowning in a 
pool. The rescuer swims out to save the endangered person but upon pulling him or 
her out of the water the rescuer inadvertently breaks the endangered person’s arm 
(Feinberg 1992: 27). Can we say that the endangered person has been harmed by 
the rescuer and should he or she have a claim against the rescuer for the broken 
arm? It seems not, as the burden of the broken arm seems to be offset by the 
overriding benefit of being saved. So too, it is argued, the burden of a disabled 
existence suffered by a wrongful life plaintiff, or by Jim in the above scenario, is 
offset by the benefit in coming to exist, and that there is therefore no harm in the 
relevant full sense which is suffered. In summary then, the argument is that the 
wrongful life action cannot be justified on ethical grounds because it provides a 
mechanism for compensating a person who has not been harmed.  
 
In this thesis, I subject the abovementioned argument to closer scrutiny. In doing so, 
I will need to address two prominent questions implicit therein. Firstly, is a wrongful 
life plaintiff, like Jim, harmed by the conduct of a medical practitioner who negligently 
facilitates his or her coming into existence into a disabled state? Secondly, is 
disability necessarily a harmful state or condition to be in? It will become clear that 
this second research question is implicit within the first question.  
 
I will argue that the first question can be answered in the affirmative. More 
specifically, I will propose that the charge that the wrongful life plaintiff has not 
suffered harm rests upon the application of a deeply problematic conception of harm 
which, upon closer inspection and analysis, does not actually accord with our 




about objectively rendering a person worse off. Harm is rather about subjective 
clashes of the will and forced experiential states. This has the effect that we can only 
harm others if they subjectively feel harmed and, as I will argue, this makes more 
sense when we consider certain instances of ‘non-harm’, such as elected death, 
painful contact sport and certain forms of sadism and masochism (“S&M”). 
 
Based on this, I will argue that if we follow a subjective will-based approach to harm, 
which I submit accords with our intuitions regarding harmfulness, we can conclude 
that the wrongful life plaintiff was harmed. I will also argue that harm can be 
retroactive in nature, in that there can be a time gap between the harmful act or 
event and the harmful felt effects of that act or event. By conceptualising harm in this 
way, we can conclude that the wrongful life plaintiff, if he or she subjectively takes 
his or her disability to be harmful, has suffered harm by being forced into a disabled 
existence which clashes with his or her will, irrespective of the fact that at the time 
that the medical practitioner acts the wrongful life plaintiff is not a person with a fully 
fledged will, but rather a foetus in utero. This does, however, imply that only disabled 
persons who can later communicate their wills will be able to show that they are 
harmed. In other words, only disabled persons who have the ability to express a 
rejection of their disabled existence will be able to show that they have been harmed 
and thereby claim using the wrongful life action. I will, however, try to show that this 
is a necessary limitation in that it protects the integrity of the wrongful life action, and 
saves it from the charge that it presupposes that all disabled persons have miserable 
lives.  
 
On the assumption that harm has to do with a subjective frustration of the will, I will 
then proceed to answer the second question, that is, whether disability is necessarily 
a harmful state or condition. This question arises because it is implicit within my first 
research question. More particularly, the causal question of whether a wrongful life 
plaintiff can be harmed by a medical practitioner who causes him or her to be born 
disabled instead of not being born at all, presupposes that being in a disabled state 
is harmful. Naturally, a moral patient cannot be harmed by the conduct of a moral 
agent whose conduct has the effect that the moral patient moves into a particular 
state, if that state is not also harmful within itself. My answer to this implicit question, 




based account of harm. That is, if harm is about subjective clashes of the will then 
we can probably never definitively say that disability as such is a harmful condition, 
as it would only be harmful in particular cases (where it does in fact clash with a 
particular person’s will) and therefore never necessarily harmful in all cases. I also 
acknowledge, in further amplification of this, that there is great variation in disability 
and also that disability is viewed very differently depending upon whether one adopts 
a medical understanding or a social understanding of disability. There is also the 
issue that disabled people tend to view disability very differently to the way that most 
able-bodied people do. In light of this, my answer to the question on whether 
disability is a harmful condition is meant to be explorative rather than authoritative, 
so that I do not make a faulty generalisation. In other words, what I will provide is an 
overview of the ways in which disability might be conceptualised as harmful, which is 
not to say that it is necessarily harmful. I will provide this overview by analysing 
disability with regard to three common experiences often thought to be associated 
with disability, namely; suffering, a lack of or decreased access to qualia (or ways in 
which the world is experienced by virtue of the possession of certain senses) and a 
lack of autonomy or personal agency.2  
 
Based on the aforegoing, I will attempt to show that a wrongful life plaintiff can be 
said to be harmed by being born into a disabled state if he or she takes his or her 
disability to be a harmful condition. The implication is that wrongful life actions 
become ethically justifiable, in that they provide a necessary mechanism for 
compensating persons who have been harmed.  
 
In this thesis, I also consider two of the most prevalent policy arguments against the 
wrongful life action. Although these arguments can be viewed as further ethical 
objections to the wrongful life action (like the ‘no harm’ objection), I have framed 
them specifically as policy arguments, separate to the main argument in this thesis. 
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 Such experiences are largely encompassed within the more general ‘poor quality of life’ claim 
against disability. In other words, it is often assumed that disabled persons have a poorer quality of 
life than able-bodied persons. Within this ‘poor quality of life’ claim, however, are a host of implicit 
claims for why, precisely, disabled life is poorer in quality than able-bodied life. The most prevalent of 
these implicit claims are that a disabled life comes with an experience of suffering, that a disabled life 
comes with an experience of decreased autonomy and personal agency, and that a disabled life 
involves a lack of or decreased access to the common ways in which able-bodied persons experience 
the world by virtue of the possession of certain senses such as sight, touch and so on, which has 




The reason is twofold. Firstly, the ‘no harm’ objection to the wrongful life action is the 
most analytically and logically perplexing argument against the action. In the legal 
literature, it is often noted to be the paramount objection to the action. This is 
because it is very near impossible to conceptualise a wrongful life plaintiff’s harm 
from within the traditional ‘harm-causing-conduct’ paradigm of civil liability without 
running into logical problems. Because of this, arguments that are developed from 
the perspective of a policy response to the wrongful life action will never gain 
traction, unless the ‘main’ problem within the wrongful life action is addressed. My 
second reason for framing the debate in this way is that it accords with the logical 
flow of a civil liability analysis of any delictual or tort-law system. In other words, the 
analysis always begins with the question of harm, and then moves towards 
questions of causation and negligence, and thereafter to questions of policy (which 
would involve questions surrounding fairness, practical effects of and possible 
slippery slopes in relation to assigning liability). 
 
In the first place, I consider the policy argument that the action unfairly discriminates 
against disabled persons by perpetuating their social inequality. I try to show, 
however, that the compensation element of the wrongful life action can be viewed as 
a form of positive accommodation which affirms the worth and dignity of disabled 
persons by recognising their difference and particularity. In the second place, I 
consider the policy argument that permitting the action would lead to a slippery slope 
whereby children, who feel harmed by coming into existence, would use the action to 
claim against their parents, and that this would conflict with the parents’ moral right 
to procreative autonomy. I try to show, however, that procreative autonomy should 
be limited in any event because it is impermissible to impose harm onto 
unconsenting individuals purely for the sake of bestowing benefits. This implies that, 
from a moral standpoint, we should take the claims of children who feel harmed by 
coming into existence seriously.    
 
Ultimately, this thesis will therefore try to show two things. In the first place, it will 
show that the wrongful life plaintiff can be harmed by being born disabled if he or she 
experiences his or her disability as harmful, and that the wrongful life action is 
therefore necessary to vindicate that harm. As a consequence, the ‘unactionable 




that the policy arguments against the wrongful life action also fail. Therefore, the 
wrongful life action is ethically desirable and should therefore be permitted.  
 
In order to make the aforementioned claims, this thesis will proceed through four 
chapters. Chapter 1 will begin by elucidating the legal nature of the wrongful life 
action as well as the legal context in which wrongful life claims arise. In this chapter, 
I will explain the legal requirements for the wrongful life action and distinguish it from 
the wrongful conception and wrongful birth actions, with which the wrongful life 
action is often confused. I will then also contrast it to pre-natal injury claims, so as to 
further distil the unique character of the wrongful life action as an action based on 
conduct which facilitates the coming into existence with a disability, rather than 
conduct which causes a disability to an individual who would otherwise not have 
been born with one. Following this, I will proceed to examine how the legal 
community has responded to the wrongful life action, from the perspective of 
legislatures and judges of different countries or jurisdictions. This chapter will 
ultimately serve to introduce the legal nature and reception of the wrongful life action, 
as well as to distil the characteristics of the action which have proved to be 
problematic from a legal standpoint.  
 
Chapter 2 will then proceed to examine the harm paradox within wrongful life 
actions. In the chapter, I will examine the specific moral account of harm which 
underlies the legal account of harm adopted in delictual law,3 namely, the 
counterfactual comparative account of harm. I will proceed to show that this account 
of harm fails to correctly describe harm by examining three contexts in which it has 
been shown that the counterfactual comparative account of harm does not accord 
with our intuitions surrounding harmfulness. These are, firstly, the context of pre-
emptive harms; secondly, omissions and failures to benefit; and finally, the context of 
future persons who would not exist but for our harmful actions (encapsulated under 
the non-identity problem). I then move over to consider some solutions that have 
been given in these three contexts by those who follow a counterfactual comparative 
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 Delictual law is the branch of the law that deals with civil harms and the compensation required to 
correct those civil harms. More succinctly, delictual law “determines when and how an actor must 
consider the well-being of others when deciding how to act” (Gerhart P,M, 2010 Tort Law and Social 
Morality: 5) If an actor is not appropriately other-regarding in his or her act, he or she may be required 




approach to harm, as well as arguments for why these attempts have failed. I will 
ultimately conclude that the counterfactual comparative account fails to explain what 
is intuitively harmful about harm. 
 
Following this, I will proceed to examine two non-comparative accounts of harm, 
being the account of Harman and the account of Shiffrin. I will argue that these non-
comparative accounts of harm are able to get around at least two of the problems 
which comparative accounts run into in the abovementioned three problematic 
contexts and that a non-comparative approach to harm therefore best 
accommodates our intuitions regarding harmfulness. I specifically argue, moreover, 
that Shiffrin’s account of harm is the most extensionally adequate account of harm 
and endorse her view that harm has to do with a subjective clashing of the will and 
forced experiential states. In support of this, I will try to show that her account can 
accommodate the intuition that death is only harmful when it is unelected in the 
same way that assault is only harmful if the victim subjectively feels that it is harmful. 
The examples of painful contact sport and instances of sadism and masochism 
(“S&M”) serve as good illustrations of this latter point. On the assumption, then, that 
harm has to do with the subjective clashing of the will and forced experiential states 
rather than the objective worsening of a prior position, I ultimately argue that the 
wrongful life plaintiff, who objectively may very well be in a better position than he or 
she would have been in, can be harmed. I will also argue that harm can be 
retroactive so that the wrongful life plaintiff can suffer the subjective effects of harm 
after the harming event has occurred, which avoids the charge that is often levied 
against Shiffrin’s account of harm in a wrongful life context, which is that at the time 
the negligent medical practitioner acts the child is not yet a person with a will and 
therefore does not have the capacity to be harmed.  
 
Chapter 3 will then move to address the second research question, that is, whether 
disability is a harmful condition. In order to answer this, I begin by looking at two very 
different models of disability, being the traditional medical model and the social 
model, and analyse how these different models interact with the following questions: 
firstly, whether disabled persons necessarily suffer; secondly, whether disabled 
persons lack or have a reduced access to important qualia and thirdly, whether 




are necessary for a meaningful life. In summary, I will conclude that whether a 
particular disability might be considered harmful would depend upon the unique 
nature of the impairment in question, the social context in which the disabled person 
finds him or herself as well as, and most importantly, the particular disabled person’s 
subjective experience of his or her disabled life. This approach also follows naturally 
from the account of harm which I endorse, being a subjective account of harm.   
 
The last chapter, Chapter 4, will then turn to examine two policy arguments against 
the wrongful life action. Here I will consider, firstly, the argument that adopting the 
wrongful life action would unfairly discriminate against disabled persons in that it 
would amount to a state-endorsed message that disabled lives are not worthwhile 
and that this would perpetuate their social discrimination and inequality. I will try to 
show, however, that the wrongful life action, on the contrary, can be seen as a form 
of positive accommodation, which has the ability to send a message that disabled 
persons are worthy of respect and concern and that their difference and particularity 
should be respected and promoted. I will then, secondly, turn to consider the 
argument that the wrongful life action may lead to a slippery slope whereby children 
will use the action against their parents, which would run contrary to the right to 
procreative autonomy. In response, I will try to show that it would not be ethically 
desirable to exclude the culpability of parents from the ambit of the wrongful life 
action. This is because it is impermissible to impose harm upon an unconsenting 
individual purely for the sake of bestowing benefits, and the potential culpability of 
parents cannot, therefore, be ‘neutralised’ by their act of bestowing the benefit of 
existence onto their children. The implication is that, from a moral standpoint, the 
wrongful life action should therefore be available to children against their parents if 
they feel that they have been brought into a harmful existence. This should not, 
however, be construed as an argument in favour of anti-natalism for anti-natalism 
presupposes that coming into existence is always harmful. Based on the account of 
harm forwarded in this thesis, being a subjective account of harm, coming into 
existence is only harmful if and only if the moral patient feels harmed and, therefore, 






Chapter 1: The legal nature and reception of the wrongful life action 
 
1.1. Introductory remarks  
 
Recent developments in biological science and medical technology have made it 
possible for medical practitioners to identify (through, for example, amniocentesis) 
and predict (through, for example, genetic counselling and testing), defects in 
foetuses and potential children. These developments, however, have also placed a 
concomitant responsibility on members of the medical profession to make these 
identifications and predictions accurately, or at least in accordance with the legal 
duty of care which is required of all members of their profession. Sometimes, 
medical practitioners make mistakes in their identifications and predictions of foetal 
defects. The legal consequence of these mistakes is that medical practitioners can 
be held liable and ordered to recompense persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of their mistakes. The biological consequence of these mistakes, however, is 
often the conception or birth of a disabled child “who, if knowledge of its conditions 
had been available, [might] have been aborted or perhaps not even conceived” 
(Hanson 1996: 1).  
 
As will become clear from the discussion below, assigning liability to a medical 
practitioner who made a negligent mistake and ordering him or her to compensate 
(the legal consequence) a now existent disabled child who would not have been born 
but for the negligent conduct of a medical practitioner (the biological consequence) is 
not an unproblematic exercise. This is because the exercise naturally conjures up a 
host of moral and logical complexities which the law is seemingly unable to 
accommodate. More particularly, as soon as a plaintiff’s natural or biological 
alternative position is non-existence, proving legal harm becomes an overwhelming 
hurdle.  At the same time, however, it also seems clear that in making a negligent 
mistake, the medical practitioner has done something wrong and should therefore be 
held accountable. Because of this tension, different countries or jurisdictions have 
attempted to balance the legal and biological consequences in different ways. Some 
countries, for instance, have not allowed any damage recovery in this area and in 




attempted a delicate balance by limiting damage recovery to narrowly-defined 
plaintiffs or to narrowly-defined forms of damages, as we will see below.  
 
My aim, in this first chapter of the thesis, is to flesh out the different ways in which 
different countries or jurisdictions have attempted to balance the legal and biological 
consequences from within a civil liability system. The purpose of this is twofold. On 
the one hand, it will serve to distil the metaphysical complexities inherent in 
assigning not only legal liability but also moral accountability in cases of negligent 
medical practitioners who make mistakes which carry with them the birth or 
conception of a disabled child, and how different jurisdictions have responded to or 
accommodated this. On the other hand, the discussion will also serve as an 
illustration of the specific types of legal redress which are generally available in any 
civil liability system, and the intricacies of each,, in order to distil one particularly 
controversial type of legal redress, namely, the wrongful life action, with which I will 
be primarily focussed for the remainder of the thesis.  
 
1.2. Potential available legal recourse  
 
As mentioned above, liability will sometimes attach to the conduct of a medical 
practitioner when his or her conduct does not measure up to the required standard of 
care expected of him or her (the legal consequence). There are two general strands 
of legal recourse available here, within a general civil liability system, one based on 
breach of contract, the other based on the principles of delictual law.  
 
Under breach of contract, the plaintiff will need to prove that the medical practitioner 
breached his or her duty of care owed to the plaintiff (here the patient) by virtue of 
the contract concluded between them. Importantly, this remedy will only be available 
to a parent of a child born with a disability and never to the child itself. This is 
because only a legal person can be the bearer of contractual rights and at the time at 
which the negligent conduct occurred (when the child was in utero or merely a 




yet a legal person and thus had no legal rights.4 In other words, a contractual duty 
cannot be owed to a non-existent person because one can only contract with an 
existent person.5 
  
Apart from breach of contract, however, there are a host of delictual actions available 
in the context under consideration. As with all delictual actions, (or torts, as they are 
known elsewhere6), a plaintiff must prove the basic elements of a delict. A delict 
encompasses five elements, namely, harm (or damage as it is known elsewhere7), 
conduct, causation, wrongfulness (or unlawfulness as it is known elsewhere8) and 
fault. Each of these elements needs to be proved in order to have a valid delictual 
claim. Over time, however, the jurisprudence surrounding each of these elements 
crystallises in response to the specific type of delictual action at issue, mostly within 
the context of the wrongfulness element, and rules and patterns in relation to each 
delictual element therefore develop which can be applied in other similar contexts.  
 
The general means of legal redress available under the delictual strand of recourse 
is through the wrongful conception/pregnancy action, the wrongful birth action, the 
wrongful life action and, lastly, by alleging a negligently or intentionally caused 
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prenatal injury (known colloquially as a ‘prenatal tort’). I will discuss each of these 
below.  
 
1.2.1 Wrongful conception/pregnancy 
 
Wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy actions are actions that are based on 
failed sterilisations and failed abortions. The claim here is that a medical practitioner 
failed to perform a sterilisation or failed to perform an abortion, which procedures 
they were contracted to do by the patient. The biological consequence of the medical 
practitioner’s breach of contract is an unwanted pregnancy or an unwanted child and 
a concomitant, yet unwanted, responsibility placed upon the parent(s) of that child.  
 
This action is the least controversial of the delictual actions in this area, but there are 
some areas of controversy that plague it. For example, it has been said that “the 
blessing of giving birth to a healthy child overrides, as a matter of law, any injury 
incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of that birth.” (Meintjes-Van der Walt 1991: 747) 
The argument is, therefore, that the wrongful conception/pregnancy action will 
always be illegitimate. It has also been argued that the action has the side effect that 
the unwanted child which is born is viewed as ‘damage’ which connotes something 
negative that gets transposed onto the child. This is thought to be emotionally 
disturbing for a child.  
 
Judges of different countries or jurisdictions, however, have come up with innovative 
ways to avoid this negative transposition onto the child. In South Africa, for example, 
the wrongful conception action is lawful9 and the judicial technique used to avoid 
conceptualising the ‘meant to be aborted’ child as damage is to conceptualise the 
damage as the financial damage which befalls the parents of the child. Recovery is 
furthermore limited to parents who did not want the child for economic reasons such 
as, for example, the fact that they could not afford another child. This is but one 
example of a judicial technique used to balance the legal and biological 
consequences mentioned earlier. 
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1.2.2 Wrongful birth and wrongful life 
 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions take place in a different context. In this 
context, the parents want a child; however, the child that is subsequently born has 
some form of unexpected disability or disease, ranging from relatively minor 
disabilities10 to some very severe disabilities.11 In this context, therefore, a child is 
wanted, but it is a healthy, disease-free and disability-free child that is wanted. 
Importantly, both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions are premised on the fact 
that had the parent(s) had knowledge of the disability, the child would have been 
aborted on that basis. In other words, both actions are premised on the fact that the 
parents would have chosen selective abortion on the basis of disability or disease. 
 
Once the diseased or disabled child is born, much to the dismay of the parents who 
wanted and planned for a healthy child, a host of unwanted and unplanned-for 
damages ensue. On the one hand, there are patrimonial damages. These would 
include, for example, the costs of medical assistance and special schooling needed 
by a disabled child. On the other hand, there are non-patrimonial damages.12 These 
would include, for example, the associated pain and suffering that may be 
accompanied by being disabled or by having to raise a disabled child. The purpose 
of the wrongful birth and wrongful life actions is then to attempt to recover these 
damages from the medical practitioner who failed to identity or accurately predict the 
disability or disease.  
 
In order to try and recover these damages within a delictual or tort-based system of 
civil liability, all the elements mentioned above (harm, conduct, causation, 
wrongfulness and fault) will need to be proved. The plaintiff will, firstly, have to prove 
that the medical practitioner failed to identity or predict the disability (i.e. conduct, 
specifically in the form of an omission) in circumstances in which a reasonable 
medical practitioner in his or her shoes would have done so (i.e. fault). These two 
requirements together are referred to as a negligent omission. The more 
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controversial part of the delictual analysis then comes in when the plaintiff must 
prove that the negligent omission caused him or her, or them (if we are dealing with 
two parents), harm. In a wrongful birth action, the parents bring the claim against the 
medical practitioner and the causation of harm must thus be proven from their 
perspective. In a wrongful life action, however, the causation of harm that must be 
proven is harm from the perspective of the disabled child.13  
 
This last mentioned claim needs to be emphasised. In the wrongful birth action, the 
parents bring a claim that the negligent medical practitioner “caused them to suffer 
the extraordinary expenses and emotional strains of having a defective child whose 
birth could have been prevented” (Hanson 1996: 2). The emphasis is thus on the 
damages that the parents subsequently suffer because of the birth of the disabled 
child. Following the logic of the legal test for harm, if we compare the position before 
the negligent omission of the medical practitioner (where there are no extraordinary 
expenses or emotional suffering present) with the position after the negligent 
omission of the medical practitioner (where there are extraordinary expenses and 
emotional suffering present) the parents are clearly in a worse off position after the 
negligent omission than they would have been and have thus been harmed. 
 
With the wrongful life action, however, the child must claim, “that but for the 
negligence of the [medical practitioner] [I] would have been aborted, and [I was 
therefore] harmed by being born” (Hanson 1996: 2). The damages in this instance 
therefore become intricately linked with the child’s very existence because in order to 
prove harm the child must claim that it would have been better had he or she not 
been born, i.e., not existed. This leads to a floodgate of moral and logical problems, 
the intricacies of which will be fleshed out in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For the 
moment, it suffices to say that the problem comes down to the following. In 
determining whether legal harm is suffered we use the counterfactual comparative 
test. To show that you have suffered harm you must show, based on the logic of the 
counterfactual comparative test, that you are in a worse off position than the position 
you would have been in, had the negligent conduct not occurred. Applying this to 
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wrongful life claims, the child would need to claim that he or she would have been 
better off had he or she not been born by saying that his or her life of disability is 
worse than no life at all. This leads to what is known as the harm problem, aptly 
stated by Steinbock (1986: 16): 
 
It is impossible for a person to be better off never having been born. For if I had 
never been born, then I never was, if I never was, then I cannot be said to have 
been better off. For to be harmed is to be made worse off; but no individual is 
made worse off by coming to exist, for that suggests that we can compare the 
person before he existed with the person after he existed, which is absurd. 
Therefore, it is logically impossible that anyone is harmed by coming to exist and 
wrongful-life suits are both illogical and unfair in that they require the defendant 
to compensate someone he has not harmed. 
 
It is this problem which leads the wrongful life plaintiff into the majority of its legal 
hurdles and it is also the basis upon which most courts have rejected the wrongful 
life action, as will be discussed below. Before moving on to consider this, however, 
there is one last area of delictual liability to consider, for the sake of conceptual 
clarity and completeness. 
 
1.2.3 Prenatal injury claims 
 
The last area of delictual liability that needs mention in the context under 
consideration is the negligent or intentional causation of prenatal injuries, or ‘prenatal 
torts’ as they are known colloquially. With these claims, we are dealing with the 
causation of a prenatal injury whilst in utero which leads to the occurrence of some 
form of disability once born.  
 
In South Africa, damages that arise due to the causation of prenatal injuries resulting 
in disability or disease are recoverable. A particularly interesting case in this regard 
is the case of Road Accident Fund v Mxolisi Richard Mtati obo Zukhanye Mtati (“RAF 
v Mtati”).14 In this case, a pregnant pedestrian was struck by a negligent motor 
vehicle driver and her child was subsequently born (some five and a half months 
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later) with brain damage as a result of the collision. The Road Accident Fund 
pleaded that a foetus in utero was not a legal person and that the insured driver thus 
owed no delictual duty of care towards the foetus. The court, prompted by the 
plaintiff’s counsel, considered the possibility of the utilisation of the nasciturus 
fiction15 to found a claim for the child; however, it ruled that it was not necessary as 
the normal delictual elements, properly conceptualised, could be used to found a 
claim. The court proposed that by accepting that there may be a time gap between 
the ‘harm causing conduct’ and the damage or harm that ensues, a delict could be 
established, that is, that the harm befell the child once he or she was born into the 
disabled state. The claim therefore succeeded, and the disabled child was awarded 
compensation for the causation of her brain damage and the loss which came about 
as a consequence of the brain damage. 
 
It is important to take note that there is a crucial difference between, on the one 
hand, wrongful life and wrongful birth claims and, on the other hand, pre-natal injury 
claims. In RAF v Mtati, for example, the child would not have been born with the 
disability had the defendant acted otherwise and the defendant therefore caused the 
disability. In a wrongful life and/or a wrongful birth claim, however, the child would 
have been born with the disability in any event due to biological or genetic forces at 
play, and in that sense the defendant did not cause the disability per se (Ruda 2010: 
204). The claim, in other words, is not that the child was harmed before birth, but 
rather that the child was harmed by being born (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994: 15). 
This difference is summarised well in the case of Gleitman v Cosgrove,16 wherein a 
child claimed compensation from a medical practitioner who had failed to advise his 
mother about the pregnancy risks associated with rubella and he was born disabled 
as a result. In the case, one of the judges said the following: 
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We must remember that the choice is not between being born with health or 
being born without it; it is not claimed that the defendants failed to do something 
to prevent or reduce the ravages of rubella. Rather the choice is between a 
worldly existence or none at all.... 
 
Now that the differences between the various related delictual actions have been 
properly fleshed out, I turn towards an examination of the wrongful life action 
specifically. We have above noted that there is a ‘harm’ problem that seems to 
plague the action. I now turn to a discussion of how judges and legislatures have 
explored this harm problem from within the general civil liability system. This 
discussion will also serve to introduce some of the policy arguments against the 
action, such as the argument that the action discriminates against disabled persons 
and that the action could lead to a slippery slope wherein children could claim 
against their parents for being born, which I will later analyse in Chapter 4 in greater 
detail. 
 
1.3. The legal community’s response to wrongful life actions 
 
The legal community’s response to wrongful life actions is far from uniform owing of 
course to the different ideologies and hierarchy of rights at play in each different 
jurisdiction or country.17 It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to present a complete 
comparative legal analysis of wrongful life actions. What this section will do, 
however, is group the legal community’s response into two groups, being those 
countries that have been against permitting the claim and those countries that have 
been in favour of permitting  the claim (although having perhaps subsequently 
disallowed it). The purpose is to show how the ‘harm problem’ has been written into 
law in the form of legislation or incorporated into the common law through judicial 
incremental development.  
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1.4.1 Countries against permissibility 
 
It appears that the general trend has been to not allow the action at all (Mukheibir 
2005: 757). The claim has not been allowed to succeed, for example, in England, 
Australia, Germany and most American states. This is mostly based on the inability 
to prove harm and calculate damages (what I have termed the harm problem, briefly 
discussed above). In Australia for instance in the case of Harriton v Stephens18 the 
court said, upon being confronted with a wrongful life action, that a “duty of care 
cannot be clearly stated in circumstances where the appellant can never prove (and 
the trier of fact can never apprehend) the actual damage claimed...” (my emphasis). 
In England, moreover, in the case of McKay v Essex Area Health Authority,19 the 
decision turned on the argument that that the non-existence or ‘not-being’ of the child 
could not be conceptualised in monetary terms and, therefore, that no damages 
award was conceivable. The court stated the following in this respect in paragraph 
771 of the judgment: 
 
How can a court begin to evaluate non-existence, ‘The undiscovered country 
from whose bourn no traveller returns?’ No comparison is possible and therefore 
no damage can be established which a court could recognise. This goes to the 
root of the whole cause of action. 
 
Section 1(2) of England’s Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act of 1976 
furthermore now bars any wrongful life claim for a child born after the Act’s passing 
into law.  
 
In America, a wrongful life action has only been recognised in three states, being the 
states of California, New Jersey and Washington. Most other states have been 
divided in either hearing the action but ruling against it or dismissing it during the 
pleadings stage on the ground that it does not even disclose a cause of action. In 
Illinois, for instance, in the case of Siemienic v Lutheran General Hospital,20 the court 
                                            
18
 (2006) 226 CLR 52, Para 276 
19
 (1982) All ER 771 (CA). 
20




took this latter approach. In a case where the court actually proceeded to hear the 
case, the judges came to the following ruling, in Speck v Finegold:21 
 
Whether it is better to have never been born at all rather than to have been born 
with serious mental defects is a mystery more properly left to the philosophers 
and theologians, a mystery which would lead us into the field of metaphysics, 
beyond the realm of our understanding or ability to solve. The law cannot assert 
a knowledge which can resolve this inscrutable and enigmatic issue. 
 
In Germany, the wrongful life claim has also not been allowed to succeed on the 
basis of the complexities surrounding the plaintiff’s harm. However, the highest court 
in Germany also relied heavily on the disability discrimination objection in its refusal 
of the claim.22 The court was of the opinion that recognising such an injury in the 
case of a wrongful life claim “would infringe the interests of all physically and 
mentally disabled persons” and that it would therefore go against the German 
constitutional provisions in terms of dignity, equality, and so on (Chürr 2015: 759). 
 
1.4.2 Countries in favour of permissibility 
 
In respect of the countries that have allowed the wrongful life action there are the 
Netherlands, Israel, France, and the American states of New Jersey, Washington 
and California. Some of those countries, however, have subsequently gone against 
that decision in later years, as will be seen below.  
 
In the Netherlands, in the Kelly Molenaar case,23 a wrongful life claim was allowed. 
The court was not persuaded by the argument that harm and damages could not be 
legally conceptualised. Instead, the court relied on Article 6:97 of the Dutch Civil 
Code which provides that, in each case, damage must be assessed “in accordance 
with the method which is most appropriate to the nature of the damage” (Mukheibir 
2005: 756). The court ruled that awarding damages for pecuniary loss in this context 
would not lead to the conclusion that life with disabilities is worth less than life 
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without disabilities. An award of damages, according to the court, merely serves to 
remedy the fact that disabled life does come with a unique set of challenges and that 
an award of pecuniary damages would enable a disabled child to improve his or her 
living conditions (Mukheibir 2005: 760).  
 
The Kelly Molenaar decision is evidently also one of the most radical wrongful life 
decisions in that the court also awarded the plaintiff general damages for pain and 
suffering in addition to her special damages (the direct financial damages associated 
with the plaintiff’s situation). The court ruled that there had been an infringement of 
the plaintiff’s person, owing to her severe handicaps “which she could have been 
spared had the parents terminated the pregnancy” (Mukheibir 2005: 756).  
 
In California, in the case of Turpin v Sortini,24 a wrongful life claim was allowed in 
part in that the court only allowed the claim for special patrimonial damages to 
succeed and not the general damages claim. The court reasoned that traditional 
rationales against the action were only persuadable against the general or non-
pecuniary damages claim (such as pain and suffering for example) but that “the 
financial burden on the plaintiff’s family and the ability to measure special 
[patrimonial/financial] damages without difficulty justified recovery” (Schuster 2016: 
2336). 
 
In South Africa, in the case of H v Fetal Assesment Centre (“H v FAC”),25 the court 
ruled that a wrongful life claim was viable in principle (although the lower court is 
now to decide the merits of the claim in casu) but that it should only succeed, 
assuming all the delictual elements are met on the facts, if a wrongful birth claim is 
not simultaneously available to the parents. The court said that the burden on the 
parents and the burden on the child should be viewed as a single one so as to 
balance the burden put upon medical practitioners in this context.26 The H v FAC 
case is also well-known for invoking the ‘best interests of the child’ principle as 
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something that should be considered when deciding wrongful life cases, which none 
of the other cases to date have done.27 
 
In France, in the case of Nicholas Perruche (“Perruche”),28 a wrongful life claim was 
upheld in the Supreme Court. The court said that it was not necessary to take into 
consideration the fact that the only way that Nicholas Perruche would have been 
born without the defects was if he were not born at all, as this was apparently a 
purely ethical consideration and not a legal one (Callus 2001: 120). The court in 
Perruche furthermore conceptualised the problem not as one of harm or damage, 
but one of causation. The court, however, found a way to establish the causing of 
harm by linking the medical practitioner’s negligence to Nicholas’ mother’s desire 
and right to terminate the pregnancy and in that way “identified the loss of the child, 
not as the handicap from which he suffers, but as the loss of the chance never to 
have been born” (Callus 2001: 120). The court’s decision, however, subsequently 
sparked an outcry in France and protests ensued, both by disabled members of 
French society (who regarded the decision as an infringement upon their dignity) as 
well as medical practitioners (who responded by refusing to perform routine ultra-
sounds). The French Parliament ultimately enacted legislation prohibiting wrongful 
life actions. 
 
In Israel, in the case of Zeitsov v Katz,29 a wrongful life claim came before the Israeli 
Supreme Court and a wrongful life claim against a medical practitioner was 
recognised in principle, although the case was to be subsequently sent back to the 
lower court for a decision on the merits (a similar situation to that in H v FAS). What 
is most interesting about this case is the detailed philosophical analysis the judges 
went into, rather than attempting to stave off metaphysical and ethical considerations 
as most other courts had done. One judge for instance (Judge Ben-Porat) confronts 
the harm paradox head-on by accepting “the possibility of comparing the child’s life 
with his non-life, the latter being a real alternative to the former” (Heyd 1986: 584). 
Judge Ben-Porat’s view was that in some instances, albeit very rare instances, it 
would in fact be better for someone not to be born rather than to be born and suffer 
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from the particular disease or disability in question (Carmi 1990: 778). She even 
went so far as to provide us with a criterion for how to go about identifying these 
types of rare instances she envisages, by relying on the criterion of the reasonable 
person.30 Her argument is that we can delineate the line between serious disabilities 
that make life not worth living and not-so-serious disabilities which do not have this 
effect, by relying on how the reasonable person of average intelligence would 
conceptualise the line between the two. 
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the approach to wrongful life actions has 
been far from uniform around the world. Different jurisdictions have responded in 
different ways by either prohibiting the action (England, Australia, Germany), 
allowing the action completely (Netherlands), allowing the action but then legislating 
against it (France) or allowing it but only in part by limiting it to the recovery of 
special financial/pecuniary damages (California) or to instances where a wrongful 
birth claim is not simultaneously available (South Africa). It can therefore be said that 
different jurisdictions or countries have attempted to balance the legal and biological 
consequences in very different ways, and for very different reasons. This proves that 
a more in-depth philosophical analysis of the wrongful life action and its perplexities 
is worthwhile to pursue, and may provide a scaffolding or baseline for a more 
universal legal approach to the action.  
 
1.4. Concluding remarks  
  
The aforegoing discussion has attempted to shed light on damage recovery in this 
controversial area of civil liability and specifically on how courts as well as some 
legislatures have dealt with the balancing of the legal and biological consequences 
discussed earlier. A further purpose of the discussion was to introduce the legal 
context in which the wrongful life action arises and the controversial aspects of the 
action that have been identified by judges and lawmakers.  
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It was shown, for example, that the most prominent argument against recognition of 
the action centres on problems with the application of the legal test for harm. It 
became evident that courts have generally refused to permit the action on this basis. 
It also became evident that courts, apart from the Israeli court in Zeitsov v Katz, have 
made conscious and focussed efforts to avoid addressing the harm paradox in order 
to keep metaphysics and ethics out of the law. In the next chapter of this thesis, 
Chapter 2, I will attempt to show why this attempted separation is unfortunate and 
problematic. More specifically, I will argue that the account of harm upon which the 
legal test for harm is based turns out to be a deeply flawed account of harm which 
does not accord with our intuitions surrounding harmfulness. I will argue that a better 
account of harm exists, through which the wrongful life plaintiff’s harm is better 
conceptualised and through which our intuitions regarding harmfulness are well 
accommodated.  
 
It was also shown, in the discussion above, that the wrongful life action has a 
seemingly complicated relationship with disability as a normative concept. The 
contrast between the court’s position in Germany that the action infringes upon the 
dignity rights of disabled persons, and the court’s position in the Netherlands (in the 
Kelly Mollenaar case) that a compensatory award is necessary in order to affirm the 
rights of disabled persons, makes this clear. The practical effect of the Perruche 
case in France, moreover, whereby disabled persons protested against the decision 
and the fact that the legislature had to then enact legislation prohibiting the action, 
shows that the action has an importance normative effect on the lives of disabled 
people. In sections 3 and 4.1 of this thesis, I take up these arguments further. I will 
argue, for instance, that the wrongful life action can actually have a positive 
normative effect on the lives of disabled persons in that the action can function as a 










Chapter 2: The harm paradox within the wrongful life action 
 
2.1  Introductory remarks 
 
As can be seen from the discussion on the response of the legal community above, 
the main obstacle to recognition of the wrongful life action is the inability of the legal 
community to comfortably conclude that the wrongful life plaintiff was harmed. As 
was also preliminarily noted, this is because the way that harm is legally determined 
is by adopting a counterfactual comparative approach to harm. More specifically, 
determining harm, legally, involves comparing two objective states and, in that 
sense, it is a comparative account of harm. Upon comparing these two states, 
furthermore, harm is evidenced by proving that the plaintiff has moved into an 
objectively worse state than he or she would have been in had things been 
otherwise. The comparison of harm therefore rests on a counterfactual comparison. 
We can therefore conclude that the legal nature of harm is underpinned by a 
counterfactual comparative account of moral harm.  
 
Upon an analysis of the wrongful life action along these lines, it seems as though the 
conduct of the medical practitioner benefitted rather than harmed the wrongful life 
plaintiff. This is because the objective position that the wrongful life plaintiff would 
have been in had the negligent medical practitioner acted lawfully would be non-
existence because he or she would have been aborted and would therefore not have 
existed, and non-existence is worse than existence albeit with a disability, or so the 
argument goes. The wrongful life plaintiff has therefore actually moved into a better 
position than he or she would have been in had the medical practitioner acted 
otherwise. Therefore, the action of the negligent medical practitioner benefited rather 
than harmed the disabled child.  
 
At the same time, however, I would argue that, intuitively, the medical practitioner 
has harmed the child. Let us return to the example of Jim mentioned in the 
introduction. Jim is disabled, has severe breathing problems and experiences 
chronic pain and immobility. He also feels that he misses out on many meaningful 




have occurred, had the medical practitioner acted otherwise. They are, therefore, 
imposed upon him. Thus, the harm paradox arises. Intuitively, we want to say that 
the wrongful life plaintiff was harmed by the conduct of the medical practitioner, but 
we cannot comfortably conclude this if we take harm to be an objective 
counterfactual worsening of one’s position.31 In this chapter of the thesis, I want to 
subject this harm paradox to closer analytical scrutiny. In summary, I will attempt to 
show that the intuition that the wrongful life plaintiff is harmed by the medical 
practitioner can be accommodated if we follow a subjective approach to harm, 
whereby harm is not understood as objectively rendering a person worse off, but 
rather as imposing upon a person a condition or state which does not accord with his 
or her will. I will also argue that harm can be retroactive in nature, in that the 
subjective effects of harm can arise after the fact, because it is not morally 
imperative that the harm causing act and the harmful effects of that act take place 
simultaneously.  
 
In order to make these claims, I will start by providing a closer examination of the 
counterfactual comparative account of harm. Following this, I will discuss three 
instances wherein the counterfactual comparative account of harm leads to results 
that do not accord with our intuitions surrounding harmfulness, namely, in cases of 
pre-emption, omissions and failures to benefit, and in the case of future persons who 
would not exist but for our harmful actions (encapsulated under what is known as the 
non-identity problem). I will then discuss some attempts at addressing these 
problems from within the counterfactual comparative domain, but will try to show that 
these attempts generally fail. I will ultimately conclude that the counterfactual 
comparative account of harm does not adequately capture what is intuitively harmful 
about harm. 
 
Following this, I will move to consider  accounts of harm which are non-comparative 
in nature, and will analyse whether these accounts fare better in terms of the 
aforementioned three problematic contexts. I will try to show that they do. I will 
specifically argue that the deviation between the results that the counterfactual 
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 I pause here to note that in this thesis I am not primarily concerned with the responsibility or 
accountability of the medical practitioner. Rather, I am interested in the possible harm suffered by a 





comparative accounts of harm give us and the results that our intuitions regarding 
harmfulness give us does not arise if we adopt a non-comparative account of harm. I 
will furthermore specifically argue that the best non-comparative account of harm 
that we have on offer is Shiffrin’s will-based account.  
 
I will also address the concern that Shiffrin’s account of harm has the effect that only 
persons with wills can be harmed and that at the time that a disabled child is born, 
he or she does not really possess a will. I will try to show that this hurdle can be 
overcome by acknowledging that harm can be retroactive in nature in that there can 
be a time gap between the harming event and the harmful felt effects of that event. 
In summary, I will therefore argue, in this chapter, that the wrongful life plaintiff has 
been harmed if we follow Shiffrin’s account of harm, coupled with an acceptance that 
harm can be retroactive, and that this account of harm is the best account available.  
 
Before proceeding with the above, however, it would be wise to pause to consider 
the importance of such an endeavour. That harm is an extremely important concept 
seems to be a truism. Restrictions against harming are found in a variety of contexts 
such as the moral context, the legal context, the political context, the criminal context 
and the medical context (Shiffrin 2012: 357). Concrete examples of such restrictions 
can be found, for example, in the Hippocratic Oath (do no harm to your patient) and 
in Mills’ Harm Principle (be free to live as you wish so long as you do no harm to 
others) (Bradley 2012: 390). It can therefore be said that the concept of harm is one 
of the most important yardsticks against which we measure our conduct. What is 
more, harm has important legal ramifications and consequences. People are 
imprisoned or forced to pay out large sums of money for harming other people. It is 
therefore vitally important that the nature of harm is properly understood and that we 
have an adequate account of harm upon which to rely in order to justify these legal 
ramifications. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the centrality and importance of the concept of harm there is 
little literature, until fairly recently, detailing and discussing what harm actually is 
(Bradley 2010: 391, De Villiers-Botha 2018: 1). This is unfortunate for a variety of 
reasons, the most prominent for our purposes being that the account of harm 




account, has possibly not undergone enough analytical scrutiny. It becomes 
pertinent to ask whether the philosophical theory of harm upon which the legal theory 
of harm rests is a solid foundation, and whether there are not perhaps other 
accounts or theories of harm which might fare better, a question which I aim to take 
up in this chapter. 
 
2.2 The counterfactual comparative account of harm  
 
The counterfactual comparative account of harm can be described as follows: an 
event harms a subject if and only if its occurrence moves the subject into a position 
whereby he or she is worse off than the position which the subject would have been 
in, objectively speaking, had the event not occurred. In other words, “a harmful event 
is an event that makes things go worse for someone, on the whole, than they would 
have gone if the event had not happened [and] [c]onversely, a beneficial event is one 
that makes things go better for someone” (Bradley 2012: 396). By this logic, “[t]he 
harmfulness of an event depends on a comparison with how things would have been 
had the event not occurred” (Feit 2015: 361, own emphasis). 
 
An important feature of this model is that harms and benefits are seen as 
symmetrical and occupying opposite ends of the same scale. To decide whether a 
person has been harmed by an event, we look to where on the scale the person is, 
objectively, after the event and where on the scale the person would have been, 
objectively, had the event not occurred. If the person has moved down on the scale, 
then they have been rendered worse off and the event has harmed that person 
whilst if the person has moved up on the scale they have been made better off and 
the event has benefited that person.  
 
We thus know that on this account if an event has the effect that it moves a person 
down on the scale, then they are harmed and that if an event has the effect that it 
moves a person up on the scale then they are benefitted. But how, precisely, is a 




well-cited account of harm of Joel Feinberg can help us to conceptualise this.32 On 
Feinberg’s account, the effect of harms and benefits on a person is assessed relative 
to a person’s overall network of interests.33 An interest, he says, is a “distinguishable 
component of a person’s good or well-being” (Feinberg 1985: 58). An interest is 
therefore something that a person has a stake in, ranging from short-term goals to 
long-term goals to general or over-all important life achievements. When a person’s 
interest has been negatively affected as a result of an event, they have been made 
worse off, whilst if a person’s interest has been advanced as a result of an event, 
they have been made better off. “[T]he determination of harms and benefits is 
[therefore] unavoidably affected by the prior locations, high or low, of interest states 
on the graph” (Feinberg 1985: 59). 
 
Consider the following example. Suppose that an elderly citizen, Alastair, who has a 
very small pension that is barely enough to survive on, decides that he wants to 
invest all of his life savings into something that will render a high return so that he will 
have enough money to live comfortably. He gets into contact with a financial advisor 
who invests the funds for him. It later turns out that the financial advisor actually 
invests the funds into his own ‘Ponzi scheme’ and Alastair loses all his money. In this 
scenario, because the funds were so crucial to Alastair’s future economic viability, 
we can say that the financial advisor has affected Alastair’s interests in the following 
ways. The financial advisor’s conduct has had the effect that the interests of Alastair 
has been set back (in that it has reversed its course or been put back to where it 
started); been defeated (in that it has been irrevocably destroyed); and been 
thwarted (in that its progress has been opposed) (Feinberg 1984:53), which all have 
the effect that Alastair is moved down the scale and is harmed.  
 
Drawing on the above, we can say that the counterfactual comparative account, in 
this context, adheres to the following understanding of harm. Each person has a web 
                                            
32 See Feinberg, J. 1984. Harm to Others (Oxford University Press); Feinberg, J. 1985. Wrongful 
Conception and the Right Not to be Harmed. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy; and Feinberg, J. 
1992. Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming. In Freedom and Fulfilment: 
Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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 ‘Interests’ are, however, not the only mechanism that can be used to conceptualise harm on the 
counterfactual comparative account. Harm can also be conceptualised, for example, as moving 
towards pain and moving away from pleasure or moving towards unhappiness and moving away from 




of interests, ranging from basic necessities such as water and food (Feinberg calls 
these welfare interests) to higher-order life goals (Feinberg calls these ulterior 
interests). An event, furthermore, can either “promote them in his advantage ... [or] 
thwart them ... to his detriment” (Feinberg 1984: 34). If the event promotes them, the 
person moves up on the scale and the person has been benefitted. Conversely, if 
the event thwarts or sets them back, the person moves down on the scale and is 
harmed.  
 
Admittedly, the counterfactual comparative account is appealing. It seems to accord 
with an economic style of thinking wherein harms and benefits are determined by a 
kind of cost-benefit analysis (Shiffrin 2012: 367). This is probably the reason why the 
approach is used within the legal context.34 In fact there are other benefits, inter alia, 
that it is not limited to particular types of subjects (and can therefore apply to other 
entities other than human beings, such as animals); that it is an account of extrinsic 
harm rather than intrinsic harm35 (and therefore does not depend upon any one 
particular conception of welfare or well-being which ensures that universal 
evaluations of harm are possible); and that it does not merely list different harms and 
benefits but rather provides a unified account or a universal test for harm (Bradley 
2012: 396-397). However, the counterfactual comparative account of harm also 
faces some serious difficulties and clashes with our intuitions surrounding 
harmfulness in many respects. Some have argued that these difficulties are 
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 I pause here to note, however, that the counterfactual comparative account of harm has led to 
some problems within the legal context. The case of De Vos v Suid-Afrikaanse Eagle 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1985 (3) SA 499 (A) is a pertinent example. In that case, the deceased 
had applied for a life insurance policy which would pay out on condition that at least the first premium 
has been paid before his death. The policy holder (the deceased) had unfortunately died before this 
first premium could be paid. The wife of the deceased then attempted to claim the value of the life 
policy from the defendant who had caused her husband’s death. The court was consequently tasked 
with deciding whether the wife of the deceased had suffered harm that would then be recoverable 
from the defendant. Upon applying the counterfactual test for harm, the court had to compare her 
current position (wherein she is not entitled to the proceeds of the life policy because the first 
premium had not been paid) with the counterfactual position which would have occurred had the 
defendant not caused the death of her husband. The court ruled that if her husband had not died she 
would in any event not have been entitled to the proceeds of the life policy as her husband would still 
have been alive and the policy would not have been activated. Therefore, in applying the 
counterfactual comparative test, she had not suffered any harm because she was not now in a worse 
off position than she would have been in had the defendant not caused the death of her husband.  
35
 Extrinsically harmful states are states which are not harmful in themselves, but which rather lead to 
or cause intrinsically harmful states. For example, smoking may colloquially be said to be harmful, but 
the actual harm which the smoker suffers (in the form of say, lung cancer or a heart attack) comes 
about as a result of smoking. The act of smoking a cigarette is therefore not harmful in itself. In 




insurmountable (Bradley 2012, Shiffrin 1999; 2012, Hanser 2008; 2011), whilst 
others have argued that they are solvable (Thompson 2011, Hanna 2016, Klocksiem 
2012). It is to these difficulties which we now turn. 
 
2.3 Problems with the counterfactual comparative account of harm  
 
According to Bradley (2012: 394), one of the desiderata of a good account of moral 
harm is what he terms “extensional adequacy” by which he means that the analysis 
must fit the data. More particularly, a good moral account of harm must accord with 
our intuitions about when events are harmful and when they are not. Intuitively, 
certain things are harmful and certain things are not and we should favour the 
analysis which gets all the data right. Based on this logic, accounts or analyses of 
harm which lead to results that are at odds with our intuitions about harming should 
be rejected. Shiffrin echoes this when she says that a good theory of harm: 
 
...should identify harm in such a way that captures most of our central, intuitive 
judgements about what counts as harm, while supplying some unifying 
understanding of why all the conditions we recognize as harms fit together 
(2012: 358). 
 
It can be argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm does not 
accord with our intuitions regarding harmfulness in a variety of contexts. In what 
follows, I will focus on three of these contexts. Firstly, I will look at cases of pre-
emptive harms whereby an intuitively harmful event is rendered not harmful, upon 
the logic of the counterfactual comparative account, because it is followed by 
another more harmful (or equally harmful) event, and the subject is therefore not 
rendered worse off by the occurrence of the first event. Secondly, I will look at 
omissions and failures to benefit. In this context, the counterfactual comparative 
account of harm seems to count mere failures to benefit as harmful omissions. 
Following this, I will then, lastly, move over to the non-identity problem. The problem 
here is that, on the counterfactual comparative understanding of harm, future or 
possible people cannot be harmed by actions of existent people if those same 
actions are also necessary conditions for their own worthwhile existences, because 




precise structure of the moral argument against recognition of the wrongful life 
action.  
 
2.3.1 Pre-emptive harms   
 
Pre-emptive harms occur when “an intuitively harmful event befalls a subject 
moments before a second, equally intuitively harmful event ... [and] the first event is 
rendered not harmful, due to the existence of the second” (De Villiers-Botha 2018: 
9). A well-cited example is that given by Bradley (2012: 397) and is known as 
‘Batman’s heart attack’. The example proceeds as follows: 
 
Suppose Batman drops dead of a heart attack. A millisecond after his death, his 
body is hit by a flaming cannonball. The cannonball would have killed Batman if 
he had still been alive. 
 
On the counterfactual comparative account, Batman was not harmed by the heart 
attack. This is because the heart attack did not make things go worse for Batman, as 
he would have died a millisecond later in any event by being hit by the flaming 
cannonball. The problem, however, is that intuitively the heart attack seems harmful 
to Batman because, intuitively, dying from a heart attack is something harmful (De 
Villiers-Botha 2018: 9). In other words, the counterfactual comparative account here 
fails to count a harmful event as harmful and, therefore, is not an extensionally 
adequate account of harm. 
 
Some have argued that the counterfactual comparative account can accommodate 
pre-emptive harms in ways that do accord with our moral intuitions. Hanna (2016: 
262-263) for instance, tries to do this. Hanna argues that the intuitive problem comes 
to the fore because we have failed to distinguish between pro tanto harm and overall 
harm. This distinction is mirrored in the distinction between harm in a respect versus 
harm all-things-considered. Suppose, for instance, that a person must undergo a 
painful surgery in order to save his or her life. In this instance, we can say that 
although the patient may suffer some pain as a result of the surgery, the surgery is, 
all-things-considered, beneficial for the patient. Therefore, the pain which the patient 




rescuer who breaks the arm of an endangered person whilst trying to perform a 
rescue does not harm the endangered person all-things-considered, but only in a 
respect, so that the broken arm is viewed only as a pro-tanto harm (Feinberg 1992: 
27). 
 
Hanna applies this argument structure to the heart attack example. Hanna argues 
that the heart attack that Batman suffers is only a pro-tanto harm and not an all-
things-considered harm to Batman. Therefore, according to this argument, the 
counterfactual comparative account can accommodate the intuition that Batman was 
harmed by the heart attack in that it can be seen as a pro-tanto harm, but not an 
overall harm, seeing that he would have been hit by a flaming cannonball directly 
after.  
 
De Villiers-Botha (2018), however, argues that this sort of analogy fails. According to 
her, there is an important difference between Batman’s Heart Attack and the surgery 
or rescue examples that Hanna refers to. That is, only in the latter cases of the 
surgery and the rescue is “there a clear causal link between the pro tanto harming 
event and the potentially worse harming event that it prevents [such that] the pro 
tanto event is unambiguously necessary to prevent the worse harm from occurring” 
(2018: 10). In pre-emption cases like Batman’s heart attack, on the other hand, there 
is no necessary connection between the two events other than the fact that they are 
in close temporal proximity.  
 
Another possible way to get around pre-emptive harms within a counterfactual 
comparative understanding of harm is to rely on the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic harm and argue that only intrinsic harm is relevant in the context of pre-
emptive harms. This is the route Klocksiem (2012) takes. Klocksiem argues that the 
intuitive problem in pre-emption cases arises because we have failed to make a 
necessary distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic harm, and specifically “between 
the event that constitutes the harm [the intrinsic harm] and the related event that is 
its cause [the extrinsic harm]” (2012: 295). The example Klocksiem uses to explain 






Archie’s Broken Legs: 
Veronica breaks Archie’s legs just before Betty has a chance to break them. 
Since Archie’s legs would have been broken anyway, Veronica does not make 
things go worse for Archie than they would otherwise have gone. 
 
According to Klocksiem, it is only intrinsic harm which ought to be considered here. 
The intrinsic harm in the above example is the pain and anguish associated with 
Archie’s broken legs or the desire frustrations he will experience as a direct result of 
the broken legs (2012: 295). This, according to Klocksiem, is the harm which Archie 
actually suffers. The physical breaking of Archie’s legs by Veronica or Betty is an 
extraneous feature of the harm and can therefore be regarded as an extrinsic harm 
to Archie. Based on this, Klocksiem says that the relevant counterfactual comparison 
is between a world in which Archie has pain and anguish associated with his broken 
legs and a world in which he does not, and not between a world in which Veronica 
breaks Archie’s legs and a world in which Betty does.  
 
The only way to buy into Klocksteim’s approach is if we are willing to endorse the 
notion of intrinsic harm. The problem, however, is that intrinsic harm relies on notions 
of substantive well-being and there are a host of difficulties and disagreement 
regarding what constitutes well-being.36 Some interpret well-being as pleasure, some 
as fulfilled desires and some even as being virtuous.37 By the same token, a lack of 
well-being could be because of pain, desire frustration or the lack of a good moral 
character. In order to have a unified account of harm, however, it may be important 
to avoid presupposing any substantive theory of well-being. Bradley (2012: 394) 
summarises this as follows: 
 
Proponents of different axiologies should be able to agree – at some suitable 
level of abstraction – about what it takes for someone to be harmed, even if they 
might disagree about whether pain, or frustration, or something else, is required 
for harm. 
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 See Holtug (2002) The Harm Principle in Theory and Moral Practice, in this regard. 
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Some philosophers have endorsed the notion that what makes something intuitively 
harmful is precisely that it affects well-being. De Villiers-Botha (2018), for example, 
has posited that in cases of pre-emptive harms the divergence between the results 
that the counterfactual comparative accounts gives us and the results our moral 
intuitions give us arises because we fail to acknowledge the implicit role of well-being 
when ascribing harm (2018: 13). According to De Villiers-Botha, “our intuitions are 
not based simply on whether or not the subject is worse off but on whether or not 
[their] well-being has been affected in an appropriate way” (2018: 15). Our intuition in 
Batman’s Heart Attack, for instance, is that Batman was harmed by the heart attack 
irrespective of whether he would have been hit by a flaming cannonball a millisecond 
after. Our intuition is such, according to De Villiers-Botha, because we naturally 
assume that Batman experiences sufficient or normal levels of well-being and that 
death therefore negatively impacts on his levels of well-being.  
 
Parfit (1984) argues that pre-emptive harms can be accommodated on the 
counterfactual comparative account and in a way which keeps to an extrinsic 
conceptualisation of harm, by adopting a principle of group harming. On Parfit’s 
logic, in the case of Archie’s Broken Legs, both Veronica and Betty together harm 
Archie (Bontly 2016: 1239). “They together harm [Archie] because, if both had acted 
differently, [Archie] would not have [had his legs broken]” (Parfit 1984: 71). However, 
we could also say that Archie would not have had his legs broken if the bus driver 
had been a little late in stopping at the bus stop where Archie was waiting that day 
on his way to go and meet Veronica and Betty, or perhaps if the car driver had not 
stopped at the pedestrian crossing when Archie was busy crossing the road on his 
way to meet Veronica and Betty. The point is that if every single person in the world 
had acted differently, Archie might not have had his legs broken, and therefore by 
this account, many people are responsible for arming Archie. This cannot be right 
since it would lead to unlimited liability and we would lack a definitive wrongdoer. 
Parfit anticipates that and adds the proviso that: “When some group together harm ... 
other people ... this group is the smallest of which it is true that, if they had all acted 
differently, the other people would not have been harmed...” (Bontly 2016: 1239).  
 
According to Norcross (2005), Parfit’s doctrine of group harming is problematic 




be concluded that only one of the parties harms the victim, in instances where 
intuitively both parties do. Consider Norcross’ example below, adapted by Bontly 
(2016: 1240), and further adapted by myself: 
 
Murder at the Oasis: 
Both A and B hate Traveller and want to kill him. A decides to poison Traveller’s 
water bottle with a fatal poison. Traveller notices a strange odour in his water 
bottle and decides to stop at an oasis to buy a new bottle of water. B recognises 
Traveller at the oasis as the man that he hates and shoots him dead.  
 
Using Parfit’s group-harming approach, we have the result that only A harms 
Traveller and not B. Why? Because had A not poisoned Traveller’s water, Traveller 
would not have stopped at the oasis and been killed by B. If however, B had not shot 
Traveller, A’s act would have killed Traveller in any event. Therefore, “A is the sole 
member of the smallest group of people of whom it is true that, had they all acted 
differently, Traveller would have been better off” (Bontly 2016: 1240). This does not 
accord with our moral intuition that both A and B harm Traveller. 
 
Let us take stock. We started off by saying that the counterfactual comparative 
account does not fare well in the context of pre-emptive harms because the 
conclusions reached in respect of harm do not accord with our intuitions. We then 
looked at the approaches of Hanna, Klocksiem and Parfit at saving the 
counterfactual comparative account in the context of pre-emptive harms. We found 
all of these approaches to be problematic in at least one respect. It can therefore be 
said, at this juncture, that the pre-emption problem presents a serious difficulty for 
the counterfactual comparative account of harm. 
 
2.3.2 Omissions and failures to benefit  
 
Another context in which the counterfactual comparative account of harm is argued 
to misrecognise harm is in the context of negative action or omissions. “Moral 
common sense [seems to] hold that harming a person is a graver offence than 
merely failing to benefit him, even if each form of treatment leaves him in the same 




seems to count all negative action or all omissions as harmful, including mere 
failures to benefit, which are intuitively not harmful, because in such instances the 
subject is also left in a worse off position counterfactually. In this sense, the account 
over-determines harm and is therefore argued to be extensionally inadequate. 
Consider De Villiers-Botha’s (2018: 4) example below: 
 
One Hundred Dollars: 
Batman has $100 in his pocket, but does not give it to Robin. 
 
On the logic of the counterfactual comparative account, Batman has harmed Robin 
by his omission, because Robin would have been better off had Batman given him 
the hundred dollars. This, however, does not accord with our intuitions. Ordinarily, 
we would not regard Batman’s conduct as harmful to Robin in this example. 
 
Hanna (2016) again tries to save the counterfactual comparative account from this 
charge. According to Hanna, only events are harmful under the counterfactual 
comparative account. In the case of One Hundred Dollars, however, there is no 
event that takes place and there is, therefore, no harm that is done to Robin in 
Batman not giving Robin the money. De Villiers-Botha (2018: 4), however, argues 
that the argument which relies upon the non-occurrence of an event only makes 
sense in instances where the potential harmer is an entirely passive agent. In 
respect of One Hundred Dollars, for instance, “to plausibly constitute a non-event, 
Batman cannot even conceive of the possibility of giving the money to Robin in the 
first place, as this would leave him in a position where he needs to decide for or 
against the action” which would then constitute an event (2018: 4). To see why this is 
true, consider Bradley’s Golf Clubs example below (2012: 397): 
 
Golf Clubs: 
Suppose Batman purchases a set of golf clubs with the intention of giving them 
to Robin which would have made Robin happy. Batman tells the Joker about his 
intentions. The Joker says to Batman, ‘why not keep them for yourself?’ Batman 





In this scenario, Batman considers the possibility of benefitting Robin. He specifically 
purchases the golf clubs with this intention in mind. As soon as Batman changes his 
mind and decides to keep the golf clubs, an event takes place and he is therefore no 
longer passive in relation to Robin’s non-benefit. Hanna’s non-occurrence defence 
therefore does not work in this context.  
 
Klocksiem (2012) also makes an attempt to save the counterfactual comparative 
account from the omission problem delineated above. In illustration of his argument, 
Klocksiem asks us to compare two examples, which I have again briefly adapted.  
 
a) Betty’s Hat: 
Archie buys a hat on Saturday afternoon with the intention of giving it to Betty on 
Monday as a present. On Monday, he tries it on, likes the way it looks, and 
decides to keep the hat for himself instead. 
 
b) Betty’s Nurse: 
On Saturday afternoon, Archie promises to Betty that he will serve as her nurse 
after her surgical operation on Monday. On Monday morning he wakes up and 
decides to rather spend the day with Veronica.  
 
According to Klocksiem, whether or not an event counts as a serious omission (and 
therefore a harm) or a mere failure to benefit depends upon extra contextual details 
in addition to whether the person is rendered better or worse off. Klocksiem says, for 
instance, that we generally regard refraining from action as morally permissible, 
unless there are extra contextual details which render the omission special or 
unusual and which thereby compel the moral agent to act. In Betty’s Nurse, for 
example, Archie has additionally broken a promise made to his friend and he has 
ignored his friend in her time in need. In Betty’s Hat there is no such extra moral 
responsibility that arises which compels action.   
 
According to Klocksiem, in cases where we consider the actor to have some extra 
moral obligation to act, such as in Betty’s Nurse where Archie is obliged to act 
because he has made a promise to his friend in her time of need, we regard 




world as the world in which his default action is performed.38 Then, when the 
counterfactual comparison takes place, we compare a world in which Archie serves 
as Betty’s nurse (the default world) with a world in which he does not and can then 
conclude that Betty has been rendered worse off. More succinctly, “we take serving 
as nurse to be Archie’s default action because he is obligated to do so, conclude that 
Archie did affect Betty’s welfare and classify it as a harm” (2012: 294). Compare this 
to Betty’s Hat, wherein there is no special obligation, and in which the nearest 
possible world is, therefore, not one in which Archie by default gives Betty the hat. 
When the counterfactual comparison takes place, we therefore conclude that Betty is 
no worse off because in the next possible world, she is not given the hat anyway. In 
Betty’s Hat, we are therefore dealing merely with a failure to benefit and not a harm. 
Klocksiem fleshes this out further by explaining that: 
 
If the world in which S is better off is very similar to the comparison world, and so 
an intervention was required to prevent that world from coming about, we are 
more likely to regard the relevant event as a harm. If the world in which S is 
better off is not very similar to the relevant comparison world, and so an 
intervention was required to bring it about, we are likely to regard the relevant 
event as a failure to benefit (2012: 295). 
 
In the context of Betty’s Nurse, the world in which Betty is better off (a world 
where Archie serves as her nurse) is very similar to the comparison world (a world 
where Archie, by default, serves as her nurse) and Archie’s decision therefore 
prevents the better off world from coming about for Betty. Therefore, Betty suffers 
a harm in Betty’s Nurse. In the context of Betty’s Hat, in contrast, the world in 
which Betty is better off (a world where Archie gives her the hat) is not similar to 
the relevant comparison world (because in that world Archie’s default action is to 
not give her the hat) and therefore an intervention, on the part of Archie, was 
required to bring about the better off world for Betty. In Betty’s Hat, therefore, 
Betty is not harmed, and Archie has only failed to benefit her.  
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I find Klocksiem’s solution to hold some promise. I also find that it accords with our 
intuition that omissions are only morally impermissible when there is something 
‘extra’ such as a promise holding between friends. From a legal perspective, I 
would here also add the existence of a special relationship - for example, between 
doctors and patients, between parents and children and between police officers 
and civilians. When these extra contextual factors are at play, our intuitions 
regarding the difference between failures to benefit and harmful omissions do 
seem to differ significantly. 
 
However, I also find Klocksiem’s approach to be problematic for a variety of 
reasons. There is, firstly, the problem that in adding the requirement of extra 
contextual details, a purely objective counterfactual comparative account of harm 
is thereby abandoned in that we are now no longer only ascertaining the pure 
objective position or nearest possible world that would have occurred. Instead, we 
may be making a value judgment about what that nearest possible world should 
look like. In that way, his argument may undermine itself and show how pure 
counterfactual comparison alone cannot determine whether harm has or has not 
occurred. Secondly, it is often said that analyses of harm are supposed to be a-
moral.39 That is, whether or not a moral patient could be said to be harmed should 
not depend on the intentionality or fault of the moral agent. When we take into 
account, in our analyses of harm, aspects regarding intentionality such as broken 
promises, there might be an argument to be made that we are bringing fault, 
accountability and responsibility into the analysis and that our judgment is thereby 
being clouded by the fact that Archie has made a promise in Betty’s Nurse that he 
has not made in Betty’s Hat. It could be argued that Archie’s promise should have 
“no impact on whether the harms inflicted are of equal size; [and that it should 
affect] only the blameworthiness of [Archie] or the wrongness of [his] actions” 
(Bradley 2012: 395). If we accept Klocksiem’s argument, we may, therefore, be 
entering the realm of the wrongfulness of actions, rather than the harmfulness of 
actions. Arguably, actions must be harmful in order to be wrongful, but not the 
other way around. In other words, a particular act can be harmful to another 
person irrespective of whether or not the moral agent has acted with bad 
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intentions and thereby acted wrongly. The killing of a person, for example, can be 
harmful, irrespective of whether the actor acted with bad or good intent (for 
example in self defence). 
 
Drawing on the above, it seems as though the omission / failure to benefit problem 
is once again a serious problem for the counterfactual comparative account of 
harm. Although both Hanna and Klocksiem must be credited for identifying the 
complexities within the problem that need further exposition, their solutions are 
found wanting. My own position on the omission / failure to benefit problem, which 
will be greater detailed in section 2.4.2 below, is that the purported ethical 
difference between the two is really more of a semantic difference than a real 
difference, with the implication that the omission / failure to benefit problem is not 
a real problem.    
 
So far I have considered pre-emptive harms and the difference between 
omissions and failures to benefits in the context of the counterfactual comparative 
account. It was shown that in both contexts, the counterfactual comparative 
account of harm gives the wrong results, results which do not accord with our 
intuitions regarding harmfulness. In the next section I move to consider another 
context in which the counterfactual comparative account of harm gives the wrong 
result, that is, in the context of future persons who would not exist but for our 
harmful actions. 
 
2.3.3 Future persons who would not exist but for our harmful actions 
 
Our moral accountability towards future persons has been problematised by Parfit 
through his infamous non-identity problem. The non-identity problem has been 
widely discussed in philosophical discourse and arises in many contexts. It has been 
used, for example, to conceptualise our duties towards future people in the context 
of environmental ethics. Consider the example of ‘Risky Policy’ given by Parfit in this 





Suppose that, as a community, we have a choice between two energy policies 
[Risky Policy or Safe Policy]. Both would be completely safe for at least two 
centuries, but one would have certain risks for [future] people. If we choose 
Risky Policy, the standard of living would be slightly higher over the next two 
centuries. We do choose this policy. As a result, there is a [radiological] 
catastrophe two centuries later, which kills thousands of people. 
 
According to Parfit, our decision to adopt Risky Policy does no harm to the future 
people that are killed two centuries later in the abovementioned scenario. This is 
because if we do the opposite and choose Safe Policy, then these particular future 
people who we are now considering as the subject of harm will never exist. In other 
words, if we today choose the Safe Policy then, because of the butterfly effect of 
human action, it is quite conceivable that very different people will exist two centuries 
later, than if we had chosen Risky Policy. Therefore, choosing Risky Policy actually 
enables the persons who later die in the catastrophe to exist. If we choose Safe 
Policy, these particular people will not exist. Our decision to choose Risky Policy 
therefore benefits these people rather than harms them because it causes them to 
exist.  
 
In essence, the non-identity problem forces us to confront the following question. 
“Can an act harm someone - a future someone - if that person would never exist but 
for that very action?” (Bontly 2016: 1233). Recall that on the counterfactual 
comparative account of harm, “an action can harm someone only insofar as it is 
worse for her, and an action seemingly cannot be worse for someone if she would 
not exist without it” (Bontly 2016: 1233). Let us take another example, from within a 
biomedical context, to conceptualise this (Bradley 2012: 398): 
 
Mary’s Child: 
Suppose Mary is contemplating pregnancy. If she becomes pregnant now, she 
will conceive a child, Jane, who will have a painful disease. If she waits a few 
months to conceive, she will conceive a different child, John, who will not have 
that disease. In that case, Jane would never come into existence at all. Mary 
chooses to conceive Jane. Jane lives a good life on the whole, despite the pain 
that she endures from her disease; but due to all that pain, her life is much worse 




On Parfit’s logic, Mary’s decision cannot be said to have harmed Jane, because 
Mary’s decision is a necessary condition for Jane’s existence. Mary’s decision 
causes Jane to exist with a good life on the whole and we therefore cannot morally 
criticise the decision as being harmful to Jane because Jane is happy, on balance, to 
have been born. Jane has therefore not been rendered any worse off by Mary’s 
decision, given that an alternative choice would have resulted in Jane’s non-
existence. 
 
From examples like Risky Policy and Mary’s Child, Parfit wants to point out that a 
decision which seems to harm a future individual cannot be criticised on moral 
grounds when the very same decision which brings about the harm is linked to the 
existence of the particular future individual. More succinctly, “[t]he trouble appears 
when the very person an action would seem objectionably to harm ... would never 
exist if not for that action” (Parfit 1984: 357). This is notably the precise structure 
applicable in wrongful life cases, the action there being the negligent conduct of the 
medical practitioner. The person which the action would seem to harm (the disabled 
child) would not have existed if the medical practitioner had not acted precisely in the 
way in which he or she did. This is because the disabled child would have been 
aborted or not conceived and therefore would not have existed. According to Parfit’s 
logic, we then cannot say that the medical practitioner’s conduct was harmful to the 
wrongful life plaintiff, in that the medical practitioner did not cause the wrongful life 
plaintiff any harm. In fact, if we regard coming into existence with a life worth living to 
be a benefit, the medical practitioner’s conduct seems to benefit the wrongful life 
plaintiff in that it puts him or her into a better position (existence) then he or she 
would otherwise have been (non-existence). 
 
According to  Woollard, “[i]t is because our behaviour does not make the future 
individual worse off than they would otherwise have been that it is suggested that we 
do not harm them” (2012: 681, own emphasis). The non-identity problem therefore 
seems to create a puzzle if we generally conceptualise harm as an objective 
worsening of a counterfactual position. I will later argue that this puzzle does not 
arise if we abandon the understanding that harm has to do with the objective 
worsening of a counterfactual position. For now, however, let us consider a possible 




It has been argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm can 
accommodate the harm that Jane suffers in Mary’s Child by again relying on the 
distinction between pro-tanto harm and all-things-considered harm (Bradley 2012: 
406). The proposed solution here is that Jane does not suffer all-things-considered 
harm and only pro-tanto harm. I struggle to see how this solves anything. The non-
identity problem arises specifically because of the divergence between our intuition 
that Jane was harmed and that, theoretically, Jane was not harmed because she 
was not made worse off. We therefore need a solution that accords with our intuition 
that Jane was harmed or that does justice to this intuition. A solution that relies on 
the fact that Jane was not harmed (because she was not all-things-considered 
harmed) or that Jane was partly harmed, is therefore not adequate. We need a 
solution that accords with our intuition that she was, in fact, harmed. It is also 
important to keep in mind that overall harm is what matters, both morally and legally. 
Both moral repugnance, as well as legal liability, arguably only attach to actions that 
cause harm to a person over-all.40  
 
Let us take stock again. This chapter has so far looked at the problem that the 
counterfactual comparative account of harm is unable to account for our intuitions 
surrounding harmfulness. More specifically, it was shown that it cannot account for 
pre-emptive harms, it cannot clearly distinguish between omissions and mere 
failures to benefit, and it does not allow us to conclude that future persons whose 
existences are tied to our acts can also be harmed by those acts. At most, we can 
conclude that they have been partly harmed or harmed only in a respect, which does 
not do justice to our intuition that they are, in fact, harmed. In light of these 
considerations, I submit that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is 
extensionally inadequate in that it does not accord with our intuitions regarding 
certain instances of harm. It can therefore be said that the counterfactual 
comparative account does not adequately capture or adequately reflect what is 
intuitively harmful about harm. In light of this, the argument that the wrongful life 
plaintiff is not harmed (because he or she is not rendered any worse off) may be 
premised upon a flawed conception of harm. In the next section, I will attempt to 
show that harm is not actually about the objective worsening of counterfactual 
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positions, but rather about imposing subjective experiential states which clash with 
the subject’s will, and that the wrongful life plaintiff’s harm can be accommodated in 
this way.  
 
2.4 Non-comparative accounts of harm  
 
Proponents who ascribe to a non-comparative understanding of harm generally 
understand harm in terms of non-comparatively harmful states. More specifically, on 
a non-comparative account, a state can be harmful for a person “regardless of 
whether a better state was ever a genuine alternative for [that person]” (Hanser 
2008: 426). There is therefore no comparison with a prior state or with a state which 
could have been had things been otherwise. Gardner summarises this well in saying 
that non-comparative accounts of harm: 
 
...hold that an event harms an individual just in case it causes her to be in a bad 
state, such that the state’s badness does not derive from a comparison between 
that state and some alternative state that the individual would or could have been 
in (2015: 427, own emphasis). 
 
In this section of the thesis, I will examine two accounts of non-comparative harm - 
that of Harman and that of Shiffrin. I will try to show that they improve upon the 
counterfactual comparative account of harm because they are able to get around at 
least two of the three problems levelled against the counterfactual comparative 
account. More specifically, I will argue that although these accounts may also fail to 
distinguish between harmful omissions and mere failures to benefit, they at least fare 
better in the contexts of pre-emptive harms and in the context of the non-identity 
problem. I will also argue that Shiffrin’s non-comparative account offers better 
solutions when it comes to certain intuitive non-harms such as elected death, elected 







2.4.1 Harman’s list of harmful states  
 
Harman conceptualises harm in the form of a closed list of harmful states. There is 
no test for harm per se for Harman. There is only a list of harms such that if the 
conduct of person X results in person Y coming to be in any of the listed states, 
person Y has been harmed by person X. According to Harman, these states are 
necessarily limited to the following: “pain, mental or physical discomfort, disease, 
deformity, disability or death” (2009: 139). Therefore, in order to determine whether a 
person is harmed, we merely need to decide whether or not the person is caused to 
be in a state of pain, discomfort, disease, deformity, disability or death. If they are 
caused to be in any of the aforementioned states, they have been harmed, “even if 
the state is not worse for the victim than other states” (Gardner 2015: 430).  
 
An advantage for Harman’s account is that it seems to avoid the problems 
associated with pre-emptive harms. Recall the example of Batman’s Heart Attack. 
On Harman’s account, Batman is harmed because the heart attack causes Batman 
to die and death is a harmful state on Harman’s account, therefore Batman is 
harmed by the heart attack. The fact that Batman would have been hit by a flaming 
cannonball moments after the heart attack is, therefore, neither here nor there. 
Similarly, in the case of Archie’s Broken Legs, Archie is harmed by the broken legs 
which Veronica breaks because the result is that he suffers pain and physical 
discomfort, which is a harmful state on Harman’s account. Again, the fact that Betty 
would have broken Archie’s legs a moment after is neither here nor there. 
 
Another advantage of Harman’s non-comparative account of harm is that it may also 
get around the non-identity problem. Recall the example of Mary’s Child. On 
Harman’s account of harm, Mary has harmed Jane because her conduct causes 
Jane to be in a diseased state, irrespective of the fact that Jane would not have 
existed had Mary acted otherwise (Bradley 2012: 398). Similarly, in Risky Policy, the 
future people are harmed because their states of being accord with one or other of 
the harmful states in Harman’s list. A radiological catastrophe would surely result in 
these people suffering pain and physical discomfort and they would ultimately have 




fact that had we acted otherwise, they would not have existed and that they are, 
therefore, likely objectively better off rather than worse off.  
 
Turning to the fine line between omissions and failures to benefit, however, it seems 
as though Harman’s account cannot adequately demarcate the line between the two. 
Recall the example of One Hundred Dollars and Golf Clubs. In both instances, 
Batman’s conduct does not directly cause Robin to be in a state of pain, mental or 
physical discomfort, disease, deformity, disability or death, and he is therefore not 
harmed. However, in Betty’s Nurse, which we intuitively take to be a harmful 
omission rather than a failure to benefit, Betty is also not caused to be in a state of 
pain, mental or physical discomfort, disease, deformity, disability or death by the 
inaction of Archie either. In Betty’s Nurse, therefore, Archie does not harm Betty, 
which I have argued is intuitively the wrong result.  
 
Perhaps we could say that Betty is caused some form of mental distress and 
discomfort in Betty’s Nurse while, in One Hundred Dollars and Golf Clubs, Robin is 
not. However, we can contextualise the two Robin examples to show that Robin is 
also caused mental distress. Suppose that Robin’s family, unbeknownst to Robin, is 
being held captive. The captor presents Robin with a deal. He proposes that he will 
free Robin’s family if Robin gives him one hundred dollars on the spot. Robin opens 
his wallet and sees that he only has fifty dollars and, as a result, becomes nervous 
and scared. Had Batman given Robin the hundred dollars, Robin would have had 
enough money to pay the captor. Batman’s inaction or omission therefore harms 
Robin by causing him mental distress and discomfort. So again, as with the 
counterfactual comparative account, on Harman’s account there is seemingly no way 
to make the morally relevant distinction between harmful omissions and mere 
failures to benefit, because both harmful omissions and failures to benefit can easily 
cause one of the harmful states part of Harman’s list. 
 
Is Harman’s account, then, an improvement on the counterfactual comparative 
account of harm? Harman’s non-comparative account of harm seems to get around 
at least two of the three problems which were levied against the counterfactual 
comparative account. It is therefore an improvement on the counterfactual 




problems which bear mention. For example, Harman’s account includes death as a 
necessarily harmful state. This means that when a person dies, he or she will always 
be said to be harmed.41 I would argue that this does not accord with our intuitions 
regarding the harm in death. In some, albeit very rare, instances we generally regard 
death to be a benefit rather than a harm. Here I am referring to people who are living 
in intolerable suffering and pain with no hope of recovery. In such instances, death 
may come as a benefit rather than as a harm. Harman’s account cannot 
accommodate this. 
 
A different though related point can be made about deformity. On Harman’s account, 
deformity is necessarily harmful. However, in many societies, deformity is seen as 
something positive, and even something to strive towards. For example, in some 
countries the practice of ‘neck stretching’ is a beauty ideal which gives women better 
marital prospects and therefore leads to better economic circumstances, despite 
causing physical deformities of the neck. There is also the fact that modest body 
modification is widely practiced in contemporary western culture. The example of ear 
lobe stretching makes this clear. Despite the fact that these are literally deformities of 
the ear, people choose them, and people enjoy them. In what way can we then say 
that these things are then harmful to them? On the contrary, I would argue that these 
things are not harmful, precisely because they are consented to.42  
 
The examples of the non-harm in death and deformity lead me to question whether 
harm is perhaps more of a subjective phenomenon than we generally regard it to be. 
In fact, I would argue that the counterfactual comparative account of harm actually 
brings this to the fore anyway, contrary to what most counterfactual comparative 
harm theorists would admit. Suppose, for instance, that Robin and Archie both have 
a set of 100 stamps. Batman steals 50 stamps from each of them. In both instances 
Robin and Archie are worse off than they would otherwise have been because they 
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each have 50 stamps less. However, suppose that Robin is an avid stamp collector 
whilst Archie has merely inherited an unwanted stamp collection from his 
grandfather. If this were the case then, intuitively, only Robin would be harmed, 
because only Robin would be bothered about his loss of the 50 stamps. Schramme 
summarises this well (2013: 86): 
 
We value different things ... Someone might lose a stamp from his collection and 
would be worse off than before, but might not be bothered about it at all. For 
someone else, this loss might be deemed a considerable worsening of his 
situation. Hence, whether something is comparative harm seems to depend on 
subjective evaluations (own emphasis). 
 
Harman’s account is therefore extensionally inadequate with respect to the 
possibility of non-harm in death and non-harm in deformity, thereby implying that her 
account does not take into account the subjective nature of harm. One can also think 
of numerous other instances of harm which are not on the list. In addition, the 
obvious major problem with Harman’s account is that it is not a unified account of 
harm. Her account does not explain what unifies the items on her list. More 
specifically, it does not tell us why pain, physical and mental discomfort, disease, 
deformity, disability and death are all harmful to the subject. In other words, the 
account does not “explain what all harms have in common by locating a common 
core to them” and it therefore violates the unity principle as a core desideratum of a 
good account of harm (Bradley 2012: 395). In light of this problem, let us move on to 
consider another non-comparative account of harm which might provide the glue for 
the unification of the items on Harman’s list, that is, an account which shows why all 
of these above-mentioned states might be harmful, without resorting to the fact that 
they make the subject objectively worse off.  
 
2.4.2 Shiffrin’s will-based account of harm 
 
After noting the various problems that the counterfactual comparative account of 
harm runs into in the context of pre-emption and failures to benefit, Shiffrin comes to 





These examples raise the question of why comparisons are salient. What seems 
basic to the moral significance of harm is the condition that one is in, not the 
condition one was or otherwise could have been in. One’s broken limb [in the 
rescue case] will have a similar reason-requiring force whether or not it registers 
a comparative decline in one’s condition. The concern is that even if modified 
comparative accounts can deliver the right answers in these cases, they will still 
be chasing after results. It will remain unclear why comparisons ought to be 
central to assessments of harm (Shiffrin 2012: 369, own emphasis). 
 
Like Harman, Shiffrin advocates for a non-comparative account of harm. In her 
account, she also mentions potential examples of harmful states such as death, 
broken limbs, pain and disability, but her account is not necessarily limited to these 
states in the same way that Harman’s account is (2012: 376). In this sense, Shiffrin’s 
account of harm provides a test for harm, rather than a list of harms. Her test for 
harm is developed out of what she takes to be the commonality between harmful 
states. For Shiffrin, what all harmful states have in common is that they conflict with 
or usurp an individual’s will (Gardner 2015: 432). 
 
In order to understand how Shiffrin gets here, we need to first look at her discussion 
of the asymmetry between harms and benefits. According to Shiffrin, there exists a 
moral asymmetry between harms and benefits.43 In the first place, harms and 
benefits have different reason-requiring justificatory force. In the case of the 
bestowal of a benefit, simple assent of the recipient is required, whereas in the case 
of the bestowal of a harm, something more is required in that the harm must be 
deserved, it must be necessary to vindicate a right, it must be necessary to avoid a 
greater harm or it must be consented to, in order to be morally permissible (2012: 
362). In the second place, says Shiffrin, “it is often impermissible for a third party to 
impose a harm to secure an overall benefit for a nonconsenting agent but 
permissible and even reasonable for that agent to make the same decision for 
herself” (2012: 376). For example, it seems permissible for a surgeon to sever an 
unconscious person’s arm in order to avoid the patient dying (thereby preventing a 
greater harm), whilst it does not seem equally permissible for a surgeon to sever an 
unconscious patient’s arm in order to enhance memory, hearing or appearance 
                                            
43




(thereby bestowing a benefit) (2012: 363). The proviso, however, is that in the latter 
case, the severing of the arm in order to bestow some kind of enhancement or 
benefit, is rendered permissible if the patient consents. This makes sense in the 
context of cosmetic plastic surgery. In the case of a nose job, for instance, a patient 
consents to the physical deformity of a broken nose, a crushed septum and the 
consequent pain in order to be benefitted by a more aesthetic appearance.   
 
Based on these observations, Shiffrin concludes that “the relation of the [potentially 
harmful] condition to the will of the agent who endures it may play a more integral 
role than comparative, interest-based accounts assign it” (2012: 376). More 
particularly, Shiffrin argues that because consent authorises harm in instances 
where harm would usually be impermissible, this is evidence of the fact that agency 
and autonomy play important roles in our ascriptions of harm. Armed with this 
understanding, Shiffrin then moves to define harm as “a distinctive sort of frustration 
or impediment of the will or of the ability to exert and effect one’s will” (2012: 383). 
Harm, for Shiffrin, therefore lies within the process of being subjectively frustrated or 
impeded in the exercise of one’s autonomous will. More specifically, harm comes 
about by frustrating “an agent’s efforts to exert her will to influence, adapt, 
manipulate, and conform her experience and environment to fit her will” (2012: 382). 
 
Let us take a few examples to illustrate how this plays out. In the case of death, for 
instance, Shiffrin argues that unelected death interferes with the will of the subject in 
that “[b]y constraining the duration and contents of one’s life, it forces a particular 
end to a person – making her passive with respect to that central aspect of her life...” 
(2012: 386). It is, however, important that she refers to unelected death and thereby 
acknowledges that in some instances, where death is elected, death can come as a 
benefit or at least as a non-harm to the subject, such as in consented to deaths in 
physician-assisted euthanasia. I noted that elected death presents a problem for 
Harman’s account above. Shiffrin’s account seems to overcome it.   
 
In respect of pain, deformity, disability and disease, moreover, Shiffrin says that 
these conditions may have the effect that they “forcibly impose experiential states 
that clash with one’s will … [as] … such conditions [may] significantly impede one’s 




396). Importantly, however, by acknowledging that these experiential states must be 
forcibly imposed to constitute harm, she allows for the fact that sometimes pain, 
deformity and disability and disease are not experienced as harms by the subject, 
that is, when they are consented to.  
 
Consider the case of pain for example. We generally understand pain to forcibly 
impose an experiential state upon a subject which clashes with his or her will. 
Indeed, when I stub my toe on the doorway, I am generally enraged at the fact that a 
state of pain has been imposed upon me. But then how are we to understand those 
who are disposed to masochism and S&M? These people consent to pain and 
physical discomfort because they find these things pleasurable. On Shiffrin’s 
account, they are therefore not harmed, because nothing usurps their wills. Instead, 
the seemingly harmful conduct becomes not harmful, precisely because the conduct 
actually accords with the subjects’ wills. I believe this realisation actually accords 
with our intuitive understanding of harmfulness. A similar argument can be made 
about those who engage in painful contact sport such as boxing. Intuitively, we do 
not take these sports stars to be harmed by engaging in these sports; in fact we 
praise them and admire them for their strength and courage. A further similar 
argument can be made in the context of deformity and body modification, as 
discussed earlier under Harman’s account. In light of these observations, it can be 
said that “whether something is a ... harm seems to depend on subjective 
evaluations” (Schramme 2013: 86). Shiffrin aptly summarises the abovementioned 
sentiments in the following way: 
 
...harm brings about a cleavage between a person’s life and her will. When she 
actively decides to undergo a harmful condition, that cleavage is partially or 
perhaps entirely bridged by the operation of her will and control. The active 
engagement and operation of her will, in taking on and endorsing the imposition 
of harm, changes the significance of the harm into more of that associated with a 
mere cost (1999: 130, own emphasis). 
 
Turning to disability, consider the case of a young man, Bernard, who is a high 
school football star on track for a scholarship and a professional football career, and 




that if Bernard were to become a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident, his 
disability would have the effect that it would result in a substantial incongruity 
between his will (in wanting to be a professional football star) and his life (never 
being able to become a professional football star). His disability would therefore 
come to him as a harm. A similar process could take place in the context of a 
debilitating disease which has the effect that a person’s goals and desires become 
unattainable. Again, should the person want to become disabled or want to contract 
the particular disease, they are not harmed, on Shiffrin’s account.44  
 
Besides the more serious cases of unelected death, pain, disability and disease, 
however, Shiffrin’s account of harm can also explain why the interference with 
everyday common life projects or goals harm those affected. Recall the case of 
Alastair, discussed earlier, who has a small pension and decides to invest some of 
his funds to end up with more funds, but who inadvertently ends up investing them in 
an illegal ‘Ponzi scheme’ with a dishonest advisor. On Shiffrin’s account, Alastair is 
harmed by the financial advisor, not because he moves into a worse off objective 
position than he would otherwise have been, but because the financial advisor’s 
conduct causes a frustration or impediment of Alastair’s will in wanting to secure a 
better financial future. This seems to better explain what is harmful about the harm 
that Alastair suffers.  
 
Shiffrin’s account therefore seems to deliver the right answers. However, does it also 
overcome the problems of pre-emptive harms, omissions and the non-identity 
problem? In the first place, in the context of pre-emptive harms, it allows us to 
conclude, as Harman’s account also does and the counterfactual comparative 
account does not, that Batman is harmed by the heart attack and that Archie is 
harmed by having his legs broken. However, in contrast to Harman’s account, 
Shiffrin’s account has a stronger justificatory force for why this is so. Recall that for 
Harman, Batman is harmed by the heart attack because it causes death, which is a 
harmful state, and Archie is harmed by the broken legs because this causes 
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disability and pain, which are harmful states. For Shiffrin, however, these things are 
harmful because they are states which Batman and Archie did not will for 
themselves. Batman did not will for himself a heart attack or death, and Archie did 
not will for himself broken legs. If they had willed these states, however, they would 
not be harmed, on Shiffrin’s account. I agree with this implication. It seems clear to 
me that once a potentially harmful state or condition is willed, the state or condition is 
no longer harmful to the subject. The example of death makes this very clear. If I 
want to die, then my death comes to me as a benefit, rather than a harm. Similarly, if 
I want to engage in painful S&M activities, the pain is subjectively experienced as 
beneficial, rather than harmful.   
 
How does Shiffrin’s account fare in the context of the non-identity problem? Some 
argue that Shiffrin’s account faces a major problem in this context. That is, that if 
harm has to do with the usurping of the will, then it seems as though persons or 
entities who at the time at which harmful conduct ensues do not have wills, cannot 
be harmed. Jane, in Mary’s Child, for example, would probably not will upon herself 
a disability, but at the time at which Mary makes the decision to continue the 
pregnancy (when Jane is still in utero), Jane does not yet have a will with which 
Mary’s decision could clash. Similarly, in Risky Policy, although these future persons 
would probably not will upon themselves a radiological catastrophe which would 
result in their premature and painful deaths, they do not yet exist and therefore do 
not have wills at the time at which the decision is made. Likewise, in the wrongful life 
action, the disabled child who is subsequently born does not have a will at the time 
at which the medical practitioner acts.  
 
Many have argued that this is an insurmountable problem for Shiffrin’s account of 
harm. In fact, Bradley argues that it has the result that it violates ontological 
neutrality, in that it only allows for certain kinds of beings (being conscious 
autonomous beings with wills) to be the victims of harms (2012: 400). Consider the 
cases of foetuses, neonates and infants, or adults who are unconscious or brain 
damaged. How might we conceptualise that an event has had the effect that it 
results in “a distinctive sort of frustration or impediment of the will or of the ability to 





One possible solution is that, in cases where the subjects of harm are unable to 
consent or unable to express their wills, we can rely on their hypothetical non-
consent. In other words, one can say that Jane is harmed by being born in the 
diseased state (even though she does not have a will at the time that Mary makes 
the decision), and that future people are harmed in Risky Policy (even though they 
do not yet exist and therefore do not have wills), because if they did have wills at the 
time at which the potentially harmful conduct ensues, they would have objected 
(Rabenberg 2015: 4).  
 
In fact, hypothetical postulations of the will are not uncommon in moral contexts. 
When we are faced with moral dilemmas in the context of incapacitated or 
unconscious persons, we generally act in accordance with our intuitive moral 
judgments on whether or not a particular person would consent to condition X or Y. 
Consider the scenario of a patient born with severe cognitive impairment and who is 
kept alive through a feeding tube. In such a scenario, our judgments on whether or 
not the patient would prefer to carry on living cannot be based on any previously 
expressed will. A decision that the patient is harmed by being kept alive through the 
artificial feeding tube can therefore only be based upon a hypothetical postulation of 
that patient’s will, because there is no evidence of such a will. In other words, the 
decision is based upon a reasonable person standard because we have no 
knowledge of what the particular individual would or would not will for him or herself. 
 
This is a similar approach, although very different in method, to the approach taken 
by Judge Ben-Porat in the case of the wrongful life action in Zeitsov v Katz 
mentioned in Chapter 1. Recall that Judge Ben-Porat’s view was that in some 
instances, albeit very rare instances, it could be concluded that a disabled life is 
more harmful to its subject than not existing, if the reasonable person would deem it 
so. Judge Ben-Porat’s suggestion is therefore that the reasonable person can 
represent the hypothetical postulation on whether a disabled neonate’s life would be 
better or worse than not existing. In this way, we can hypothetically postulate 
whether or not a particular disabling condition is a condition that one would not will 





Hypothetically postulating the will of another person who cannot communicate his or 
her will, however, makes me ethically uncomfortable. Moreover, and more 
importantly, if harm has to do with will-usurping experiential states that are imposed 
upon a person (which I have attempted to show above) then harm is necessarily 
subjective in nature and, therefore, harm must be subjectively experienced in order 
for it to be harmful. If this is true, then relying on hypothetical consent, in the absence 
of a previously expressed will, cannot adequately ground a claim that a person has 
or has not been harmed. Does this then imply, however, that all persons who are 
unable to express a will at the time at which the potentially harmful event occurs, 
cannot be harmed? According to Shiffrin, this is not necessarily the case. In this 
regard, Shiffrin explains that our actions can set into motion causal chains which 
result in harm that occurs in the future. That is, that harm can be retroactive in 
nature. She aptly describes this in the following way:  
 
If our actions now set into motion causal chains that will result in a right’s being 
violated in the future, the action is, at best, morally problematic. That the effect is 
not imminent and the future rights holder is not present at the time of our action 
matters little. Immediacy carries little moral imperative (1999: 138). 
 
Shiffrin draws on Feinberg’s bomb example to explain this.45 In the bomb example, 
Feinberg asks us to imagine that a person places a bomb inside a pre-school 
classroom and programs it to go off in seven years. As planned, the bomb goes off 
seven years later and kills a number of five-year old children. Here, it is natural that 
we should find the bomb planter’s conduct to be harmful to the children who die 
seven years later, even though at the time that the bomb is planted (two years before 
their coming into existence), they did not yet exist and therefore did not have wills to 
be usurped. According to Shiffrin, this is because the bomb planter’s conduct 
violates the rights of, and thereby harms, the children who will exist seven years 
later. More specifically, the action “sets into motion a chain of events that will lead to 
the violation of the rights that will come to be held” (1999: 137).  
 
That there can be a time gap between the harmful event or the harmful act and the 
harmful felt effects or harmful consequences of that event is actually not that 
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strange. This is the approach which was taken by the South African Supreme Court 
of Appeal in RAF v Mtati, discussed in Chapter 1. In that case, recall that a pregnant 
pedestrian was struck by a car and the child that was in utero at the time was 
subsequently born with brain damage. The Road Accident Fund argued that no harm 
could be done to a non-existent person. The court, however, took a different 
approach and ruled that there could be a time lapse between the harmful conduct 
(the conduct of the driver by driving into the pregnant pedestrian) and the injury 
which sets in as a result (the disability that the child suffers from). Therefore, 
although at the time that the conduct took place the child was not a ‘person’, the 
child became a ‘person’ upon being born alive, and it is at this juncture that the harm 
sets in. Similarly, we could say that in the case of Mary’s Child, although Jane does 
not exist at the time that Mary makes her decision, she is harmed upon being born 
disabled once the effects of her disability come to life and start to affect her. 
Likewise, the future persons in Risky Policy experience the harmful effects of the 
choice when the radiological catastrophe occurs, not at the time that we as society 
members make the actual harmful choice.  
 
I find Shiffrin’s argument that harm can be retroactive in nature and that immediacy 
carries little moral imperative to be persuasive. I also think that if we acknowledge 
this, coupled with an acknowledgment that harm is subjective in nature, then the 
harm paradox within the wrongful life action is resolved. More specifically, if we say 
that harm is about subjective clashes of the will, and that the enquiry into whether or 
not the medical practitioner imposed upon the disabled child a condition which the 
particular child would not will for him or herself need not necessarily take place at the 
time at which the medical practitioner acts, then the wrongful life plaintiff can, in 
principle, be said to be harmed. The enquiry can take place once the disability 
arises, or even once the child expresses subjective disaffection as a result of the 
disability with which he or she was born. As mentioned, South African delictual law 
acknowledges this in any event.  
 
One last problem, however, is that the abovementioned approach would only be 
available to those who are able to communicate that a harmful act has usurped their 
will. Those who are disabled to the extent that they cannot communicate this would 




claim on his or her behalf and would have to rely on the hypothetical non-consent of 
the disabled child. As mentioned earlier, however, I find this approach problematic, 
and I, therefore, put forward that only those who are able to communicate that their 
disabilities clash with their wills should be able to claim via the wrongful life action. 
This, therefore, leaves those who are intellectually disabled to such an extent that 
communication is severely affected without any wrongful life remedy.46 I pause here 
to note, however, that I find this to be a necessary limitation for the wrongful life 
action. In the first place, and as will become clear from a reading of Chapter 3, there 
is no uniform understanding of the nature of disability, and we can therefore never 
say for sure that disability as such is necessarily harmful. Instead, what we have is a 
mixed understanding wherein either the individual suffering aspect is emphasised 
(the medical model) or the social discrimination aspect is emphasised (the social 
model). In the second place, and more importantly, disabled people tend to view 
disability differently to the way that most able-bodied people do. It is, therefore, 
imperative that only a disabled person who him - or herself subjectively feels that 
their disability is harmful should have access to a wrongful life claim.  
 
To summarise the above, it seems that Shiffrin’s account, albeit with a little bit of 
extra work, can accommodate the non-identity problem. By acknowledging that harm 
can be retroactive and that the harmful felt effects of a harmful act can take place 
later, the harm suffered by a wrongful life plaintiff can therefore be acknowledged.  
 
Turning lastly to the context of omissions and failures to benefit, Shiffrin’s account 
seems to run into another hurdle and this time, it cannot be overcome. Recall the 
examples of One Hundred Dollars and Golf Clubs. The counterfactual comparative 
account has the effect that Robin is harmed in both One Hundred Dollars and in Golf 
Clubs because he is rendered worse off than he would have been had he received 
the money and the golf clubs. Intuitively, however, one would take Robin to have 
been deprived of a benefit only and thereby not harmed. On Harman’s account, 
Robin is not harmed in either of these scenarios, because he is not placed into one 
of the states which are part of her list. However, as we saw, we can contextualise the 
examples in a way that Batman’s omissions do come to Robin as harms. On both 
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accounts, therefore, there is seemingly no reliable way to distinguish between 
harmful omissions and mere failures to benefit.  
 
How does Shiffrin’s account fare? Upon a Shiffrinean reading of One Hundred 
Dollars and Golf Clubs, we may want to say that Robin has been harmed. This is 
because it could be argued that Robin would most definitely have wanted one 
hundred dollars and the golf clubs and would probably have willed those states for 
himself.47 Therefore, he is harmed by Batman in Batman not giving him these things. 
Therefore, it seems that Shiffrin’s account collapses the distinction between harmful 
omissions and failures to benefit, in the same way that the counterfactual 
comparative account and Harman’s non-comparative account do as well. In light of 
this, it seems that the omission/failure to benefit problem is a serious problem for all 
three accounts. 
 
The fact that the omission/failure to benefit problem is a serious problem for all three 
accounts of harm discussed in this chapter might also suggest something further 
regarding the relationship between harm and non-benefits in general. That is, that 
harm and non-benefits might only differ semantically, and not ethically.48 This claim, 
of course, however, runs contrary to the generally accepted view which is that 
“[m]oral common sense holds that harming a person is a graver offence than merely 
failing to benefit him” (Purves 2019: 2629). My aforementioned claim, in the context 
of omissions and failures to benefit, therefore, leaves us with some open questions, 
which could be better explored in future research, but which I will briefly mention 
here. 
 
Firstly, if there is no morally relevant distinction between harm and non-benefits, and 
failing to benefit can also constitute harm, could it be argued that there are actually 
moral obligations to benefit others? In fact this is not actually that strange. In the 
context of human enhancement, for example, some have argued that failing to 
enhance a person (i.e. failing to benefit that person) may actually constitute a harm 
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to that person.49 Another example that comes to mind, from within the political or 
legal context, is that of affirmative action. The underlying premise of such a policy is 
that failing to benefit previously disadvantaged persons is a form of harm to those 
persons in that it perpetuates their socio-economic exclusion. Take the example of a 
trust fund which provides for bursaries for white students only. In such an example, it 
can be said that black students are indirectly harmed, and there are a host of 
regional legislative mechanisms, constitutional provisions and international law 
instruments which enforce the prevention of such harm.50 However, if we analyse the 
‘harm’ which befalls the black students who are denied access to the bursary 
scheme it really is more of a failing to benefit which takes place here. In other words, 
these students are denied something that would benefit them – that of affordable 
education. These examples show that moral obligations to enhance are quite real. 
 
Secondly, if we then accept that moral obligations to benefit exist, what kinds of 
benefits should qualify as morally compelling action on the part of the moral agent? 
In other words, should a moral obligation to benefit be qualified? For example, 
perhaps a moral obligation to benefit could be qualified by saying that only benefits 
which are related to basic welfare (such as food and water) would qualify as 
compelling action. It seems morally imperative, for instance, that governments 
should be expected to ensure that their citizens have access to basic goods. The 
existence of social grants and government pensions, for instance, seems to affirm 
this. Another possible way in which a moral obligation to enhance could be qualified 
is by saying that only benefits which would enhance previously disadvantaged 
persons (such as in the example of affirmative action above) should morally compel 
an agent to act. These are open questions and open examples which may be 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Let us take final stock. This chapter has looked at the concept of harm in moral 
theorising. We began by noting that the moral account of harm which underpins the 
legal account is the counterfactual comparative account. We then proceeded to 
examine this account and found it to be problematic in the context of pre-emptive 
harms, in the context of failures to benefits and omissions, and in the context of 
future persons who would not exist but for our harmful actions.  
 
We then moved on to consider two non-comparative accounts of harm. Here, we 
found that with both non-comparative accounts, in contrast to comparative accounts, 
the pre-emption and non-identity problems do not arise. The non-comparative 
accounts are therefore an improvement on the counterfactual comparative account. 
We also found that Shiffrin’s account provides us with a more adequate justification 
for why pre-emptive harms could still be harmful and for why future persons who 
would not exist but for our harmful acts could still be harmed by our actions. This is 
because harm comes about when it causes a situation that conflicts with one’s will. I 
tried to show that this makes intuitive sense when we consider the non-harm in 
elected death and elected assault.  
 
I also tried to show that the conflict with the will need not be immediate, such that 
persons who do not have fully developed wills at the time at which potentially harmful 
events occur can suffer harm after the fact. There can also be a time gap between 
the event that puts those effects into motion and the subjective effect on the 
subject’s will. The harm paradox within the wrongful life action is thereby resolved 
and the act of the medical practitioner, in omitting to identity the disability, could 
easily come as a harm to the plaintiff if the specific plaintiff takes his or her disability 
to be a harmful condition which he or she would not consent to or would not will for 
him or herself. 
 
When it came to omissions and failures to benefit, however, we found that none of 
the accounts on offer - being the counterfactual comparative account, Harman’s 
account and Shiffrin’s account - give us the right answers. I think this is precisely 




Whether an event would come as a harm or a failure to benefit would seem to 
depend entirely upon the subject’s will. If Robin, in Golf Clubs, was more like 
Alastair, the elderly gentleman in need of extra cash for retirement, we could say that 
Batman harms him by not giving him the extra cash. However, if Robin was a secret 
incessant gambler desperately trying to recover from his gambling addiction, then 
Batman neglecting to give him the extra cash would not be harmful to Batman. We 
have now also seen that this leads to interesting implications regarding the 
relationship between harm and benefit in general and that it also leaves open some 



























Chapter 3: Disability and harmfulness 
 
3.1 Introductory remarks  
 
In this chapter of the thesis, I want to examine the ways in which disability may be a 
harmful state or condition.51 However, and as argued in Chapter 2, a state or 
condition is only harmful to a subject, on my understanding, if the subject deems it to 
be harmful. Therefore, the question of whether disability is necessarily harmful can 
be seen as an ambiguous question, in that it does not qualify from whose 
perspective it should be answered from. In other words, when we are talking about 
one or other state being harmful, we also need to talk about harmful for whom, or 
from whose perspective? Taking this as a point of departure, we will see, in this 
chapter, that there are a myriad of approaches to the harmfulness or otherwise of 
disability. For instance, some view having a disability as a form of suffering that 
comes about as a result of individual functional deficiencies. On the other hand, 
some regard societal biases and attitudes towards disability as the cause of the 
suffering that disabled people experience and hold that there is therefore nothing 
inherently harmful about disability. There is also the fact that disabled people tend to 
view disability very differently to the way that most able-bodied people do. This is 
reflected in the fact that able-bodied persons generally express a preference towards 
their able-bodied-ness over being disabled, whilst disabled persons express a 
preference in favour of their disability. In light of all of this, this chapter is intended to 
be explorative rather than authoritative. In essence, I want to examine the ways in 
which disability might be harmful to its subject, which is not to say that disability is 
harmful as such.   
 
In order to address the above, this chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will begin 
with an examination of the way in which disability has traditionally been 
conceptualised, that is, from within the domain of the medical or biological model. It 
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will be seen that on this model, disability is conceptualised as a form of deficient 
human functioning and the harmful effects of disability are viewed as the inevitable 
outcome of biological impairment. Disability, as understood on this model, is 
furthermore necessarily or intrinsically a ‘bad’ thing and can, and should, be 
remedied through medical intervention.  
 
Following this, I will then, turn to an examination of the social model of disability, 
which stands in direct contrast to the medical or biological model. Although there is 
much disagreement among proponents of the social model, the basic idea that they 
all ascribe to is that disability is not something bad in itself; rather, disability is 
socially constructed and a form of discrimination. Many disabled persons who follow 
the social model, for example, do not think of themselves as disabled but, rather, as 
‘differently-abled’. Leading on from this, it is argued that if social discrimination 
against disabled persons is removed, the lives of disabled persons would be easier, 
and the harmful aspects of disability would disappear. Thus, although disability is 
sometimes something ‘bad’ that disabled people experience, it can be changed or 
addressed on a collective societal level, and it is thus not something inevitably, 
inherently, or necessarily bad for the disabled individual.  
 
Following this, I will then turn to examine some concrete ways in which it might be 
argued that a disabled state is a harmful state, whilst working from within both 
models of disability described above. I will adopt Harris’ conceptualisation of a 
harmful or harmed condition here, that is, a condition which one has a strong rational 
preference not to be in.52 This naturally follows from my understanding of harm as a 
subjective usurping of the will. Here I will turn to examine possible arguments for why 
a disabled state might be said to be a condition that one has a strong rational 
preference not to be in, and therefore something bad or harmful for the disabled 
person. I specifically look at three common arguments here. These are, firstly, that 
disability involves necessary suffering; secondly, that disability involves a lack of or 
decreased access to important qualia; and thirdly, that disability involves a lack of 
autonomy or decreased sense of personal agency.  
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Against this background of the different models of disability and the different ways in 
which disability can be seen as a harmful condition, I will then turn towards the 
question as to whether it is morally permissible to cause a disabled life, or to causally 
contribute to a disabled life (as in the case of the conduct at issue in the wrongful life 
action). This is important because even though disability might not necessarily be 
harmful for a particular disabled person, it may still be that causing the disability is 
what is harmful.  
 
Before proceeding with all of the above, however, it would be wise to again pause 
and consider the value of an analysis or problematisation of the normative concept of 
disability. In this respect, Harris posits that “[t]he answer to the question ‘what is 
disability’ is of more than semantic importance” (2001: 383). Nathan and Brown 
(2018: 593) furthermore echo this by saying the following: “[u]nderstanding the 
nature of disability is of the utmost normative and practical significance .... [in order 
to] ensure equal opportunities, participation and flourishing ... for all citizens.” More 
specifically, disability as such needs to be properly understood so as to pick out the 
correct ethical measures or tools to be employed in the context of disabled persons 
as a group. This will become especially evident in relation to the wrongful life action, 
as the action itself can be seen as one such ethical measure or tool, developed 
against the backdrop of a particular understanding of disability. For present 
purposes, it suffices to note that the action is specifically geared towards 
compensating a person for the fact that he or she has been caused to live a life in a 
disabled state. Depending upon the model of disability one follows, this 
compensation can be interpreted very differently.53    
 
3.2 The traditional medical/biological model of disability 
 
Let us then begin with the traditional model of disability. The traditional model of 
disability is rooted in the medical or biological approach, and adopts a biomedical 
definition of disability. In this regard, disability is viewed as “some sort of medically 
observable deviation from biomedical norms” or as a form of a-typical species 
functioning (Riddle 2013: 378). A-typical species functioning is something ‘bad’ when 
                                            
53




it deviates from the norm to such a degree that it is disadvantageous to the 
organism. For example, a person who is bound to a wheelchair cannot walk whereas 
the majority of the population can walk, and the person’s a-typical functioning is 
therefore a disadvantage relative to the rest of the population. A disability is thus 
necessarily bad on this model, unless the disability produces some sort of advantage 
for the individual, relative to the rest of the population, in which case it would actually 
be an adaptive ability, rather than a disability. 
 
Under this model, moreover, disability is viewed as an individual pathology, located 
within the disabled individual him or herself, and particularly within his or her own 
physical body (Riddel 2013: 378). Because of this, there is said to be a direct causal 
relationship between biological impairment and the functional limitation. Functional 
limitations (commonly referred to under this model as ‘handicaps’), such as not being 
able to access a building on account of not being able to walk and thus being unable 
to ascend a staircase, are seen as the direct result or the inevitable outcome of the 
underlying biological impairment. Another way of saying this is that “impairment is 
the primary cause of social or personal limitation” (Nathan & Brown 2018: 594, own 
emphasis). McMichael, for instance, says that “a physical handicap, of itself, 
constitutes an emotional hazard and sooner or later will become an emotional 
challenge for both the child and his family” (1971: 15, own emphasis). 
 
By this logic, furthermore, it can be said that the removal of functional limitations or 
‘handicaps’ is to be done by removing or ‘treating’ the impairment itself. This is 
because impairments are viewed as properties of individuals and individual bodies, 
and “the problem of disability is seen as a problem of individuals, to be dealt with ... 
by medical cures and rehabilitations” (Amundson & Tresky 2007: 544). Disability is 
thus a medical condition, which has a medical remedy. 
 
From the above, we can distil the following characteristics of the traditional model of 
disability. Firstly, disability is necessarily a bad or harmful thing for a disabled person 
because it results in unnatural or deviant human functioning which produces no 
advantage for the individual relative to the general population. Secondly, disability 
flows directly from the underlying impairment so that the impairment is necessarily 




address this is by ‘fixing’ the impairment through individual  medical treatment in the 
form of medications, operations and rehabilitations, so as to restore or enable the 
‘normal’ functioning of the individual as much as is physically possible.   
 
3.3 The social model of disability 
 
The social model of disability developed largely as a critical response to the 
traditional medical model. There are many versions of and progressive debates 
within the social model. Nevertheless; the common perspective shared by its 
proponents is that disability is not viewed as the direct consequence of impairment; 
rather, disability is seen as something which is socially constructed. “An impairment 
or abnormality [under the social model] is no less a social construction than a credit 
rating or income-tax bracket” (Allen 2005: 95). In this regard, disability is something 
we create or something we impose onto experience. In this way, and more 
specifically, disability, as a concept, becomes influenced by “social forces such as 
morally impermissible attitudes, neglect and architectural barriers, unfairly imposed 
on people with impairments” (Nathan & Brown 2018: 594).  
 
Therefore, whilst the traditional model adopts an individual pathological approach, 
the social model adopts a social pathological approach and posits that limitations 
experienced by disabled persons are not caused by their individual physical 
impairments. Rather, they originate within the social context. The solution to 
eliminating the harmfulness which disabled people encounter in their everyday lives, 
moreover, is to eliminate discrimination in society and to adopt stringent 
accommodation measures so that every disabled person is able to flourish within the 
community. In other words, “impairment is not a problem, it is the way difference and 
impairment manifest themselves in our social institutions that results in a problem” 
(Riddel 2013: 378). In this regard, Alison Davis (a disability activist who also 
happens to have spina bifida) says the following: 
 
... if I lived in a society where being in a wheelchair was no more remarkable 
than wearing glasses and if the community was completely accepting and 
accessible, my disability would be an inconvenience and not much more than 




the fact that I have spina bifida (Davis 1989, cited in Newell 1999: 173-174, own 
emphasis). 
 
On this model, therefore, disability is not defined in individual functional terms, but 
rather in terms of unfair social disadvantages and socially imposed restrictions of 
activity and autonomy, caused directly as a result of discrimination. From this we can 
deduce the following: whilst under the medical model impairments are necessarily a 
bad thing because they result in disadvantageous functional limitations, under the 
social model impairments are conditionally bad as the badness of disability comes 
only as a result of discrimination. In other words, impairments in and of themselves 
are neutral and only become negative if persons with impairments find themselves 
within a society which is discriminatory towards people with impairments.  
 
An example can be used to illustrate this. Many deaf persons do not identify as being 
disabled, but rather as ‘differently abled’. For some deaf persons “[d]eafness is not 
pathological, but merely another way of being normal” (Cooper 2007: 563). 
Deafness, on this understanding, is thus not a medical condition and it does not 
need to be cured.54 Many deaf persons claim that although they do not utilise the 
‘normal’ mode of communication, they still communicate and convey ideas in much 
the same way that hearing persons do, and that they merely utilise a different 
medium to do so. In fact, it is sometimes suggested that sign language is in some 
ways even superior to spoken language, which would mean that deafness becomes 
an adaptive ability. For example, it has been suggested that sign language is easier 
to use than oral language because less muscle control is required; that sign 
language conveys better information in terms of spatial relations; and that sign 
language is four-dimensional and therefore more expressive than oral language 
(Cooper 2007: 574). 
 
Drawing on this, it might be ethically suspect to suggest that being deaf is something 
bad or harmful in itself. Might it not be that being deaf is merely another way of being 
in the world and that the only thing bad that deaf persons experience is 
discrimination and a social environment that does not accommodate them? In fact, 
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examples of deviations from ‘normalness’ or from normal biological functioning in 
other contexts shows that deviations from normal biological functioning are not 
necessarily bad things. The example of homosexuality makes this clear. 
Homosexuality can be viewed as a form of a-typical species functioning, in the strict 
medical sense, but it can be argued that it is not a necessarily harmful state. The 
harm that befalls homosexual persons, on this understanding, comes about only as a 
result of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.55  
 
The social model has been quite successful in addressing discrimination against 
disabled persons. However, there is a core criticism often levied against it. This is 
that the model underplays or neglects the impact of physical impairment when, in 
fact, it is an important aspect of many disabled persons’ lives (Shakespeare 2013: 
217). It is especially hard, for instance, to ignore the negative physical aspects of 
impairment for persons with degenerative diseases and constant pain. Addressing 
discrimination and increasing positive accommodation for a person in constant pain 
will not change the brute fact that the person is in constant physical pain. Related to 
this, the social model has often been interpreted as a rejection of medical prevention, 
medical cures and rehabilitation, because of the downplaying of physical impairment 
and the focus on the elimination of discrimination as the ‘cure’ (Shakespeare 2013: 
218). It has also been argued that the social model has the implication that causing 
disability would not be wrong. 
 
Let us take stock again. We started by examining the traditional medical or biological 
approach to understanding disability. In this context, we said that disability is 
understood to be a direct result of biological impairment and deficient human 
functioning. We then moved on to the social model and found that the social model 
questions this underlying causal relationship and deems it to be misconstrued. 
Instead, under the social model, disability is seen as a form of social construction 
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 For example, although homosexual men cannot have biological children in the ‘normal’ way that 
heterosexual men can, there are new technologies available, for example IVF, through which 
homosexual men can have biological children. These technologies, however, are extremely 
expensive. If these technologies were more readily available and accessible, homosexual men would 
have the same or at least near similar procreative opportunities that heterosexual men do. In this way, 
the biological difference between homosexual and heterosexual men in respect of procreation is not 
harmful itself. Rather, it is the difference in the accommodation given to homosexual and heterosexual 




and thus a result of discrimination. My initial question in this chapter of the thesis, 
furthermore, was whether it can be said that disability is a harmful condition to be in 
for its subject. On the traditional model, the answer seems to be in the affirmative, 
and a disabled state is seen as something inherently or necessarily bad that needs 
to be medically corrected or fixed. On the social model, however, the answer is a 
little trickier because of the complication of the impairment/disability dichotomy. What 
can be said, however, is that on the social model, disability is not seen as something 
intrinsically or necessarily bad. It is not bad to be born disabled on this view. It is, 
however, bad to be born disabled simpliciter if the society into which you are born is 
discriminatory against disabled persons and if the social environment is not 
accommodating.  
 
I do not aim, in this chapter, to express any opinion on which model adequately 
captures the nature of disability. My own view is that both models have something 
important to say about disability and that disability has both biological and social 
aspects. I do, however, wish to examine how these different understandings of 
disability interact with the argument that disability is a harmful condition, to which we 
now turn. It should become evident that whether a particular disability could be 
considered harmful depends largely upon how a particular disability is 
conceptualised, and whether that conceptualisation is formed through the 
perspective of a disabled person or an able-bodied person. 
 
3.3 Disability as a harmful condition  
 
According to Harris, to be in a harmful condition is to be in a condition which one has 
a strong rational preference not to be in (Harris 2001: 384). This account also 
accords with my conception of harm, extrapolated in Chapter 2, wherein a subject is 
harmed if he or she is caused to be in a state which he or she would not will, i.e. a 
state which he or she has a preference not to be in. Armed now with the different 
ways in which disability is conceptualised within the different theoretical models, let 
us look at some concrete ways in which disability may be such a condition. I have 
chosen to examine three experiences associated with disability which are often used 




limited range of access to qualia, and the lack of autonomy or personal agency. It is 
interesting to see how the medical model of disability and the social model of 
disability have completely different things to say about these three experiences. 
 
3.3.1 Necessary suffering 
 
It is common to ascribe to disability some notion of necessary suffering. Disability is 
generally “assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is inherently negative” 
(Campbell 2005: 109). It is very common to hear things such as ‘he suffers from 
spina bifida’ or ‘she suffers from epilepsy’. The argument that disability involves 
suffering is also often invoked as a justification for selective eugenic abortion based 
on the idea that preventing the amount of disabled births prevents suffering, and 
preventing suffering is morally desirable, and that therefore selective eugenic 
abortion is permissible (Edwards 2001: 380-381).  
 
However, it is fairly uncertain how, precisely, we should understand the claim that 
disability involves necessary suffering. Edwards (2001: 381), for example, argues 
that if we conceptualise it as an empirical claim, then it may very well be false. This 
is because there are countless examples of persons with disabilities who claim that 
they lead happy and fulfilled lives and that if this is so, then disabled persons cannot 
be said to be suffering (2001: 381). Alison Davis, for instance reports the following in 
relation to her disability: 
 
Despite my disability and the gloomy predictions made by doctors at my birth, I 
am now leading a very full, happy and satisfied life by any standards. I am most 
definitely glad to be alive. …. [H]andicapped people are …. presumed by …. 
doctors, philosophers and Society in general to have the capacity only for being 
miserable… (Davis 1985: cited in Newell 1999: 173). 
 
It seems, then, that if most or at least a large portion of disabled persons experience 
their lives in a similarly positive way to that of Alison Davis, then the argument that 
disability involves necessary suffering seems to be empirically false. The story, 
however, does not end there. Some have argued that these positive outlooks on life 




notwithstanding a major impairment is reported, amount to unreliable adaptive 
preferences. 
 
The idea of adaptive preferences is captured well in what is known as the ‘fox and 
grapes’ parable. The parable asks us to imagine a fox in search of some sweet 
grapes. The fox notices some grapes hanging from a tree but realises they are too 
far up for him to reach. “On realising he cannot reach the grapes he desires, the fox 
insists ‘grapes are too sour for foxes’, and he did not want them anyway” (Begon 
2015: 243). The fox, however, “seems to be ‘fooling himself’: he has failed to 
acknowledge his limitations or recognise that the real reason he no longer prefers 
grapes does not concern their sourness”, but rather the fact that he is unable to 
reach them (Begon 2015: 243). 
 
In conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation sometimes individuals cope by 
forming a belief that their circumstances are ‘not that bad’ and sometimes even 
proclaim to prefer their circumstances to any ‘normal’ alternative (Begon 2015: 241). 
For example, in the case of Stockholm syndrome a kidnapped person sometimes 
develops a sense of trust and affection for his or her captor (Begon 2015 241). A 
similar process might be underway in ‘battered wife’ syndrome. It is thought that 
these sorts of adaptive preferences are irrational and unreliable.  
 
It is sometimes argued that a similar mental process might be underway in people 
who report happy lives notwithstanding their disabilities. In one study, for instance, it 
was found that of the people with serious disabilities that were studied roughly 54% 
of these persons reported an excellent or at least good quality of life (Albrecht & 
Devlieger 1999: 981). These numbers compare starkly with a national survey 
conducted in the same year in which only 80-85% of able-bodied persons reported a 
satisfied life (Albrecht & Devlieger 1999: 981). In order to account for this “disability 
paradox” as they call it (because they find it strange that disabled persons 
experience their lives as enjoyable), the same authors conclude their study with the 
following: 
 
The high quality of life reported by many [disabled] respondents could be due to 




new conditions and made sense of them. Individuals who experience disability 
can find an enriched meaning in their lives secondary to the disability condition. 
In this study, secondary gains occurred when individuals used their disability 
condition and subsequent outcomes to reinterpret their lives and reconstitute 
personal meaning in their social roles (Albrecht & Devlieger 1999: 986, own 
emphasis). 
 
In this way, disabled persons come to value their lives notwithstanding their 
impairments, by focusing on secondary gains which could not have been gained had 
they not been, or become, disabled. These secondary gains could consist, for 
example, of a resurgence of religious beliefs or a new-found talent for motivational 
speaking.  
 
Elizabeth Barnes (2009) argues that ascribing unreliable adaptive preferences to 
disabled persons who are positive about their disabled condition is hopelessly 
inaccurate. On her account, moreover, there are two types of preferences, and only 
one type is adaptive and unreliable. On the one hand, there are preferences formed 
as a result of extrinsic social distortions, social wrongs or inter-personal moral-
badness, which are all adaptive and unreliable (Barnes 2009: 13). For example, in 
the case of a kidnap victim, whose preference towards their kidnapper is formed in 
relation to an extrinsic or external social wrong that is imposed upon him or her. On 
the other hand, however, there are preferences formed by intrinsic influence, as a 
result of intrinsic facts surrounding who we are in and of ourselves – such as, for 
example, our sexuality. Disability falls into this second group according to Barnes. 
This is why we would judge a preference of a kidnap victim to be adaptive – “since 
they prefer something that arose from unjust, agent-caused influences – whilst our 
preferences for our sex or sexuality are reliable – even if being female or 
homosexual makes our life more difficult or ‘worse’” (Begon 2015: 249-250). Barnes 
therefore argues that the perspectives of disabled persons in relation to their 
disabilities are similar to the perspectives of persons formed in relation to their 
sexuality. In this regard she says: “That a person has a disability is a fact about 
herself, rather than social distortion... a way a person is in and of themselves” 
(Barnes, cited in Begon 2015: 250). On Barnes’ view then, we cannot describe the 




notwithstanding their disabilities as being unreliable or false, and that they are 
therefore actually empirically true.  
 
Based on the aforegoing discussion, it is arguable that the quality of life of disabled 
persons is judged differently by non-disabled people and disabled people (or non-
disabled people who are disability activists and share the sentiments of disabled 
persons, such as Barnes). This leads one to question whether the necessary 
suffering claim often made about disabled persons is perhaps formed in relation to a 
prejudice or bias towards disabled persons. Saxton, who herself has spina bifida, 
notes in this regard that those that ascribe a poor quality of life to disabled persons 
generally also ascribe to the medical model of disability. The medical viewpoint in 
respect of disability, however, is biased against disabled people, according to 
Saxton, and therefore those that ascribe to it view disability disproportionately 
negatively. In this regard, she says that “the medical system tends to underestimate 
the functional abilities and overestimate the ‘burden’ and suffering of people with 
these conditions” (2013: 92). According to her, this is generally because medical 
practitioners seem to: 
 
…have a distorted picture of the lives of disabled people. They encounter 
disabled persons having health problems, complicated by the stress of a 
marginalized life ... but because of their training, the doctors tend to project the 
individual’s overall struggle onto the disability as the ‘cause’ of distress. Most 
doctors have few opportunities to see ordinary disabled individuals living in their 
communities among friends and family (2013: 92). 
 
Ho echoes these sentiments in noting that:  
 
...many in medicine and bioethics continue to dismiss or discredit [the positive 
disabled] experience as subjective, mistaken, or simply [the] result of the lowered 
expectations due to disabilities. Moreover, biomedical and bioethical approaches 
generally [assume] that ... those who lack the ‘normal’ opportunity range cannot 
have a high quality of life ... Available information regarding the quality of life of 
people living with impairments and medical descriptions of various conditions 
and experiences are generally one-sided, selectively representing these 




According to Saxton, not only does the medical system distort the lived reality of 
disabled lives, but so does the media. In this regard, she says that the media and 
“especially the movies, distort our lives by using disability as a metaphor for evil, 
impotence, eternal dependence, or tragedy...” (2013: 91). 
 
Saxton holds that these are all deeply biased distortions of disabled lives and are not 
empirically accurate. If we listen to those who are living with disabilities, the picture is 
quite different. It is also noteworthy, for instance, that many non-disabled people who 
subsequently become disabled later in life tend to change their initial negative 
outlooks on disability and instead express sentiments of positive value towards their 
lives. Moreover, families who have disabled children and “who are familiar with the 
actual impact of the disabilities tend not to seek [the related genetic] tests for 
subsequent children” (2013: 93). It is for these reasons that Saxton says that 
suffering claims should be evaluated only from within the disabled community and 
from the perspective of people who are actually disabled. 
 
Lastly, it bears mention that there is great variation in the amount of suffering that 
one might potentially experience as a result of different kinds of disabilities. Some 
disabilities seem to be accompanied by more suffering than others. Tay Sachs, for 
example, is a serious and fatal disease accompanied by characteristics such as the 
loss of motor skills, seizures, intellectual disability and paralysis, and death usually 
occurs by age four. It can be said that such a disease would probably be 
accompanied by great distress and suffering. However, besides these ‘serious’ 
disabilities, there are also disabilities which are less serious. Short-sightedness is 
probably a good example. I doubt that people who are short-sighted would regard 
their lives as involving intolerable suffering.     
 
To conclude this section, it can be said that the claim that disability involves 
necessary suffering should not be uncritically accepted. Rather, we saw that as an 
empirical claim it may very well be false. Furthermore, it also seems that we cannot 
make any general claims regarding suffering involved in disability as such because 
there is great variation in disability and because some disabilities seem less tolerable 
than others. To problematise this even further, it also seems that whether a particular 




of the person who has the particular disability, as well as on which viewpoint, being 
either a medical or a social viewpoint, one adopts in respect of his or her disability.    
 
3.3.2 Access to qualia 
 
It is often argued that disabled persons may lack or have a reduced access to certain 
important qualia, which has the effect that disability is harmful. Harris, for example, 
says that the harm in disability arises as the result of “the deprivation of worthwhile 
experience” (2000: 98). “Deaf people [for instance] are denied the world of sound, 
music and the most fundamental form of human communication” (Savulescu 2002: 
771). Similarly, people who have no hands are unable to touch and feel the texture 
of a velvet pillow and people who are unable to smell are unable to experience the 
sweet floral smell of a fleshly picked rose. In respect of children with Cerebral Palsy, 
for example, McMichael (1971: 56) says the following: 
 
Cerebral Palsy in particular precludes children ... from participating in a normal 
range of childhood experiences. Their inability to go shopping, help with the 
cooking, or to play normally with other children puts them at a disadvantage, 
which is often compounded by defects of speech or hearing which [inhibit] them 
from asking the questions by which a child extends his knowledge of the world 
around him (own emphasis). 
 
There are actually two claims being made here. The first claim, which is perhaps less 
strong, is that disabled persons “miss out on certain qualia that others find intensely 
pleasurable” and that this is therefore bad because being unable to access things 
that are pleasurable is bad (Cooper 2007: 570). McMahan (2005: 77), for instance, 
describes this well by noting that “[t]he lack of an ability that is instrumentally 
valuable to those who have it is, in general, an obstacle to the achievement of the full 
range of goods characteristic to human life.” The second claim, which I believe is a 
stronger claim, is that disabled persons miss out on or have a reduced access to 
certain qualia which are vital, not for pleasure, but for survival, essential functioning 
and normal everyday life. McMichael’s claim above, for example, emphasises this 
aspect. For example, it may be harder for a blind person to cross the road by virtue 




a tsunami by not being able to hear the warning sirens by virtue of not being able to 
hear. It may also be harder for a disabled child with communication difficulties to 
make sense of his or her world and ask the necessary questions from other 
inhabitants of the world, as McMichael notes. 
 
In response to these claims, disabled persons often invoke the ‘differently abled’ 
view of disability, which has developed out of the social model of disability and again 
as a critical reaction to the traditional medical model. This view of disability is 
sometimes termed the ‘mere difference’ view of disability. According to this view, 
being blind, being deaf, being unable to walk, or even being unable to do all three, 
are merely different ways of ‘being in the world’ and carry no intrinsic disadvantages, 
but are rather a neutral or “natural part of human diversity” and human variation 
(Barnes 2014: 88). This argument is often used by those in the deaf community. 
 
It is also argued that many able-bodied or ‘normal’ persons miss out on or have a 
reduced access to  important qualia anyway. For example, it can be said that some 
‘normal’ able-bodied people who lack musical ability or have ‘poor taste in music’ 
lack important qualia (Edwards 2001: 382). Similarly, it can be said that although 
intellectually disabled persons might miss “out on those dimensions of experience 
which require considerable intellectual acumen, for example doing complex work in 
maths or even philosophy..., it may be said of those of average [or ‘normal’] 
intelligence that they too miss out on such experiences” (Edwards 2001: 382). 
 
This leads one to question whether having access to certain qualia is that paramount 
to living a fulfilled life. In fact, and as Cooper notes, it cannot necessarily be inferred 
that access to more qualia is a good thing and it cannot be inferred that all senses 
are necessarily good (2007: 571). She uses the example of smell and asks us to 
imagine a world in which air pollution is even more rampant than today and where 
the air pollution produces an immense stench. In such a world, according to Cooper, 
a person unable to smell “may come to be considered unusually fortunate” (2007: 
571). Under the traditional or medical model of disability, furthermore, we might say 
that the disability becomes an advantage relative to the rest of the population, and in 
that sense is no longer something ‘bad’ for the individual and therefore no longer a 




Cooper also argues, moreover, that in some instances where a certain quale is 
lacking, disabled persons are able to develop an additional quale which non-disabled 
persons have no access to. For example, deaf persons have been argued to be 
more sensitive to vibrations and visual stimuli than people who are able to hear 
(2007: 571). In this way, “[a] single disability [for example, deafness] may seem 
neutral because it can be compensated for by other abilities that develop to fulfil its 
functions” (McMahan 2005: 96). McMahan, however, argues that the development of 
additional compensatory abilities cannot neutralise what is ‘bad’ about disability 
because if disabilities are individually neutralised in this way then they should also be 
neutral in combination, which, he says, they are not (McMahan 2005: 96). In this 
regard, he says the following: 
 
If we consider why a number of different disabilities would in combination make a 
life worse, the explanation will appeal primarily to effects that each would have 
on its own but that cannot be adequately compensated for because of the 
presence of other disabilities. For example, the bad effects of blindness could not 
be adequately compensated for in the case of a person who was deaf and wholly 
paralyzed. In short, the bad effects of disability are largely additive (2005: 96). 
 
There is an element of this that rings true for me. How might a person who is deaf, 
blind and completely paralysed develop compensatory access to an alternative quale 
by which to communicate? Seeing as they are deaf, they would be unable to 
respond to verbal stimuli but they would also not be able to become more responsive 
to visual stimuli by virtue of the fact that they are also blind. Seeing as they are 
furthermore completely paralysed, they would also have no use of their hands with 
which they could utilise sign language. In summary then, although it might be said 
that the lacking of important qualia is not necessarily disadvantageous, due to the 
fact that a person who is disabled in respect of one set of qualia can actually become 
‘more abled’ in relation to other kinds of qualia, this becomes problematic in the case 
of persons who are disabled in relation to many different kinds of qualia. The 
‘differently abled’ argument in this way only makes sense for persons with ‘minor’ or 
singular disabilities such as deafness or blindness, but not so much in the context of 
persons who have multiple disabilities, and therefore lack many or a variety of 




To conclude this section, I would, therefore, say that the lack of important qualia 
argument is strong when considering persons with multiple disabilities. In the context 
of persons with less severe or singular disabilities, however, the qualia argument 
makes less sense because if disabled persons can develop compensatory (or even 
better) access to qualia which are able to fulfil the functions of the absent ones, then 
a lack of the particular set of qualia cannot be harmful. This is, because the usurping 
of the will to access one set of qualia (for example, those that facilitate the will to 
communicate) seems to be attenuated or accommodated by having access to other 
sets of qualia and, in that sense, the will to communicate is no longer usurped. 
Furthermore, there may be an argument to make that if society were more 
accommodating of people with disabilities and invested more social capital in 
additional means for blind persons to cross roads or for deaf persons to identify 
tsunami warning sirens, then the lack of qualia necessary for survival argument 
seems to fall away too. 
 
3.3.3 Autonomy and personal agency 
 
The next argument which I want to address in this context is the argument that 
disabled persons lack the necessary autonomy or personal agency to be able to 
experience a fulfilled life.56 The argument here is that many severely disabled 
persons are unable to autonomously engage with their environments and therefore 
lack the full capacity to pursue a decided-upon course of action in life and, therefore, 
lack a fully autonomous life and a reduced sense of personal agency. This 
discussion is also particularly relevant in light of my conceptualisation of harm as 
something which conflicts with one’s autonomous will. What should become evident 
from the discussion below, however, is that a disability does not necessarily have the 
effect that it directly usurps a person’s will and autonomy. On the contrary, 
sometimes this usurping of the will comes about when caregivers and other able-
bodied members of society are unaccommodating and refuse to acknowledge the 
(albeit different) capacity of disabled persons to make autonomous choices.  
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bed-bound and unable to function without the assistance of able-bodied persons. There are of course 
many disabilities where little to no assistance is required from others and where disabled persons can 
fulfil their everyday needs on their own. I, furthermore, note that there is an implicit problem here 




One study, which examines disabilities of the hand in relation to autonomy, noted 
that “most movements in [activities of daily living] require object manipulation with a 
stable handgrip” and that the “[p]erformance of activities of daily living … is critical to 
ensure a full and autonomous life” (Gracia-Ibáñez et al 2018: 102). In this way, 
people with hand disabilities who are physically unable to grip objects may miss out 
on an important dimension of active human perception, being object manipulation57, 
and this results in a loss of an important sense of autonomy. More specifically, if we 
understand autonomy, on the most rudimentary level, to mean one’s ability to fulfil 
one’s basic needs and desires, then not being able to grip an object, for example, a 
mug, so that one may take a drink of water on account of being very thirsty, can be 
seen as an illustration of a lack of autonomy because of an underlying disability. In 
this regard, recall the discussion in Chapter 2 in relation to Shiffrin’s will-based 
approach to harm founded on the notion of autonomy. For Shiffrin, autonomy is 
related to the: 
 
…sheer exercise of agency – in an agent’s efforts to exert her will to influence, 
adapt, manipulate, and conform her experience and environment to fit her will. 
The value of autonomous action lies both in the object of achieving harmony 
between the agent’s will and the contents of her experience and environment, 
and in the means of its achievement – that this object is effectuated through the 
exertion of the agent’s will (2012: 382, own emphasis). 
 
A severely disabled person’s exercise of agency is also further complicated by the 
fact that many disabled persons are physically dependent and reliant upon able-
bodied persons to fulfil their everyday needs. The common image conjured up here 
is usually in relation to disabled persons who, as a result of their disability, are 
unable to move at all58 or unable to move ‘normally’59, or in relation to disabled 
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 Object manipulation entails being able to actively engage with one’s external environment and the 
objects encountered therein. Picking up a cup, kicking a ball or turning on the stove, for example, all 
involve a measure of object manipulation in that the objects within one’s perceptual field are 
manipulated (i.e. they are acted upon other than by a natural environmental force such as wind) in 
order to achieve some goal.  
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 Such as, for example, cases of quadriplegia or cases of ‘locked in syndrome’ where persons can 
only, at most, move their eye muscles. 
59
 Such as, for example, cases of paraplegia, spina bifida, cerebral palsy, multiple sclerosis and cases 




persons who, as a result of their disability, are unable to communicate.60 To give an 
example in the case of persons who are unable to move, consider the following first-
person account collected by Sullivan (2005: 32) upon interviewing a paraplegic 
person in a paraplegic clinic.  
 
… [T[hey laid me on pillows and there was a pillow to spare …. So they lifted me 
up and laid me again. And it ended up so that they had a bit of me on each of the 
pillows but it meant that I didn’t have a pillow under my fracture side… [I]t was 
really, really painful. I said ‘I don’t think you’ve laid me right.’ And they said ‘Well, 
how would you know? You’ve just arrived here.’ ... ‘We’ve moved the team now 
and we have to do a full team lift, so you’re stuck like that’. And it was really, 
really painful… And she said, ‘Are you in pain?’ And I said ‘yes’. And she said 
‘That’s good, because it means you’ve got feeling doesn’t it?’ and walked off. 
And I had to just lie there in agony until the afternoon shift came on. 
 
In this example, the disabled person does not have the autonomous ability to relieve 
his pain on his own. He is completely dependent upon the health care worker to do 
this for him, but she dismisses his perception and his pain.  
 
A preliminary initial objection to this argument that disabled persons are ‘too 
dependent’, is to say that all persons, including able-bodied persons, are dependent 
upon others anyway and in this way broaden the notion of dependency to include the 
able-bodied. It has been said, for instance, that complete autonomy and 
independence is in any event unattainable for any person, including non-disabled or 
‘normal’ persons because dependence is ‘part and parcel’ of what it means to be a 
human being. More specifically, that; 
 
...while most people do not need somebody else’s assistance at all times, 
dependence is part of the human condition; it is mutual dependence that allows 
human beings to live in a society, to meet each other, to build relationships, to 
fall in love, and so on (Marzano-Parisoli 2001: 652).  
 
Similarly, Ells (2001:603) says:  
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We are all dependent upon others to help equip us with the basic provisions of a 
healthy and happy life (e.g., food, shelter, electricity, potable water, affection, 
and so on), but these dependencies usually go unnoticed.  
 
In this regard, it is also noteworthy that during the continuum of life, we all 
necessarily go through key time periods wherein we are very dependant and reliant 
upon other persons. This is especially so during the beginning stages of life when we 
are babies and infants, unable to fend for ourselves without the help of others. It is 
also especially prevalent during the end stages of life when we might have to move 
over to assisted living or hospices, or, if we are lucky, where we might be taken care 
of by our family members.  
 
Because of the fact that that some disabled persons are presumed to lack the ability 
for self-governance (i.e. the exercise and control over oneself), family members or 
caregivers often take it upon themselves to make the necessary decisions affecting 
disabled persons’ lives. The disabled person is often assumed to be unable to do 
these things for themselves. Sometimes there is even also a questionable imposition 
of the will upon the disabled person, by a non-disabled person. Consider the 
following reports given by persons classified as intellectually disabled, noted by 
Björnsdóttir & Stefànsdóttir: 
 
Diana, a 30-year-old woman who lived with her parents described how they 
made all decisions for her and, for example, decided what clothes she should 
wear, when she should go to bed, and what she should eat, ‘I think they do this 
out of love ... They want me to feel good in the morning when I wake up and 
when I go to bed and I just tell them OK but I do not go to sleep right away ... I 
want to decide for myself when I am tired’ (2015: 12, own emphasis). 
 
Ari, a man in his 40s, shared an apartment with two other disabled men. He 
neither chose to live with them nor chose to live in this particular place: I used to 
live in a group home with four other people. The staff at the office [Municipal 
Service Centres] decided I should live there and also that I should live here. 





Björn … is a young man also labelled as having profound intellectual and 
multiple disabilities. He was scheduled to sit on the toilet three times per day 
even though he had communicated strongly that he did not want to and it did not 
serve any purpose since he was unable to control his bowel movements. The 
staff told us that this had always been done this way and they did not seem to 
question these practices nor perceive Björn’s objections as important or relevant 
(2015: 13, own emphasis). 
 
The above examples illustrate how easily able-bodied persons disregard and dismiss 
the autonomous wills and desires of disabled persons. Diana, Ari and Björn in the 
above examples are assumed to lack the capacity to be able to decide when they 
are tired, what they would like to eat, where they should live and when to go to the 
loo, even though it is fairly evident from the above examples that they do have the 
capacity to decide these things. The problem is rather that their views are not taken 
seriously, which is, in itself, an infringement upon personal agency.  
 
A different though related point can be found in the context of disabled persons who 
are not only not able to do what they would like to do, but also are unable to say 
what they want to say. In some cases wherein disabled persons are unable to 
communicate verbally, such as in the case of non-verbal autism, a process of 
facilitated communication is utilised. Facilitated communication “is a technique in 
which a facilitator holds the hand, wrist, elbow or shoulder of a person with a 
disability as s/he constructs messages on a keyboard or by pointing to letters on an 
alphabet display” (Erevelles 2005: 52). Facilitated communication techniques have 
been criticised to be inauthentic forms of authorship. This is because the product of 
the facilitated communication might have been unconsciously influenced by the 
facilitator and the product therefore might not be truly authored by the autistic person 
(Erevelles 2005: 55).  
 
Let us again take stock. A lack of autonomy can come about for disabled persons, in 
light of the above discussion, in two respects. Firstly, because some disabilities have 
the consequence that they render the disabled person not able to do the simple 
things that he or she wants to do. This could be, for example, by not being able to 




mug so that one may take a drink of water on account of being thirsty. The second 
respect in which this comes about is in instances where caregivers or able-bodied 
persons in general impose their wills onto disabled persons and decide what is best 
for them. The harm of disability here is then imposed by caregivers (or the social 
environment) rather than innate to disability. This is especially so in cases of 
disabilities that are linked to a constrained, or lack of, ability to communicate, 
wherein the disabled person becomes subject to the wills and desires of the non-
disabled persons whom they are in the care of.  
 
It, therefore, seems as though a lack of autonomy may be an important foundation 
upon which to argue that a disabled condition is a condition which a person would 
have a strong rational preference not to want to be in. This argument, however, 
would apply more strongly in the context of extreme disabilities where people are 
heavily reliant on able-bodied persons or where they are unable to communicate 
their needs. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that able-bodied persons may be 
guilty of not having an authentic listening ear when it comes to the wills and desires 
of disabled persons and that this may actually be harmful in itself. This brings us 
back to the social model of disability because it is seemingly then not coming into 
existence with a disability that is harmful, but a particular environment which is 
harmful, and this harm can be alleviated by altering the environment in accordance 
with the wills of the disabled persons who inhabit that environment. 
 
To conclude our discussion on whether disability is a harmful condition, the following 
remarks bear mention. Firstly, we can never say that disability as such is a harmful 
condition. This is because not all disabled persons view their disabilities as a form of 
suffering; because a lack of qualia is not necessarily experienced as harmful and can 
often be compensated for; and because disabled persons do not necessarily lack 
autonomy because of their disabilities as such, but perhaps rather because able-
bodied persons impose their wills onto their lives. In light of this, whether a particular 
disability could be considered harmful is largely a function of the interaction between 
the physical impairment, the social environment and, most importantly, the subjective 





3.4 The moral permissibility of causing disability    
 
The above discussion has dealt with some concrete ways in which disability may be 
thought to be harmful to a disabled person, in the context of suffering, qualia and 
autonomy, and, therefore, a harmful condition. It has become evident that able-
bodied persons, who generally follow the medical model, conceptualise disabled 
persons as persons who necessarily suffer because of a lack of or reduction in 
access to qualia and personal autonomy. Many disabled persons, who generally 
follow a social model, however, conceptualise themselves as persons who 
experience joy and happiness like able-bodied persons do, feel that they have a 
variety of ways in which to accommodate absent qualia, and hold that it is society 
that negatively impacts on their autonomy, rather than their physical disabilities. In 
light of this, whether a particular disability could be considered harmful depends 
largely upon the perspective from which one views the disability. The implication is 
that disability cannot be conceptualised as a necessarily harmful condition. Rather, it 
will only be harmful in particular instances – more specifically – in instances where 
the particular disabled person takes his or her disability to be harmful. If a wrongful 
life plaintiff does not take his or her disability, he or she cannot claim that they have 
been forced into a harmful condition. However, another way in which a wrongful life 
plaintiff could perhaps make a claim is by alleging that, although their disability is not 
harmful, the causing of the disability is what was harmful. In what follows, I will 
therefore look at the ways in which the causing of disability could be harmful, without 
presupposing that disability is a harmful condition.       
 
There seems to be some disagreement among proponents of the ‘mere-difference 
view’ (the mere difference view is equivalent to the ‘differently-abled view’ in that 
both views do not regard disability to be inherently disadvantageous), however, on 
whether this is necessarily the case. There are those who, on the one hand, argue 
that there is nothing morally impermissible in causing disability. Many deaf parents, 
for instance, who want to have a deaf child, take this view.61 Their argument is that 
there is nothing inherently disadvantageous in being deaf and that they should 
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therefore be allowed to select deaf embryos and purposively have deaf children 
when hearing children could be had. This I term the strong mere difference view.  
 
On the other hand, there are those who ascribe to the weaker, mere-difference, view 
and argue that although disability is not something necessarily bad or harmful, it is 
still impermissible to cause disability. This view is sometimes said to encapsulate the 
following: that it is not disability that is harmful, but the causing of disability which is 
harmful and therefore morally impermissible. The logic of this position, however, has 
been criticised. It has been argued that by ascribing to the ‘mere-difference’ view of 
disability, one is also necessarily committed to the view that it would be permissible 
to cause a nondisabled person to become disabled and, by the same token, that it 
would be permissible to cause disability. According to some, however, ascribing to 
the ‘mere-difference’ view does not entail such a commitment. Barnes, for example, 
argues that one can adopt a disability positive position (and view disability as 
nonharmful) and simultaneously hold that it is morally impermissible to cause a 
disability (2014: 93-94). In order to show this, she appeals to a host of additional 
moral principles such as a lack of consent, wrongful imposition of transition costs 
and unjustified interference.  
 
Consider the first moral principle she invokes, the lack of consent. Barnes asks us to 
imagine a scenario which she calls “Light Show”, in which two persons, Amy and 
Ben, are playing around with lasers in a laboratory. Amy, by accident, points the 
laser into Ben’s eye and he becomes permanently blind (Barnes 2014: 95). Now, if 
we adopt a mere-difference view of disability, it might seem that Amy has not 
harmed Ben because disability is then merely another way of being in the world and 
does not interfere with his well-being. However, Barnes argues, we can appeal to an 
extraneous principle of consent to show why Amy’s action is harmful to Ben. In this 
regard she says that “[m]ost of us think you shouldn’t go around making substantial 
changes to people’s lives without their consent ....” (2014: 95).  
 
A second principle which Barnes invokes to explain why Amy’s action is harmful to 
Ben is the principle of transition costs. According to Barnes, even though disability is 
not a bad thing, Amy’s action has the consequence that certain transition costs are 




to reshape his life around his new disability and this will inevitably be a difficult and 
painful process (2014: 96). In this way, “it is only becoming disabled and not being 
disabled that is bad” (McMahan 2005: 95). 
 
Barnes anticipates that the notion of transition costs may not be applicable to cases 
wherein the moral patient inflicted with disability is a foetus, or where the moral 
patient inflicted with disability is an infant. Regarding the former, this is because 
“[a]daptation to the disability begins at birth .... [and]  [t]he congenitally disabled do 
not ... form goals or embark on projects that are fundamentally incompatible with the 
limitations imposed by their disability” (McMahan 2005: 97). In respect of infants, all 
personal formative experiences presumably take place only towards the end stages 
of infancy, and therefore personal formative experiences will take place once already 
in the disabled state, and there is thus no transitory personal experience (2005: 97).  
 
In response to these concerns, Barnes asks us here to imagine a woman, Cara, who 
decides to send her 6-month-old baby, Daisy, through a medical procedure which is 
intentionally aimed at making Daisy disabled, because Cara values disability (2014: 
97). In this instance, Barnes says we can appeal to a principle of non-interference to 
justify why Cara’s decision is wrong and harmful to Daisy. In this regard, she says 
that we generally ascribe to the belief that we should refrain from drastically altering 
a child’s physical development.62 From this, she generalises a wider principle of non-
interference to which one can turn to show why Cara’s decision is wrong, 
irrespective of the fact that no transition costs are imposed. She also notes that this 
principle of non-interference may be a wider principle which itself encapsulates the 
earlier consent argument, in that to do something to someone without their consent 
is to interfere with them. This is similar to Shiffrin’s argument regarding harm. 
 
The point of the above-mentioned arguments, for Barnes, is that “[t]here are plenty of 
cases in which we think it’s impermissible to cause some feature x in another person 
(even a baby ...), although we by no means think it is suboptimal to be x” (2014: 99). 
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How do Barnes’ three principles (lack of consent, non-interference and transition 
costs) feature within a wrongful life context and the particular account of harm which 
has been developed in this thesis? Firstly, it may be noted that her first principle, a 
lack of consent, would be easily accommodated within the account of harm which 
has been developed in this thesis. More specifically, that if harm has to do with 
subjective usurpations of the will, then, by the same token, causing disability to a 
person who would not welcome that disability, would be to impose a condition which 
that person does not consent to. Therefore, even if a wrongful life plaintiff does not 
take his or her disability to be necessarily harmful, it could be that he or she did not 
consent to the condition being imposed upon him or her.  
 
Regarding the third principle, the imposition of transition costs; it can also be 
accommodated within the account of harm developed in this thesis, with a little more 
conceptual work. The concern noted above, that infants who are born disabled start 
adapting to their disabilities at birth, and therefore cannot subjectively experience 
transition costs as harmful, could be dealt with by relying on the retroactive nature of 
harm. That is, that the harmful effects of the act need not be subjectively 
experienced at the time at which the act takes place, and that the effects of the 
transition can come as a harm at a later stage, once a fully fledged will has 
developed.    
 
The second principle, non-interference, is difficult to accommodate within the harm of 
the wrongful life plaintiff, as developed in this thesis. This is because in the case of a 
wrongful life plaintiff, he or she would have been born with the disability in any event, 
and there is therefore no question of imposing a disability as such. More specifically, 
had the medical practitioner conducted the amniocentesis correctly and identified the 
disability, the result may be that the child’s development is interfered with, in that he 
or she was supposed to be born disabled. In other words, if a natural process is 
about to turn an able-bodied person disabled, the principle of non-interference 
implies that we should do nothing (Kahane & Savulescu 2016: 780).  
 
The point of the above discussion is to note that a disabled person who does not 
take his or her disability to be a harmful condition could still rely on an argument that 




was imposed upon him or her which was not consented to or that the subjective 
effects of the transition into a disabled state were what was harmful. However, 
because the wrongful life plaintiff would have been born disabled in any event, 
reliance cannot be placed upon the principle of non-interference. 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has attempted to problematise the question of whether disability is a 
harmful condition by addressing it from the perspective of the medical model (i.e. 
from the perspective of many able-bodied persons) as well as from the perspective 
of the social model. We first looked at the argument that disability might involve 
necessary suffering. Here we noted that as an empirical claim, it may be false. We 
also noted that the suffering argument is conceptualised very differently depending 
on whether one adopts a medical or social understanding of disability. If one adopts 
a medical understanding, suffering seems to be inherent in disability and can only be 
remedied by medical intervention and the restoration of normal human function. If 
one adopts a social understanding, however, suffering is seen as coming from a 
discriminatory and unaccommodating social environment and hence is not inherent 
in disability.  
 
We then looked at the argument that disabled persons might lack or have a 
decreased access to important qualia but found that this argument again depends 
upon whether one adopts a medical or social viewpoint in respect of disability. It was 
also shown that disabled people are often able to develop compensatory qualia that 
can fulfil the function of absent ones in any event. The example of sign language 
used by the deaf community makes this clear. This is definitely a strong claim but it 
is less strong in the context of persons with multiple disabilities.  
 
We then, lastly, proceeded to address whether disabled persons lack important 
aspects of autonomy or personal agency necessary for a full meaningful life. Here, 
we concluded that this may be the case, but again with the proviso that this would 
make more sense in the context of persons with extreme disabilities who are unable 




noted that able-bodied persons should be careful not to usurp the wills of disabled 
persons, thereby causing them harm in terms of the conceptualisation of harm that I 
argue for in this thesis.  
 
In respect of an analysis of the medical and social models, I am inclined to think that 
they both have something important to say about disability. Whether a particular 
disability could be considered harmful would seem to depend on the interaction 
between the physical or mental impairment in question as well as the environment in 
which the disabled person with that particular impairment finds him or herself. 
Schramme summarises this well (2013: 86): 
 
... [t]here can ... be pathological conditions that people are neutral about, such as 
being dyslexic in an environment where written communication is obsolete, or 
being short-sighted in a community that secures access to glasses or contact 
lenses. So the evaluative assessment of ... harm ... depends not only on our 
subjective preferences but also on the circumstances we live in, that is, whether 
a particular disease or disability poses a real disadvantage. 
 
A deaf person, for example, who is able to utilise sign language in order to 
communicate and who is embedded within a community who utilises sign language, 
such that the person is not dependent upon other persons to enable his or her 
communication with others, would therefore not be in a harmful condition. At the 
same time, a person who is deaf and has no arms, and who therefore cannot 
communicate with sign language and would have to be assisted to communicate, 
would be in a harmful condition. In such a case, we might also conclude that this 
person would lack aspects of autonomy that are necessary for an autonomous and 
meaningful life. 
 
Taking into account the above, it is pertinent to acknowledge that whether or not a 
particular disability is harmful depends on a myriad of things. Firstly, it would depend 
upon the particular physical nature of the impairment. Secondly, it would depend 
upon the environment in which the disabled person finds him - or herself. If the 
disabled person finds him - or herself in a socially accommodating environment and 




would come to them more as an inconvenience than a harm. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, it would depend upon the way in which the disabled person him or 
herself experiences his or her disability. If the disabled person experiences relatively 
minimal harmful effects in respect of their disability, then, because harm is subjective 
according to the argument I have advanced in Chapter 2, they are not in a harmful 
condition vis-á-vis their disability. However, they could still make an argument that 
the causing of the disability was what was harmful (because it imposed an 
unconsented-to condition or an unwanted transition upon him or her) and that they 




























Chapter 4: Arguments from policy 
 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The discussion in the preceding two chapters aimed to show two things. Firstly, 
Chapter 2 attempted to show that a disabled child who is born into a disabled state 
as a result of the negligence of a medical practitioner, and who would not have 
existed had the medical practitioner acted differently, can be said to have suffered 
harm, in principle. This is because harm, properly conceptualised, is a subjective 
phenomenon rather than an objective phenomenon, and because what is harmful 
about harmful states is not that they move the subject into an objectively worse 
position, but rather that they clash with the will of the subject. It was also shown that 
this clashing of the will need not be immediate, and that harm can actually be 
retroactive in nature, in that the harmful effects of harm can arise after the fact. 
Therefore, a person who is born disabled can be said to be harmed at a later stage 
once his or her will has developed. In light of this, the harm paradox within the 
wrongful life action is resolved, and the action becomes necessary to alleviate or 
address the very real harm which a wrongful life plaintiff may suffer.  
 
In the second place, the discussion in Chapter 3 attempted to shed some light on the 
myriad of ways in which disability may be said to be a harmful condition. It was 
shown that there is vast disagreement regarding the phenomenon or concept of 
disability, and that depending upon one’s viewpoint, disabling conditions are 
perceived very differently. For the wrongful life action to maintain its integrity, as a 
tool to address the harm of being disabled, it must therefore necessarily only be 
available to disabled people who take their disabilities to be harmful. In this way, a 
disability is taken to be harmful only from within the disabled community. An 
alternative way to show harm, without having to express disfavour towards being 
disabled, is to allege that the causing of a disabled condition is harmful in situations 
where the person did not consent to the condition or to the transitory effects of 





In light of the above, it can be concluded that the wrongful life action can be ethically 
desirable in light of the fact that it can be used to address or alleviate harm, but that 
it must of necessity be limited to plaintiffs who do, in fact, take their disabilities to be 
harmful, or at least the causing of their disabilities. One implication of this is that it 
may become a matter of moral luck whether the medical practitioner harms the 
disabled person. That is, if we accept that the harm depends upon the disabled 
person’s subjective evaluation of his or her disability then the ‘harm’ cannot be 
predicted at the time that the possibly harmful event takes place. However, we could 
perhaps still say that the negligent medical practitioner acts wrongly by risking harm, 
even if no harm happens to result because the disabled person who comes to exist 
does not view their disability as harmful. 
 
Having concluded, however, that the wrongful life action is an ethically useful tool 
which can be used to alleviate imposed harm, I turn now to consider whether the 
action also passes muster against certain policy arguments that have been levied 
against the action’s ethical desirability. I will focus on two such policy arguments. 
These policy arguments are the most prevalent policy arguments against the action 
and, as such, have been mentioned in many of the legal cases which deal with the 
action. These are, firstly, the argument that permitting the action perpetuates 
discrimination against disabled persons and, secondly, the argument that the action 
might lead to a slippery slope whereby children who feel harmed by coming into 
existence may use the action against their parents, which would run counter to the 
right to procreative autonomy. In what follows, I will attempt to show that both 
arguments from policy fail and that, therefore, the action remains ethically desirable.  
 
4.2 Discrimination against existent disabled persons 
 
In this sub-section, I will examine whether the wrongful life action can be seen as 
unfairly discriminatory towards disabled persons. More particularly, I will consider 
whether permitting the wrongful life action expresses a state-sanctioned message 
that disabled lives are not worthwhile and consider whether this message has the 
capacity to negatively impact upon the lives of existent disabled persons by 




consider, in this section, the role of compensation in wrongful life actions and 
examine whether or not it addresses or perpetuates the aforementioned possible 
discrimination. 
 
4.2.1 The expressivist objection  
 
It is often argued that the wrongful life action, as an action based on being born 
disabled, has a discriminatory effect on the lives of existent disabled persons 
because it sends a negative message to them that their lives are not worthwhile. 
This message is argued to exact a heavy price and inflict an unfair burden on their 
psychological well-being (Hensel 2005: 144). A similar argument is made by 
opponents of selective abortion on the basis of disability.63 The argument, in that 
context, is that by encouraging or allowing parents to abort in light of the presence of 
disabilities, decisions are being made about who should and who should not inhabit 
the world, and these decisions carry implicit discriminatory messages. Opponents of 
selective abortion have even gone so far as to argue that the ideology behind 
selective abortion is akin to that of the eugenics movement. The idea is that the 
same principles of selection and eradication of certain classes of people that were at 
play during the German Nazi regime are at play in selective abortion. As Hubbard 
notes,  
 
...a similar eugenic ideology underlies what happened then and the techniques 
now being developed... Scientists and physicians ... are once more engaged in 
developing the means to decide what lives are worth living and who should and 
should not inhabit the world. Except that now they provide only the tools, while 
pregnant women themselves have to make the decisions ... (2013: 82). 
 
The concern is, therefore, that in allowing selective abortion, the Disabled Person 
proper is selected and eradicated, just like the Jewish Person proper was selected 
for eradication in Nazi Germany. On the assumption of this linkage, the further 
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concern is that this sends a message that the Disabled Person proper should not 
inhabit the world, which in turn sends a negative message to disabled persons who 
do currently inhabit the world. The struggle faced by existent disabled persons in 
light of this negative message has been aptly described by Asch as follows:  
 
...learning that the world one lives in considers it better to ‘solve’ problems of 
disability by prenatal detection and abortion, rather than by expending those 
resources in improving society so that everyone – including those people who 
have disabilities – could participate more easily, is demoralizing. It invalidates the 
effort to lead a life in an inhospitable world (2000: 240). 
 
Let us take a closer look at the argument that selective abortion has the capacity to 
send a discriminatory message to existent disabled persons. Upon closer 
examination, it becomes evident that the argument rests upon another argument, 
that is, that disability is identity-constituting. In other words, the argument is “based 
on a view of the relationship between disability and identity which holds that 
disabling traits or disabilities can be identity constituting” (Edwards 2004: 418). 
Because disability is identity-constituting, when society sanctions selective abortion 
on the ground of disability, existent disabled persons are led to believe that their lives 
are similarly not worthwhile, or so the argument goes.  
  
The counter argument to this is known as the contingency view, which is based on 
the idea that “reducing the incidence of disabling traits no more sends a negative 
message to disabled people than reducing the incidence of flu sends a negative 
message to flu sufferers” (Edwards 2004: 418). This view is typical of those who 
follow the medical model of disability. Those who follow the contingency view take 
disability to be contingent to a person’s identity, in the same way that flu is 
contingent to a person’s identity. Harris, for instance, takes this position (2000: 96). 
According to Harris, selective abortion is no different, in principle, to finding a vaccine 
to eradicate flu. 
 
A critical question is therefore whether or not disability is an identity-constituting 
characteristic, in the same way that other characteristics such as gender and race 




would argue that disability is indeed something that is identity determining. As noted 
by Schramme, “[d]isability is different from a passing disease. It is a condition a 
person was born with or will be in for a long time, maybe the rest of her life” (2013: 
88). It is furthermore evident that we categorise and perceive people by means of the 
categories of race, gender and disability (and probably in that exact order). It is 
common to describe person X as ‘the black guy in a wheelchair’ or ‘that white girl 
with the thick black glasses’.64 And of course, the way we cut up or perceive the 
world reflects, in turn, the way in which we cut up or perceive ourselves. More 
specifically, how we perceive the world has a direct effect on how we perceive 
ourselves.  
 
If this is true, and disability is identity-constituting, then it is understandable that 
disabled persons would interpret selective abortion as an attack on their very 
identity. In the same way, says Hubbard, in relation to race, “[m]ost of us would be 
horrified if a scientist offered to develop a test to diagnose skin colour prenatally so 
as to enable racially mixed people ... to have light-skinned children” thereby 
eliminating dark skinned children (2013: 74). Black people would most definitely 
interpret this as an attack on their very identity. Selective abortion is argued to have 
the same effect on disabled persons. 
 
Turning now to the wrongful life action, although it does not involve any actual 
medical procedure whereby a disabled foetus is selected for abortion, the action 
itself is premised upon such a selective abortion. The action only arises because the 
parents were deprived of their right to abort the child had they known of the disability. 
Recall the example of Jim’s parents in the introduction to this thesis who proceeded 
with an amniocentesis on the presupposition that they would abort should the foetus 
have any disability. In light of this, it is therefore quite clear why selective abortion 
opponents would likewise be opposed to wrongful life actions. The message that 
disabled persons should not inhabit the world comes through in a similar way in the 
wrongful life action as it does in selective abortion on the basis of disability. As 
Saxton notes, the sentiment of wrongful life actions is that it is “‘[t]oo bad that baby 
with x disease didn’t get caught in prenatal screening’” (2013: 93). 
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In fact, some have argued that the message comes through more strongly in cases 
of wrongful life actions than in selective abortion. This is because in wrongful life 
actions, “the causal inquiry is ... not the prevention of a theoretical child with 
disabilities, but instead the active termination of a specific identified [foetus or child] 
with impairments” (Hensel 2005: 177). Furthermore, because the action is premised 
on the fact that the mother would have aborted, the mother must testify to this fact, 
and must thereby renounce the life of her disabled child. She must “disavow [her 
child’s] very existence in open court in order to secure financial assistance” (2005: 
172). What is more, according to Hensel, “the disparagement is voiced from within 
the community of people with disabilities and [therefore] cannot be discounted by 
others as mere ignorance or prejudice” (2005: 173). 
 
In contrast to the views presented above, there are those who argue that selective 
abortion on the basis of diseased and disabled traits (and, by the same token, the 
wrongful life action) does not carry with it a statement or message that the lives of 
existent disabled persons are not worthwhile, or at least does not translate into any 
morally repugnant treatment of existent disabled persons. Edwards, for example, 
argues that one can hold the view that selective abortion is morally permissible while 
also holding the view that existent disabled persons should be supported and treated 
with respect (2004: 419). In a similar vein, Savulescu argues that selecting against 
blindness or deafness “does not necessarily imply that the lives of those who now 
live with disability are less deserving of respect and are less valuable” (2001: 423). 
Savulescu notes in support of this that we generally attempt to prevent accidents in 
society which cause disability such as, for example, paraplegia as a result of motor 
vehicle accidents, and that our attempts in doing so are not generally regarded as 
statements that paraplegic persons deserve less respect than non-paraplegic 
persons (2001: 423). In Savulescu’s opinion: 
 
There are better ways to make statements about the equality of people with 
disability ... we could direct savings from selection against embryos/[foetuses] 
with genetic abnormalities to improving the well-being of existing people with 





This last suggestion of Savulescu leads me to question how we should 
conceptualise the role and effect of compensation in the context of wrongful life 
actions, for this can also be seen as a mechanism for directing funding away from 
selection against disabled foetuses (i.e. the situation which would have occurred had 
the medical practitioner not acted negligently, identified the disability, with the result 
that the parents would have aborted) towards compensating disabled persons for 
being born disabled. Does awarding compensation to a disabled person for the fact 
that he or she was born improve or degrade his or her well-being? It seems, at least 
prima facie, that awarding compensation to a disabled person may improve the well-
being of that disabled person. It is to this point which we now turn.  
 
4.2.2 The effect of compensation  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a wrongful life action is a delictual 
action that is part of the civil law and is concerned with the correction of a civil wrong 
and the awarding of monetary compensation to the injured or harmed party. If a 
wrongful life plaintiff is successful in his or her claim, he or she will be awarded 
compensation in the form of money.  
 
In light of this consequence, it has been argued that the wrongful life action may, 
therefore, “seem therapeutically valuable to the [disabled] community because [it] 
provide[s] individuals with a consistent source of funding for the high cost of medical 
care that often accompanies severe impairments” (Hensel 2005: 171). The 
unfortunate reality of many disabled lives is that they carry with them financial 
burdens which non-disabled lives do not. Indeed, Shane Burcaw, the disabled 
YouTuber with SMA,65 has to undergo periodical Spinraza injections to curb his 
muscle wasting and to prevent him from losing bodily strength as he ages. Some of 
his YouTube videos centre on his negative encounters with his health insurance on 
whether or not he qualifies for another Spinraza injection. Spinraza injections are 
estimated to cost 4 million dollars over a period of ten years (roughly 68 million 
rand). In light of these sorts of examples, it is often argued that “whatever the 
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intangible effects of [wrongful life] actions on the psyche and well-being of individuals 
with disabilities, there is a tangible need for money to secure the services that the 
litigants may desperately need” (Hensel 2005: 171).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a similar argument was used in the Kelly Molenaar case 
in the Netherlands. The court there ruled that awarding damages for pecuniary loss 
in a wrongful life action would not lead to the conclusion that life with disabilities is 
worth less than life without disabilities. An award of damages, according to the court, 
merely serves to remedy the fact that disabled life does come with a unique set of 
challenges and that an award of pecuniary damages would enable a disabled child 
to improve his or her living conditions (Mukheibir 2005: 760).  
 
Human and Mills make an even stronger claim that a compensatory award to a 
disabled person in a wrongful life action has the effect that it affirms the dignity of 
that disabled person and that in denying the wrongful life claim, “society is in fact 
renouncing [the disabled person’s] right to dignity instead of protecting and 
promoting it” (2010: 86). This is because compensation sends a “message that the 
plaintiff is a worthwhile individual” whose particular needs are worthy of respect and 
concern (Hans 2017: 719). Shapira follows suit by stating that: 
 
...compensating a handicapped newborn for a negligent, preconception 
diagnosis hardly implies that the disabled life of the infant plaintiff is devoid of all 
worth; it is precisely because the plaintiff’s handicapped life does deserve 
respect and compassion that he or she ought to be offered pecuniary redress 
that is geared to ensure a decent, if hampered, life (1998: 372, own emphasis).  
 
Compensation arguments based on dignity and respect, however, are deeply 
criticised by Hensel (2005: 171-177). Hensel argues that they are premised upon a 
medical interpretation of disability rather than a social interpretation and argues that 
this is deeply problematic. Recall that under the medical model or medical 
interpretation of disability, disability is viewed as an individual problem, and disabled 
persons’ social and economic problems are seen as a direct result of their individual 
functional limitations, incapacity and dependence. The social model, on the other 




deconstructing social biases and discrimination, increasing positive accommodation 
and promoting inclusivity and diversity. In light of this, Hensel argues that:  
 
…providing desirable assistance via wrongful life ... actions reflects the 
benevolent paternalism embedded in the medical model of disability, in which 
nondisabled persons ‘assume the role of protectors, guides and spokespersons 
for disabled citizens without ever challenging the attitudinal discrimination’ in 
society (2005: 171). 
 
I disagree with Hensel’s argument. Contrary to her, I submit that a monetary 
compensatory award is fully compatible with the mandate of affirming the dignity of 
disabled persons and that it is even compatible with the auspices of the social 
model, because it can be viewed as a form of positive accommodation.66 As noted 
by Human and Mills (2010: 86), positive accommodation of disabled persons 
generally affirms their dignity precisely because it acknowledges their difference. 
When we build a wheelchair ramp for persons who cannot walk, for example, 
“society is not saying that that the lives of disabled persons have less value and that 
such persons must consequently use a different entrance to those that able persons 
use” (2010: 86). Instead, society is saying that people who deviate from the ‘norm’ 
also need to be respected and treated with equal concern. Similarly, when we allow 
students with learning difficulties to write their exams in separate venues, we are 
affirming the fact that their lives are accompanied by experiential aspects which are 
unique to their lives, and that these aspects need to be acknowledged and 
accommodated. 
 
The crucial question, then, is whether it can be said that awarding compensation to 
disabled persons is a form of positive accommodation, in the same way that building 
a wheelchair ramp is, or in the same way that allowing students with learning 
difficulties to write their exams in a separate venue is. If this is true, then the wrongful 
life action seemingly becomes compatible with the social model of disability, contrary 
to what Hensel argues above. 
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As mentioned, the lives of disabled persons are often encumbered by financial 
strains as a result of their disability. This is the unfortunate reality. Take the example 
of Shane Burcaw above, whose life will forever be encumbered by expensive 
Spinraza injections. If we view his need for the expensive Spinraza injections (the 
absence of which would result in his body becoming weaker and his muscles 
wasting away) to be a basic need, then by forcing him to bear the financial burden of 
his basic need, we seem to be infringing upon his dignity, because dignity also 
entails living a socio-economically stable life. 
 
The concept of dignity was eloquently set out in the case of S v Makwanyane67 
wherein it was said, in paragraph 328, that: “Recognising a right to dignity is an 
acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to 
be treated as worthy of respect and concern”. Such respect and concern, however, 
is not only in relation to personal autonomy and agency, but also “requires that we 
pay close attention to conditions of material disadvantage and its impact on different 
groups in our society” (Liebenberg 2005: 10, own emphasis). 
 
The case of Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,68 for instance, makes 
Liebenberg’s comment clear. In that case, the government was taken to task for not 
providing an anti-retroviral drug to HIV positive pregnant women for free, which 
would reduce the risk of HIV transmission between these pregnant women and their 
babies. The court found that: “For society to deny poor women and their newborns 
access to [the drug] would clearly indicate a lack of respect for their dignity as human 
beings entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern”.69 By the same token, 
forcing disabled persons who have unique and expensive medical needs to shoulder 
these needs themselves, may have the effect that they are not treated as worthy of 
respect and concern. On the other hand, by shifting this burden away from the 
disabled person to larger society, or to a wealthy insurance company which provides 
liability insurance to medical practitioners, we can positively accommodate these 
expensive medical needs, in the same way that a wheelchair ramp is built to 
accommodate the physical access needs of those who cannot walk at the expense 
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of the relevant institution or building owner. In light of this, the compensation element 
of the wrongful life action becomes a type of positive accommodation which affirms 
and promotes the dignity of people who are ‘different’ and have different needs. 
Drawing, furthermore, on the ‘horizontal effect’ of rights (in that rights are to be 
enforced between and amongst citizens, and not just against the state) we can say 
that the medical practitioner, being a citizen him or herself, is obligated to pay 
compensation to the disabled citizen who he or she has harmed, so that the disabled 
citizen’s equality and dignity can be affirmed.    
 
To conclude this section the following remarks bear mention. We started with an 
examination of the expressivist objection against wrongful life actions. We found this 
objection to hold weight because disability is unlike a passing illness and is, rather, 
something which is typically identity-constituting. However, we have now also found 
that compensation can actually affirm the dignity of disabled persons. We can 
therefore say that the negative effects occasioned by the concept of the wrongful life 
action on disabled persons’ identities are offset by the compensation that follows. In 
light of this, the wrongful life action turns out to be a tool that addresses the 
economic discrimination suffered by disabled persons and thereby reaffirms their 
dignity as particular beings with particular needs. The policy argument that the 
wrongful life action would infringe the dignity of disabled persons and thereby 
discriminate against them thereby fails, even from the perspective of the social 
model.  
 
4.3 Procreative autonomy and the harm of coming into existence 
 
Another policy argument against the wrongful life action is that the action would lead 
to a slippery slope whereby children who feel harmed by coming into existence in X 
or Y condition would use the action against their parents. This concern also seems to 
follow quite strongly from the account of harm which I have developed in this thesis, 
being a subjective account of harm. There is, therefore, a fear that there might be 
“an avalanche of claims filed by handicapped children against their parents” (Ruda 
2010: 227). If this were to happen, it is argued that the right to reproductive 




The further (perhaps more serious) concern is that children could then, in principle, 
use the wrongful life action to claim not only in respect of intuitively harmful 
circumstances such as, for example, disease and disability but also intuitively less 
harmful circumstances such as, for example, sex, economic status or racial 
background which produce mere indirect disadvantages rather than direct harms. It 
is noteworthy in this regard that the first wrongful life action was brought against a 
father for allowing his child to be born as an ‘illegitimate child’.70 In other words, the 
concern is that children born into relatively good conditions may have a mechanism, 
through the wrongful life action, to claim against their parents for ‘trivial harms’. The 
ethical concern is therefore summarily that: 
 
…one might seek damages for being born of a certain [colour], another because 
of race ... another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics ... for being 
born into a large and destitute family ... [or] because a parent has an unsavoury 
reputation (Zepeda v Zepeda71, cited in Raposo 2017: 343).  
 
In this section of the Chapter, I will unpack this ethical concern. I will begin, firstly, by 
looking at the right to reproductive autonomy and the possible limits thereof. Here, I 
will try to show that the right is not absolute. In support of this, I will mention some 
moral principles that have been offered against full procreative autonomy; being the 
principle of parental responsibility and the principle of procreative beneficence. In 
this way, I will try to show that there are already certain procreative choices which we 
can criticise as morally wrong and, therefore, that procreative autonomy is not an 
absolute moral right, contrary to popular belief. I will then, secondly, move over to the 
anti-natal claim that all procreation is harmful. Here, I will try to show, however, that if 
we take seriously the claim that harm is subjective then it seems to imply that 
procreation is not inherently harmful. Rather, it only risks harm, in that children born 
as a result may subjectively feel harmed by their existence, but they also might not 
feel harmed by their existences. In this way, whether or not procreation causes harm 
becomes a matter of moral luck, in much the same way that it does in the case of a 
negligent medical practitioner who fails to identity a disability. I will then, lastly, move 
over to consider the implications of these claims for the wrongful life action, 
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specifically in relation to the slippery slope argument. I will argue that there is indeed 
a risk that the slippery slope might transpire, but that moral agents ought to actually 
take seriously the claims of children who feel harmed by their existences – even if 
those claims are not based on facets of life which others, or most persons, find 
harmful and therefore trivial.   
 
4.3.1 The limits to procreative autonomy 
 
The right to procreative autonomy can be conceptualised as both a positive right and 
as a negative right. As a negative right, it enshrines the rights of all persons to bring 
into the world and rear their own children, that is, that every person should be able to 
have children and form a family, and that governments, as well as other citizens, 
should not interfere with this. In fact, this is codified into many international human 
rights law instruments. Linked to this is the argument that procreation is a 
fundamental form of bodily and personal autonomy as well as an instantiation of 
freedom of choice.72 As a negative right, procreative autonomy also protects against 
unwanted procreation. Abortion rights in liberal democracies, for instance, protect 
procreative autonomy as a negative right. If one were to conceive of procreative 
autonomy as a positive right, on the other hand, this would entail a right to be 
assisted in reproduction or in avoiding reproduction (for example, state provision of 
services such as IVF on the one hand, or abortion and contraception on the other). 
In what follows, I will be concerned with procreative autonomy as a negative right, 
that is, the argument that all persons should be allowed to procreate and that limiting 
this right, which the wrongful life action might do, would be morally problematic. In 
this section of the chapter, I aim to investigate whether procreative autonomy is an 
absolute or inviolable moral right or whether it can be limited, and how we might 
justify that.73  
 
First - the easy case, disease. It seems acceptable that a couple who both carry the 
gene for Huntington’s disease or Tay Sach’s disease should not procreate, at least 
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not the ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ way.74 It seems acceptable that their procreation would 
be risky in respect of the child who may be born as a result. However, if we 
extrapolate the basis for this claim, being that the subsequent child may be harmed, 
we are forced to consider other facets of life, other than health, which make life more 
or less harmful. Socio-economic status, for example, is an interesting case. Would it 
be more ethical for a wealthy couple to have a child than a poor couple? Given that a 
wealthy couple could pay for better nutrition and education than a poor couple could, 
could we say that the procreative activities of poorer persons are more morally 
hazardous than the procreative activities of wealthy couples?75 Similarly, given that 
only children born to heterosexual parents will have the benefit of both a ‘mother’ 
and a ‘father’, some argue (controversially) that it is more ethical for a heterosexual 
couple to have a child than a homosexual couple. These questions force us to 
consider the obligations of parents vis a vis their unborn children.  
 
Steinbock and McClamrock, for instance, argue that all procreation should be guided 
by a moral principle of ‘parental responsibility’. According to them, this principle 
entails not only that parents should be responsible for the maintenance and 
protection of their children, but also that they should actually be expected “to refrain 
from having children unless certain minimal conditions can be satisfied” (1994: 17, 
own emphasis). More specifically, the principle entails that: 
 
...in deciding whether to have children, people should not only be concerned with 
their own interests in reproducing. They must think also, and perhaps primarily, 
of the welfare of the children they will bear (1994: 17).  
 
One of the examples they use to explain this is that of so-called ‘teenage pregnancy’. 
In this regard, they note that: 
 
…teenage mothers tend to have babies whose birthweight is low, a condition 
associated both with a significantly higher mortality rate than that of normal-sized 
babies and with learning disabilities in the future. Children of teenagers are also 
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unlikely to get adequate mothering, as their mothers are still children themselves 
(1994: 17). 
 
They also mention that the principle entails “only that it is wrong to bring children into 
the world when there is good reason to think that their lives will be terrible” and not 
that “people should not have children unless conditions are ideal” (1994: 20). The 
difference between the two criteria, however, seems to be a matter of degree and, I 
would argue, depends largely upon one’s own viewpoint.76 Be that as it may, the 
principle of parental responsibility is one means by which we can limit procreative 
autonomy – in that persons should refrain from having children unless they can 
provide a minimally decent life for their offspring. I would think that we all generally 
assume some moral principle of this sort in decisions regarding procreation and that 
we only differ according to the way in which we conceptualise the concept of a 
minimally decent life.      
 
What moral duties or responsibilities could parents have in cases of ‘artificial’ 
procreation? In cases of IVF, for example, where a host of embryos are grown in test 
tubes, do parents have any moral duties towards those embryos notwithstanding 
their procreative autonomy?77 Savulescu, for instance, argues that couples are 
obliged to “select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected 
to have the best life” based on a principle of ‘procreative beneficence’ (2001: 415). 
Therefore, couples who undergo IVF and end up with a host of embryos are morally 
obliged to select the embryo which would have the best chance of life. Deciding not 
to test for genetic traits and leaving it up to chance is therefore morally problematic 
for Savulescu. Savulescu also argues that the principle of procreative beneficence 
applies not only in cases of diseased traits, but also in cases of non-diseased traits 
such as intelligence and memory. Parents can therefore be said to act wrongly 
towards their unborn children, on Savulescu’s view, if they do not take active steps to 
ensure that their offspring have the best chance of a good life.  
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The purpose of the above brief discussion, on the principles of ‘parental 
responsibility’ and ‘procreative beneficence’ is to show that there exist sophisticated 
moral arguments that show us that parents may have moral obligations towards their 
unborn children, in that they may be obliged to only bring into existence children who 
will live good or at least average lives. The thought that parents may have moral 
obligations towards their unborn children and that they could therefore be considered 
culpable or held liable for not taking active steps to ensure good or average lives for 
their offspring, is therefore not so strange. 
 
We have also seen, in Chapter 2, that it does not matter much, from a moral 
perspective, that at the time at which the parents make the decision to procreate or 
initiate the process of procreation, the unborn child does not yet exist with a will that 
can be usurped. As I have tried to show, immediacy actually carries little moral 
imperative, and it is enough that actions set into motion causal chains which result in 
harm that occurs in the future. In this way, children can be harmed by being born, 
even if at the time they do not have wills with which the harm of coming into 
existence could conflict. Again, Shiffrin aptly describes it as such:  
 
Our moral duties emanate from the force these future rights exert on us now, not 
from any right predicated to be held by nonexistent persons. If our actions now 
set into motion causal chains that will result in a right’s being violated in the 
future, the action is, at best, morally problematic. That the effect is not imminent 
and the future rights holder is not present at the time of our action matters little. 
Immediacy carries little moral imperative (1999: 138). 
 
As also mentioned in Chapter 2, Shiffrin draws on Feinberg’s bomb example to 
explain the retroactive nature of harm.78 For Shiffrin, the action of the bomb planter 
“sets into motion a chain of events that will lead to the violation of the rights that will 
come to be held” (1999: 137). In the same way, says Shiffrin, procreation sets into 
motion a chain of events that will lead to the violation of the rights of the children who 
will exist as a result of that act of procreation. Therefore, it is not morally problematic 
that the child does not yet exist at the time of the act of procreation.  
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To conclude this sub-section, the following remarks bear mention. Firstly, procreative 
autonomy is not absolute and it can be, and perhaps should be, limited by ethical 
principles in favour of ensuring that children are not harmed by being brought into 
existence. Secondly, parents have duties towards their unborn children to ensure 
that they do not cause their children harm, even though they do not yet exist at the 
time of the procreative act.  
 
However, because harm is a subjective phenomenon, as I have argued in Chapters 
2 and 3, the purpose of the above discussion is merely to highlight the basis upon 
which parents could be held morally culpable vis-á-vis their acts of procreation. That 
is, I do not want to prescribe a substantive content to the rights of children to be 
brought into a good or at least minimally decent existence. In other words, because 
harm is necessarily subjective (as I have argued), we can never say that persons 
who procreate under conditions X and Y which will result in condition X and Y in their 
child cause harm to their child. Whether that child is harmed will depend upon 
whether that particular child takes condition X and Y to have produced a harmful 
condition. In this way, whether procreative acts harm future resultant children again 
becomes a matter of moral luck.  
 
4.3.2 Procreation as necessarily harmful    
 
The above discussion has aimed to show that procreative autonomy is not absolute 
or inviolable, that is, that if children who are born as a result of their parents’ 
procreative choices feel harmed by those choices, it is not enough to say that 
parents have a moral right to procreative autonomy. Rather, the harms that might 
result from such procreation need to be taken seriously – precisely because they 
may be conditions which conflict with the autonomous wills of these children. In this 
way, the matter becomes a clash of wills. That is, that the parents willed to procreate 
and rear a child, but the child who is born as a result may not will to exist, or will to 
exist in X or Y condition.  
 
We, therefore, seem to have a pragmatic problem. If all harm is subjective, then how 




harm that would befall the parents who want to have a child if they were not allowed 
to procreate? I would like to consider one way in which we may possibly get around 
such a problem. That is, by acknowledging certain moral presumptions, such as the 
presumption that coming into existence is always or necessarily harmful or at least 
always or necessarily risky. Shiffrin, for instance, argues that “procreation is a 
morally hazardous activity [and] in all cases ... imposes significant risks and burdens 
upon the children who result” (1999: 137, own emphasis). In her opinion, acts of 
procreation always have the potential to bring with them unconsented to harms. In 
this regard, she says that: 
 
By being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume moral 
agency, to face various demanding and sometimes wrenching moral questions ... 
They must endure the fairly substantial amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, 
significant disappointment, distress, and significant loss that occurs with a typical 
life. They must face and undergo the fear and harm of death. Finally, they must 
bear the results of imposed risks that their lives may go terribly wrong in a variety 
of ways (1999: 137). 
 
In response to this, it is usually argued that although procreation necessarily 
imposes harms, it also necessarily imposes or results in benefits, i.e. the benefits of 
life. Because it simultaneously imposes benefits, it is usually argued that the child, 
who at the time cannot consent, would have consented were he or she able to. In 
other words, one could rely on hypothetical consent to justify the conduct of the 
parents in procreating by saying that existence necessarily imposes benefits which 
outweigh the harms of existence. In this way, the presumption is that every person 
wants to come into existence to receive these benefits and that procreation is 
therefore a morally innocent endeavour.  
 
Perhaps, however, the presumption should work the other way around. In this 
regard, recall Shiffrin’s distinction, mentioned in Chapter 2, between actions 
necessary to bestow a benefit and actions necessary to avert a harm. Recall that for 
Shiffrin, imposing a harm upon a non-consenting individual is only permissible if it is 
necessary to avoid a greater harm. In the case of procreation, however, says 




avert” (1999: 138). If there is no harm to avert, then the conduct cannot be justified 
on the basis of hypothetical consent because “it is impermissible for one to impose ... 
harm upon an unconsenting individual purely for the sake of granting that individual 
benefits” (Singh 2012: 104).  
 
Shiffrin’s argument is similar to David Benatar’s anti-natal argument in substance in 
that they both rely on the asymmetry between harms and benefits. For Benatar 
(2006), coming into existence is always or necessarily harmful because it creates a 
situation whereby a person will have to endure the harms of existence. If that same 
person had not existed, he or she would only have been deprived of a benefit, which 
is less morally problematic than being harmed. Therefore, according to Benatar, 
procreation is always morally impermissible. Shiffrin makes a similar claim to 
Benatar, but her argument is built upon or grounded in the importance of consent 
and autonomy. That is, that it is only impermissible, according to Shiffrin, to impose 
harm purely for the sake of bestowing benefits on unconsenting individuals. For 
Benatar, by contrast, consenting to the harms of existence after the fact matters little 
and does not take away from the harm in coming into existence. In fact, Benatar 
argues that our consent is misguided in any event and amounts to a sort of 
unreliable adaptive preference similar to that which was discussed in Chapter 2 
(Benatar 2006: 64-68). By contrast, on Shiffrin’s account, if a person were to consent 
to their existence after the fact then they have suffered no harm, precisely because 
consent renders a potentially harmful event non-harmful on Shiffrin’s account.  
 
If we drive Shiffrin’s argument to its ultimate conclusion, we can therefore say that 
Shiffrin does not actually ascribe to the argument that procreation is always immoral 
in the way that Benatar does. Rather, procreation is only immoral, on Shiffrin’s 
account, if that procreation results in the existence of a person who takes his or her 
existence to be a harmful condition. Whether the parents’ act of procreation causes 
harm to their child would depend upon the particular child’s subjective evaluation of 
his or her existence. Therefore, whether acts of procreation harm resultant children 
again becomes a matter of moral luck in the same way that the negligent medical 
practitioner’s act is a matter of moral luck. Procreation is therefore a morally risky or 




presumption in favour of nonexistence, as Benatar does, if we take the subjective 
nature of harm seriously.  
 
4.3.3 Implications  
 
To summarise the discussion so far, the following remarks bear mentioning. We 
started out by noting that procreative autonomy is not absolute or inviolable. We also 
briefly touched on arguments in favour of moral duties for parents in relation to their 
unborn children. These are, for instance, that parents may have an obligation to 
provide a minimally decent life for their offspring, or that they may have an obligation 
to ensure that the child with the best chance of life comes into existence. We then 
looked at whether procreation might actually be inherently or necessarily harmful, as 
Benatar argues. Here, however, we found that the account of harm which I have 
developed throughout this thesis would never accord with such a position. That is, if 
harm is an entirely subjective matter, then there can be no such thing as a minimally 
decent life or, by the same token, a necessarily harmful life. This implies that children 
who are born into existences which most would take to be harmful are actually only 
harmed if the particular children themselves feel harmed by coming into existence. 
By the same token, children who are born into ‘good lives’ can still legitimately claim 
that they feel harmed by their existence, for all sorts of other reasons.  
 
In light of the above, the concern that the wrongful life action may lead to a slippery 
slope in which children will utilise the action to claim against their parents for virtually 
any aspect of existence seems to be quite salient if we follow a subjective account of 
harm, such as that which I have advocated for in this thesis. My argument would 
seem to imply, for instance, that a child born of a particular race who feels harmed 
by being that particular race should have a valid claim against his or her parents. My 
argument therefore seems to ‘fly in the face’ of the commonly accepted view that 
people should accept their lot in life, or that persons should accept the unchangeable 
characteristics of their existence. In other words, my argument seems to imply that 
parents could be culpable vis-á-vis their children if they bring children into the world 
who take their existences to be harmful by virtue of certain unchangeable conditions 




to actually take seriously all accusations or claims of harm, including the claims of 
adults who feel harmed by situations that most would not regard to be harmful. That 
is, are moral agents obliged to take seriously the moral patient’s accusations of 
harm, even if other moral agents do not take the moral patient’s ascription of harm to 
be genuinely harmful, or if the collective body of moral agents do not take that claim 
seriously? This can be conceptualised as the problem of ‘trivial harms’.  
 
For example, suppose that the entire world decides to ban the burka. Islamic women 
who protest in response will likely be met with the claim that banning the burka 
causes them no harm and that it actually benefits them. The arguments made in this 
thesis, however, imply that we harm these women if they subjectively feel harmed by 
the burka ban. That is, that even though the burka ban is meant to ensure what is 
generally considered to be an objectively better life for these women, it ends up 
causing them harm. The account of harm developed in this thesis would seem to 
imply that the harm claims of Islamic women in relation to a possible burka ban 
would need to be taken very seriously, even though it may seem to be a trivial harm 
to objective observers. In the same way, the claims of children who feel harmed by 
their existence, even though, objectively speaking, they may have been born into a 
‘good’ existence, also need to be taken seriously by other moral agents, including 
their parents.  
 
Some may find this untenable. Suppose, for example, that a child sues his or her 
middle-class parents on account of them not being wealthy enough and thereby 
putting him or her at a disadvantage compared to her rich peers. At first blush, this 
may seem absurd. But why does it sound absurd? In other words, what are the 
implicit arguments being made here? Firstly, there is the argument that the parents 
brought the child into existence, causing or allowing for him or her to experience the 
benefits of life, which outweigh the harms, and they therefore cannot be culpable. 
However, we have seen from the discussion in 4.3.2 that this argument fails. That is, 
because it is morally impermissible to impose harm upon an unconsenting individual 
purely for the sake of bestowing benefits. Parents are, therefore, perfectly capable of 





A possible second argument for why my argument may be untenable is that it would 
allow for unnecessary and emotionally-straining litigation within families. It may be 
difficult to conceptualise how these families would go from the court room back to 
their homes and carry on with their normal lives, after parents have been accused of 
having imposed harmful conditions on their children. I would like to suggest, in 
response to this concern, however, that this is not foreign territory. Custody disputes 
take place in a very similar context, and the possible harm experienced by existing in 
certain conditions is an issue before the court.  
 
Continuing with an exposition of the practicalities of the arguments under 
consideration, I would like to mention one tentative suggestion for how litigation 
against parents could be limited. Recall Feinberg’s distinction between different sorts 
of interests – such as welfare interests (such as food and water and other basic 
necessities) and ulterior interests (such as higher order life goals). Perhaps only 
subjective harms in respect of welfare interests should be taken seriously, and not 
harms in respect of ulterior interests. On this basis, the claim of the child that sues 
his or her middle-class parents on account of them not being wealthy enough, 
should, perhaps, only be taken seriously if it is based on a welfare interest (such as 
not having enough money to buy food with adequate nutrition) and not on an ulterior 
interest (such as not having enough money to go to the most expensive art school in 
satisfaction of a desire to become an artist).  
 
To conclude, then, the concern that the wrongful life action would be utilised by 
persons or by children who feel harmed by certain conditions which are not 
objectively harmful is not a genuine concern, on my account, as we indeed ought to 
take subjective perceptions of harm seriously. I have, furthermore, mentioned some 
practical ways in which this may be qualified, practically.   
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has examined two policy arguments against the wrongful life action. 
The first policy argument which was examined is the argument that the wrongful life 




considered, firstly whether the wrongful life action expresses a message that 
disabled lives are not worthwhile. Here, I argued that that disability is identity 
constituting and that the wrongful life action therefore may very well express such a 
message. However, and secondly, I tried to show that the wrongful life action does 
not have the capacity to perpetuate or increase discrimination against disabled 
persons. Instead, I tried to show that the wrongful life action could be viewed as an 
ethical tool which addresses the social inequality and discrimination experienced by 
disabled persons. That is, that compensating disabled persons who take their 
disabilities to be harmful can be viewed as a form of positive accommodation which 
recognises their particularity and difference and thereby their worth and dignity.  
 
The second policy argument which this chapter examined is the argument that the 
wrongful life claim would lead to a slippery slope, and more specifically, that it would 
be used by children who feel harmed by their existences to claim against their 
parents. In addressing this argument, we started with an examination of the right to 
procreative autonomy and ultimately concluded that this right is not absolute, in that 
there exist sophisticated moral principles – such as procreative responsibility and 
procreative beneficence – which should guide our procreative endeavours. We then 
looked at the claim that perhaps all procreation is harmful, and not just procreation 
whereby parents do not take into account the welfare of the children who will result. 
In this context, however, we found that if harm is necessarily subjective in nature, 
then this cannot be true. That is, the ‘harmful’ aspects of existence (which those 
such as Benatar argue to befall each and every one of us in coming into existence) 
are not necessarily harmful. In other words, it is only if the particular person who 
exists experiences their existence as harmful, that existence could be harmful for 
that person. This also implies, by the same token, that we should take all harm 
claims seriously, even if they do not fall within the ambit of what is commonly or 
objectively taken to be harmful. I therefore conclude that the policy arguments 











This thesis has examined the wrongful life delictual action. It was shown that the 
action is both legally and morally controversial, primarily because of the fact that the 
wrongful life plaintiff’s harm is not easily accommodated within our existing delictual 
law paradigm. In Chapter 2, however, it was shown that the existing account of harm 
that the delictual law paradigm adopts is actually a problematic account of harm by 
virtue of the fact that it does not accommodate our intuitions regarding which things 
are harmful and which are not. It was shown that the counterfactual comparative 
account of harm leads to the wrong results in cases of pre-emptive harms; omissions 
and failures to benefit; and in the case of future persons whose existences are tied to 
our acts. I tried to show that non-comparative notions of harm can account for what 
is intuitively harmful about harm more satisfactorily than comparative accounts can. I 
also tried to show that Shiffrin’s account is the best account we have on offer 
because it is unified and has good explanatory power.  
 
Echoing Shiffrin’s account of harm, I tried to show that what is harmful about harm is 
that it causes a subjective usurping of one’s will. I also tried to show that this need 
not be immediate and that it can occur after the fact. Therefore, even though the 
wrongful life plaintiff was not a person with a will at the time at which the medical 
practitioner acts (because he or she was in utero), once he or she is older and has a 
more developed will, and once the subjective effects of his or her disability can be 
appreciated, he or she can be said to be harmed. The harm paradox within the 
wrongful life action therefore resolves itself, and in light of this, the wrongful life 
action becomes necessary to redress or rectify the harm which may be experienced 
by the wrongful life plaintiff.  
 
Turning to the discussion on disability in Chapter 3, however, I tried to show that 
disability is not necessarily or inherently harmful, and that whether a particular 
disability could be considered harmful depends upon a complex interaction between 
biological impairment, the social environment in which the disabled person finds him 
or herself, as well as, and most importantly, the disabled person’s subjective 
experience of the disability. I also tried to show that in light of this, it is of the utmost 




their disabilities. Because of this, and in order to protect the integrity of the wrongful 
life action, it should only be available to persons who experience their disability as a 
harm, and this harm should be voiced from within the disabled community. This 
naturally leaves out disabled persons who are severely intellectually disabled such 
that they cannot communicate their wills. The discussion in Chapter 3, however, 
shows that this is a necessary limitation. When able-bodied persons transpose able-
bodied, medicalised understandings of disability onto the disabled experience of 
disabled persons, it may be a form of harm in and of itself. It is, therefore, of the 
utmost normative importance that we guard against this. There is furthermore no 
reliable way, in any event, to ascertain whether a disabled person who cannot 
communicate experiences their particular disability as a harm. Notwithstanding this, 
however, the wrongful birth action would still be available to parents of disabled 
children who cannot communicate that they feel harmed by their disabilities. 
Moreover, society ought to provide better positive accommodation for those with 
disabilities, which may attenuate the possible harms which they experience as a 
result of their disabilities but which they cannot communicate.  
 
This thesis also tried to show that the wrongful life action passes muster against two 
important policy arguments. The first policy argument is that the action may 
discriminate against disabled persons by perpetuating the social inequality 
experienced by disabled persons. I tried to show, on the contrary, that the wrongful 
life action, by providing very necessary monetary compensation, can have the effect 
that it actually affirms the dignity of disabled persons and becomes a means of 
positive accommodation in and of itself. This is because the monetary award has the 
effect that it recognises the difference and particularity of the disabled person, as a 
person with unique particular needs. We also saw that this can even be 
conceptualised as the fulfilment of a socio-economic right. 
 
We then turned towards the second argument from policy; that is, the generally 
accepted view that if the wrongful life action is permitted, it should only be available 
to persons who are born into a disabled state due to the negligence of a medical 
practitioner and not also to persons who are born into unsuitable or inhospitable 
conditions as a result of their parents’ choices. In this regard, however, I tried to 




procreation always carries at least the risk of harm. This is because unconsented to 
harms can never be attenuated by the fact that procreation also imposes benefits on 
children because, following Shiffrin, unconsented to harms are only morally 
permissible if they are intended to alleviate greater harms. Procreation does not 
have this effect. Because of the subjective nature of harm, however, procreation 
cannot be said to be inherently immoral, as it is only immoral should a person result 
who feels harmed by his or her existence. In this way, procreation only risks harm. 
We are also obligated to take these claims seriously, as I have argued. 
 
As a last note, it should be kept in mind that the arguments made in this thesis have 
largely been in service of refuting the moral or ethical argument against the wrongful 
life action. This argument entails that allowing a wrongful life claim would be 
analogous to holding a rescuer liable for injuries that they caused to an endangered 
person whilst rescuing him or her. I have tried to show that this argument fails 
because it gives little to no recognition to the subjective nature of harm, in that what 
is harmful about harm is not that it renders a person objectively worse off, but rather 
that it produces a condition which conflicts with his or her will, and thereby a harmful 
condition. It might be argued, in response, that even though this might make sense 
from a moral or ethical point of view, it would not translate well into legal practice. 
More specifically, if harm is both subjective as well as non-comparative in nature, 
then judges who have to adjudicate these things may have a difficult task in 
calculating damages in that there is no objective point of reference to work from. In 
response to this concern, I would like to make the following three brief remarks.  
 
Firstly, this concern speaks to a much larger philosophical problem regarding the 
relationship between morality and the law, a concern which I have not attempted to 
address here. My project merely serves to draw attention to the fact that there is a 
problematic deviation between the way that harm is conceptualised and applied 
within the legal sphere, and the way that our intuitions surrounding harmfulness 
work.. Addressing or remedying this deviation, however, is not part of the scope of 
this thesis, although it may be a particularly interesting area for future research.  
 
Secondly, it bears mention that there are many instances within delictual law where 




a few and to echo the remarks of DCJ Moseneke in Van der Merwe v Road Accident 
Fund,79 there are many causes of action that are based on infringements of rights 
where the very infringement is a subjective infringement, and, we could therefore 
argue, a subjective harm. The examples of infringements of dignity, reputation, 
identity and privacy for instance make this clear. In these instances, the harm which 
is suffered by the plaintiff is largely subjective. For example, what one person may 
experience as an infringement upon their dignity, another person might not 
experience as an infringement upon their dignity. The same can be said in the 
context of reputation, identity and privacy. 80 Courts, however, award damages in all 
of these instances.  
 
Besides these personality infringements, however, courts have also awarded 
damages for instances of chronic pain where there is no accompanying objective or 
overt physical complication. The causal enquiry, in this instance, becomes more of a 
credibility enquiry in that the court is tasked with deciding whether the plaintiff, based 
on his or her own evidence and testimony as well as on his or her evidence given in 
cross-examination, has made a convincing claim. If the plaintiff is found to be 
credible, then the court accepts his or her subjective evidence of the chronic pain as 
fact and awards damages. The credibility of the plaintiff’s claims, moreover, can 
often be reinforced by corroborating evidence given by mental health practitioners 
and by friends and family who are close to the plaintiff.  
 
Lastly, I would like to mention one particular delictual case in which the subjective 
nature of harm was not only acknowledged but where a previous damages award 
was actually reduced in light of the fact that a large portion of the plaintiff’s harm was 
not subjectively experienced. This is the case of Sigournay v Gillbanks.81 In this 
case, the plaintiff was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff’s 
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injuries included an injury to the eye, the collar bone, the ribs and a brain injury.82 
The plaintiff claimed damages under a variety of heads, one of them being pain and 
suffering, and was awarded a large sum of damages in the trial court under this 
head. On appeal, however, one of the issues was whether the plaintiff was awarded 
too large an amount of money by the trial court for pain and suffering. The appeal 
court was concerned with the fact that a large portion of the pain which the plaintiff 
had suffered was not consciously or subjectively experienced in light of the fact that 
he was in a coma for a substantial period of time. On appeal, the majority ruled that 
“most of what might have been excruciating pain was not pain for the plaintiff”83 and 
that the award in respect of pain and suffering should therefore be reduced to reflect 
the pain and suffering that he subjectively experienced.  
 
The point of the above remarks is to note that the concept of general damages within 
delictual law is largely based on subjective experience in any event. In light of this, 
how to conceptualise legal harm as subjective harm becomes less of a challenge 
than it may initially seem, although the intricacies of how this might work would need 
to be properly fleshed out.   
 
As a final note, it may be interesting to note what future areas of research are 
opened up by the arguments made in this thesis. I would like to conclude this thesis 
by mentioning just two. Firstly, I noted a few times that whether the negligent medical 
practitioner causes the disabled child harm would become a matter of moral luck. I 
also noted that whether parents can be said to harm their child, by their act of 
procreation, is also a matter of moral luck. This is because at the precise time that 
the medical practitioner or the parents act, there is no child with a will which can be 
usurped. The will develops later, and it is at this point in time that harm may or may 
not set in. It may be interesting to investigate what implications this might hold for our 
concept of harm in general and especially so in relation to the blameworthiness or 
accountability aspect of harm. I mentioned earlier that this thesis was not concerned 
with the accountability or blameworthiness aspect, but it may be interesting to 
analyse what implications moral luck could have in that context. For example, if 
certain acts or events only risk harm, are they less blameworthy?  
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Secondly, my argument seems to problematise the generally accepted view of or 
relationship between harm and non-benefits. That is, if harms are the sorts of things 
that result in the alienation of a person from his or her will, then failures to benefit 
seem to qualify as harms as well. That is, because failing to receive a benefit could 
also conflict with or alienate a person from his or her will. If there is no moral 
difference between actively causing a subjective usurping of the will and inactively or 
indirectly allowing a subjective usurping of the will to come about (i.e. failing to 
benefit) then it seems to imply that failures to benefit should be taken seriously by 
moral agents. I noted earlier that this may have interesting implications in the context 
of, for example, human enhancement, but it would be interesting to consider what 
further implications this might hold in other contexts or for our conception of harm in 
general.  
 
Lastly, it bears mention that accepting the account of harm developed in this thesis 
might imply that only certain kinds of beings could be harmed - being autonomous 
beings that have wills, and are able to express those wills, or who are at least 
capable of developing a will which can be expressed (and can then be retroactively 
harmed). There may be an argument to make that my account of harm, therefore, 
violates what Bradley termed ‘ontological neutrality’ because in conceptualising harm 
in the way that I have, many sorts of beings may be excluded as victims of harm 
(2012: 400). I mentioned, and accepted, in Chapter 2 for example, that my account 
of harm entails that those who are unable to ever develop an autonomous will can 
never be harmed, and thereby excluded persons who are severely intellectually 
disabled to the point where they cannot communicate from the ambit of the wrongful 
life remedy. I tried to show, however, that this was a necessary limitation in order to 
protect the integrity of the wrongful life action and save it from the charge that it 
presupposes that all disabled lives are miserable lives. 
 
A particularly interesting question which arises, in light of my qualification that harm 
needs to be subjectively experienced and capable of expression, is whether animals 
can be harmed. Rabenberg (2015: 3), for instance, says that a subjective account of 
harm would exclude animals from the ambit of harm. Bradley (2012: 395), 
furthermore, says that “an analysis that entails that dogs ... cannot be harmed must 




the writing of this thesis, although not having explicitly addressed it anywhere.84 In 
concluding this thesis, I would like to make two very tentative suggestions as to how 
this sentiment may be incorporated into a subjective account of harm.  
 
Firstly, it could be argued that different kinds of beings are harmed in different ways, 
and thereby accept that there are, in fact, ontological differences in our concept of 
harm. Shiffrin (2012: 359), for instance, briefly touches on this in stating the 
following: 
 
Harm’, I freely concede, has a diverse range of ordinary language applications. 
Probably no account could comfortably and meaningfully accommodate all these 
uses. ‘Harm’ can be used to signify damage pure and simple ... we may that a 
plant is harmed when its leaves are stripped or an insect is harmed when its 
antennae are torn; here we point to an extended sort of damage or interruption of 
life function. I do not mean to address these sorts of harm. Rather, I mean to try 
to isolate a core notion of ahrm to individuals that justifiably occupies a 
prominent place in normative theory. (own emphasis) 
 
Shiffrin, therefore, seems to accept that only human beings are the subjects of the 
account of harm which she develops. Plants, as well as animals, however, may be 
harmed in other ways that are not based on any notion of a usurpation of a 
conscious subject’s will. I am unsure, at this stage, whether I agree with this, but my 
hesitation also seems to beg the question of why it is necessary that human beings 
and animals, or plants, must share the same sense of harm or experience/suffer 
harm in the same way.   
 
Secondly, and lastly, if we accept that harm must be universal and ontologically 
neutral, there may be ways in which to incorporate plants and animals into the 
account of harm developed in this thesis. On the one hand, we could accept that 
plants and animals do have wills, in the same way that we do. Another way in which 
to conceptualise this, is to say that our ‘wills’ are not uniquely human and are, rather, 
developed on the back of universal survival mechanisms, shared by all things which 
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are ‘alive’. This is probably more acceptable in the case of animals, who very clearly 
show fear, pain and anguish in response to certain stimuli and harmful acts, in the 
same ways that human beings do, which can be seen as expressions of the fact that 
the event taking place is not one which is welcomed or wanted. The same argument 
can be made in the context of plants, but it is less strong. To mention one example, 
there have been reports that trees are able to slightly adjust their physical position 
and rotate their branches in service of moving as far as possible (microscopically 
from our perspective of course) from deforesters. Again, this can possibly be seen as 
an expression of a will against being cut down and having to encounter death, which 
is of course a universal harm to all living beings, unless welcomed (as I have 
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